The People Have Spoken: Emerging consensus from the grassroots consultations on the drivers of crises in South Sudan

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List of Acronyms
ARCSS – Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan
AU - African Union
CES – Central Equatoria State
CID – Criminal Investigation Department
CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CTSAMM – Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism
EES - Eastern Equatoria State
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DM - Democratic Movement
FG – Focus Group
HQS – Headquarters
IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JAIRO - Justice, Accountability, Inclusivity, Responsibility, and Openness
JCE - Jieng Council of Elders
JS – Jonglei State
KPA - Khartoum Peace Agreement
LCs- Letters of Credit
LS- Lakes State
MI – Military Intelligence
MP – Member of Parliament
NASS – National Salvation Front
NBeG – Northern Bhar El Ghazal
NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations
NDS- National Development Strategy
NSS- National Security Service
PAS - Public Address System
PHC – Primary Health Care
PHCU – Primary Healthcare Unit
PIP - Public Investment Program
RDFs/RDCs - Regional Dialogue Forums/Conferences
SPLM/A – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A (IO) -Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army -In Opposition
SSND- South Sudan National Dialogue
SSP - South Sudan Pound
TGoNU – Transitional Government of National Unity of South Sudan
UNS - Unity State
UNDP - United Nations Development Program
UNMISS - United Nations Mission in South Sudan
US - Unity State
USD – United States of America Dollar
WES- Western Equatoria
WBeG – Western Bhar El Ghazal
Introduction

This document – **The People Have Spoken** - presents, to the Regional Dialogue Forums/Conferences (RDFs/RDCs), a summary of the main themes that have emerged from the grassroots consultations. Each of the fifteen Subcommittees had made presentation of its own report to the Second Session of the Plenary of the South Sudan National Dialogue (SSND) Steering Committee. The reports of the fifteen Subcommittees have been approved by the Steering Committee and subsequently edited and they are an integral part of the overall documentation of the SSND. These reports are available for the delegates to the RDFs/RDCs to read and ascertain the accuracy of this summary report. The summary has been prepared by the National Secretariat of the SSND to assist the delegates to deliberate on the views of the people of South Sudan at the grassroots level about what they think to be the root causes of the crises of governance and leadership in the country.

The summary or what the Steering Committee has decided to call: The People Have Spoken is divided into three main parts. Part One summarizes the issues emerging from the reports of the Subcommittees, which are grouped into four main clusters: **1) governance; 2) security; 3) economy; and 4) social cohesion.** Part Two is a farther articulation of the four emerging clusters through technical notes. And Part Three presents highlights of issues debated at the level of the fifteen subcommittees, which have consulted all the stakeholders at the grassroots level, refugee camps, national capital Juba, and organized forces.
Part One: Clusters of Emerging Issues That Contributed to The Root Causes of The Conflict in South Sudan

This part of Document Three provides a brief discussion of the four clusters each of which is given below. That is, the root causes of the crises facing South Sudan as reported in Part Three of this document have been grouped under four clusters.

I. Governance Cluster

A comprehensive definition of governance is needed here to contextualize emerging issues under this cluster:¹

[The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. (2003:3).]

A careful reading of the reports of the Subcommittees reveals that participants at the grassroots consultations have in fact identified the key elements in the above definition. Moreover, this definition essentially tells us that, for South Sudan to achieve political stability, the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised must be inclusive: that is to say, the reform process must include the traditions and institutions of all the stakeholders (e.g. ethnicities/tribes); so as to ensure better governance at all levels relative to the one, which contributed to the violent conflict on 15 December 2013 and 8 July 2016. An important point to note here is that institutions are a critical component of governance, but not synonymous with it. To put it in other terms, governance is an outcome (a product in an economic sense), while institutions and capacity are inputs (factors of production) necessary for its production. Good and effective governance is then to be viewed as a function of quality institutions and robust capacities for policy formulation and implementation.

Before getting a sample of views on governance from fifteen Subcommittees, it is relevant to introduce here the six components (indices) of governance as derived from the best international practices:

1. Voice and accountability;
2. Political stability and absence of violence;
3. Government effectiveness;
4. Regulatory quality;
5. Rule of law; and
6. Control of corruption.

Here is what each of the twelve Regional Subcommittees plus Refugees and International Outreach; Security; and HQs Subcommittees have reported on governance.

1.1 Refugees and International Outreach Subcommittee

These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

¹ See http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/Kaufmann.
1. The President to step aside voluntarily;
2. Inclusivity of political parties in the National Dialogue process;
3. Voices of activists and media should be free and heard;
4. Strengthening the constitution;
5. Tightening the measures against corruption in the country; and
6. Transparency, accountability, and integrity.

1.2 Western Bahr el-Ghazal Subcommittee
These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Demand for an independent state called Raga State;
2. Regaining of Kafia Kenge, Hufra Nahas, Rodom and others to the administration of the Republic of South Sudan;
3. Stoppage of marginalization in all forms against the people of Raga;
4. Facilitation of the process of obtaining South Sudan nationality to the citizen of Raga;
5. Demand for the federal system of government;
6. Inclusion of names of some tribes in Raga to the list of sixty-four (64) tribes of South Sudan; and
7. Inclusivity and equitable distribution of powers at the federal level.

1.3 Northern Bahr el-Ghazal Subcommittee
These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Lack of respect for the rule of law and constitutionalism;
2. Lack of good governance characterized by weak institutions of accountability and transparency;
3. Power struggle;
4. Loss of vision and unclear priorities;
5. Creation of more states;
6. Political differences in the SPLM are responsible for the crises in the country;
7. SPLM is being hijacked by strangers;
8. Division and grouping in the SPLM;
9. Lack of political will to follow through with treaties the country signed;
10. Weak diplomacy and lack of a well-defined foreign policy;
11. No democracy to conduct timely elections; and
12. Borders encroachment by the neighboring countries.

1.4 Upper Nile Subcommittee
These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Power struggle among the politicians;
2. Lack of accountability;
3. Lack of the rule of law;
4. Divisive policies used by the government;
5. Administrative failure and poor governance;
6. Tribalism and nepotism practiced by politicians;
7. Unfair distribution of national resources;
8. Marginalization of some communities;
9. Rewarding the rebels with high political and military positions;
10. Land and border disputes;
11. Creation of more states in the country was one recurring issue in many consultative meetings as the engine of the conflict in the area;
12. Cattle rustling/raiding;
13. The politicians inciting the citizens against each other; and
14. Lack of service delivery to the citizens.

1.5 Central Equatoria Subcommittee
These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Tribalism has become the main source of conflict in South Sudan that has affected the whole country as reflected: a) in tribal army so call Mathiang Anyor, are seen as the main source of conflict in Yei River State and in other parts of Central Equatoria, for example Bongo and Lobonok in Jubek state; and b) The Jieng Council of Elders is accused of being the main contributor to all the conflicts in South Sudan.
2. Power struggle has also become the main source of conflict in South Sudan.
3. Pastoralists are seen as the main source of conflicts in former Central Equatoria State, particularly in Yei River State.
4. Corruption: Most government officials are corrupt and steal from public funds, but they are not accountable for their actions.
5. Land has become a big problem in former Central Equatoria State and needs serious intervention from the national government.
6. Borders: Issues of borders between Terekeka and Bor, Terekeka and Jubek are seen in Terekeka State as serious enough problems to warrant intervention from Central Government.

1.6 Eastern Equatoria Subcommittee
These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Rivalry between the two major “tribes;”
2. Corruption;
3. Jieng Council of Elders (JCE);
4. Lack of representation of all the ethnic groups;
5. Federal system of governance;
6. Tribalism and nepotism;
7. Rotational and collegial presidency;
8. Creation of more states has compounded the crisis;
9. Lack of transparency and accountability;
10. Cattle destroying farmlands;
11. Governance by Presidential decrees is not popular with the people at the grassroots level;
12. Land tenure;
13. Failure to deliver basic services;
14. Weak political institutions;
15. Weak institutions of the public sector;
16. Absence of permanent constitution; and
17. Media access is limited.
1.7 **Western Equatoria Subcommittee**

These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Tribalism and nepotism;
2. Failure to deliver basic services;
3. Absence of the rule of law;
4. Marginalization of traditional authority;
5. Corruption and mismanagement;
6. Lack of transparency and accountability;
7. Creation of more states has brought new problems;
8. Women and youth are marginalized;
9. Lack of regular grassroots consultations;
10. Federalism;
11. Old politicians should retire from active politics;
12. Weak institutions;
13. Army composition does not reflect South Sudanese national character; and

1.8 **Warrap Subcommittee**

These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Power struggle;
2. Crisis within the SPLM ruling party;
3. Weak political institutions;
4. Tribal-based politics;
5. Lack of a clear vision;
6. Weak institutions of governance at all levels (i.e. federal and state);
7. Dysfunctional federal system;
8. Lack of transparency and accountability;
9. Too much decentralization at the expense of national unity;
10. Concentration of powers in one person;
11. Corruption, nepotism and tribalism;
12. Relocate national capital from Juba to Ramciel; and
13. Land tenure.

1.9 **Unity Subcommittee**

These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. No respect for law;
2. No separation of the army and politics;
3. Tribalism that breeds corruption and nepotism;
4. No accountability and transparency;
5. No application of technocracy;
6. Presence of lobbyist and gossips around the President;
7. Lack of loyalty, of patriotism and nationalism;
8. South Sudan is mixing many world ideas;
9. Frequent reshuffling causes frequent rebellions;
10. SPLM leadership is enriching itself;
11. No fair distribution of the resources;
12. No equality;
13. No room given to the political parties;
14. No clear limit of the term of office; and
15. Weak institutions.

1.10 Lakes Subcommittee
These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Power struggle;
2. Crisis within the SPLM ruling party;
3. Weak political institutions, especially within political parties;
4. Tribal-based political parties;
14. Lack of respect for the rule of law;
15. Lack of relevant laws to cater for traditional laws and norms;
16. Lack of transparency and accountability;
17. Federalism cannot be sustained financially;
18. Lack of strong bases for creating more states and counties;
19. Weak institutions of governance;
20. Payam and Boma administrators should be professionals and not political appointees;
21. Too much powers in the hands of the President;
22. Corruption, nepotism and tribalism;
23. Relocate the capital to Ramciel to solve problems of land in Juba;
24. Frequent changes of governors of the States are disruptive; and
25. Land tenure.

1.11 Jonglei Subcommittee
These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Duplication of rules, laws and policies adopted from foreign countries by the Republic of South Sudan are not consistent with our conditions;
2. Corruption;
3. Bad Governance;
4. Child abduction and cattle rustling; and

1.12 Pibor Administrative Area Subcommittee
These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Change of government through ballot boxes in general elections.
2. The cabinet at the national level does not reflect the 64 ethnic groups of South Sudan.
3. Ministers once appointed stay there for life and don’t even want to give chance to others.
4. Party procedures are not being followed when appointing people in political positions, nepotism and tribalism is the major practice.
5. There should be two terms limit for the President (5+5).
6. Random arrests of the people by national security in Juba induces fear.
7. Before the President issue decree he usually consult Jieng Council of Elders.
8. Stop Rewarding rebellion with high ranks and positions.
9. The appointment by the President using his 5 percent of MPs who have failed in the general elections is bad.
10. Currently one constituency has more than two MPs in the Transitional National Legislative Assembly.

11. Change of Governor every four or six months create instability in the state, the Governor cannot implement his programs.

12. Change of governorship must be done through consultations in with the citizens of the concern state.

13. Demand for the federal system in South Sudan.

14. Review the Political Parties Act to reduce the number of political parties in South Sudan

15. People support 32 states plus Abyei.

16. Disagreement among the senior members of the SPLM in 2013 is the root cause of this conflict in the country.

17. Reunification of the SPLM would be part of the conflict resolution in South Sudan,

18. Other groups want to take advantage of the SPLM divisions.

19. Former Cobra Agreement of 2014 has not been fully implemented,

20. National wealth is not equitably shared as a result of which there are no development activities since independence, no schools, no hospitals, no agricultural projects, and no Telecommunications network.


22. Anyuak communities have problems with their neighbors over land issues.

23. The Government should look into Ethiopia encroaching into South Sudan territory.

24. The President of the Republic to come from minority tribes next time.

25. The interim period should be 2 to 3 years to prepare for general elections.

26. Separation of power between the three organs: Executive, Legislature and Judiciary in the Country.

27. Local borders demarcation to stop organized-crimes from county to county, state to state and the national level.


1.13 Abyei Subcommittee

These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:

1. Inequitable power and resource sharing (breeds sentiment of injustice, hence, leads to conflict).

2. Constitutional challenges.

3. Weak bureaucratic institutions.

4. Absence of the rule of Law, which induces corruption practices, nepotism, and economic crimes committed against the country.

5. Lack of transparency and accountability.


1.14 Security Subcommittee

These were no per se grassroots consultations, but rather with the organized forces in Juba. These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:
1. SPLM struggle over leadership, and issues of government corruption and lack of accountability.
2. Intentional deviation from the Constitution of the SPLM party and electoral primary system guiding rules led to indiscipline in the party. The same scenario occurs in other political parties.
3. The government reshuffle in July 2013 and SPLM National Liberation Council discussion on reform document generated anger among the SPLM members, which led to December 2013 coup attempt and rebellions.
4. SPLM’s loss of direction undermines the development of the spirit of nationalism and unity.
5. Weak political parties in the country.
6. Lack of political will to resolve conflicts.
7. Selection/Appointment of semi-illiterates to the parliament based on mere representation.
8. Monopoly/combination of executive and legislative powers in one person.
9. Information breakdown between MPs and their constituencies.
10. Lack of clear vision and grand strategy.
11. Weak institutions.
12. Appointment based on nepotism and favoritism.
13. Re-structuring of states after popular consultation.
14. Misinterpretation of decentralized governing system, including localization of government administrators.
15. Weak foreign policy.
16. Weak judiciary system.
17. Interference of the executive in the judiciary system.
18. Weak law enforcement agencies.

1.15 National Capital (HQs) Subcommittee
These are the issues under the Governance Cluster:
1. Power struggle in the ruling SPLM party led to 2013 & 2016 conflict.
2. Scramble for political power right after the independence, 2011.
3. SPLM as a party being synonymous with SPLA (militarization of the system) that weakens the democratic system operations in the country.
4. Weak political parties structures have affected democracy functioning in the country & unity of its people.
5. Lack of separation of powers between three arms of government: Executive, Legislative & Judiciary.
6. Failure to develop South Sudan identity after independent, 2011.
7. The president & state leaders mostly don’t honor the country’s constitution & laws.
8. Leaders lack political will.
9. Lack of nation’s ideology and vision to govern the country after independence in 2011.
10. The loss of national visionary of our hero late Dr. John Garang.
11. Culture of greed, selfishness & ignorance of political leaders set the country to current suffering and mess.
12. Elected government (Executive &Assembly) officials neglect electorates or constituencies.
13. Elected Legislators & Governors are mostly appointed and relieved by Decrees.
14. Poor leadership in the country (the current President is unable to deliver).
15. Rebellion is always rewarded.
16. ARCISS gives power only to certain regional groups who took up arms while ignore others.
17. Land ownership & distribution.
18. Jieng Council of elders is an issue.
19. Corruption & nepotism by political leaders to favor their personal interests & tribes’ men.
20. Lack of representation of persons with Disabilities at all levels of government.

II. Security Cluster

Security has emerged as one of the four major issues. This is understandable given the fact that the current civil war in South Sudan has constrained growth of the South Sudanese economy as well as weakening the capacity of the State to provide safety and economic opportunities for sustainable livelihoods. The issues that emerged under this cluster as reported by the Subcommittees are as follows:

1. The urgent need for immediate cessation of hostilities as a necessary condition, though not sufficient for the conduct of the SSND process;
2. The need for “military rehabilitation” (which is herein broadly interpreted to mean security sector reform or transformation) or security sector reform;
3. politicization of the army and political promotions;
4. The tendency of appeasing rebel fighters and their commanders, which inflates the army (rewarding rebellion);
5. Army is disorganized, corrupt, tribal and unprofessional;
6. No security amenities for the organized forces to do their job such as vehicles, guns, uniforms and boots for the security to be maintained;
7. Ranks are scooped along tribal lines;
8. Low and/or delayed salaries for the security forces;
9. Army is individualized;
10. Appointment of army officers to political positions;
11. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians;
12. No or biased disarmament exercise;
13. Lack of care for wounded soldiers and families of martyrs;
14. Lack of pension policy, organized retirement and welfare for the forces;
15. Lack of proper armament and training;
16. Insecurity in urban areas and along roads and highways caused by “unknown” gunmen;
17. Forces taking sides in communal conflicts;
18. Arbitrary arrests and detention;
19. Rape and other abuses against women and children;
20. Abduction of children;
21. Looting, murder, killings, vandalizing houses and property, and other abuses or crimes;
22. Illegal arms in the hand of civilians;
23. Movement of cattle into farms and agricultural areas;
24. Restoration of security, transformation and formation of National army;
25. Cattle rustling/raiding; and
Politicians inciting the citizens against each other.

III. Economic Cluster

The current conflict has, as mentioned under the security cluster, constrained economic development. This is because the Government is forced to finance its war against the armed opposition groups through deficit financing (printing money). One of the consequences of deficit financing is macroeconomic instability characterized by high fiscal deficits, triple digit inflation, and exchange rate volatility. Hence, the purchasing power of income of South Sudanese people has been eroded. The participants at the grassroots consultations have articulated this dire economic situation in the following terms:

1. The market is being controlled by foreigners;
2. Skyrocketing prices of items in the market, which have eroded the purchasing power of the SSP;
3. Resource and budget allocations of the national government should be distributed proportionally based on the population of the states;
4. Nepotism affects access to business and job opportunities;
5. Multiples taxes at several checkpoints;
6. Land issues, especially in Greater Equatoria and which are also reported under governance and security clusters;
7. Lack of regulation of price of items and market generally;
8. Awarding of letters of credit (LCs) to briefcase companies owned by politicians and generals;
9. Involvement of constitutional post holders and generals in business contracts;
10. Money laundering and repatriation of money by foreigners back to their countries;
11. Lack of economic development, especially in infrastructure;
12. Lack of pension funds and delay in the payment of wages and salaries to the public sector employees;
13. South Sudan has opened its borders to everyone;
14. Depreciation of pounds against dollar; and
15. Lack of diversification of economy.

IV. Social Cohesion Cluster

Emerging issues under this cluster indicate the nature and magnitude of the impact of conflict on the value systems of the people of South Sudan. Moreover, these issues would seem to reveal the underlying trauma various communities in the country are going through. Social capital, which is the network of communal engagements have been degraded severely. Integrity and human dignity were in the past among the cardinal values of the communities that have been consulted by the Subcommittees. These values have been diminished as evidenced by the following points:

1. Hatred, tribalism and nepotism;
2. Lack of faith and morality;
3. Guns in the hands of civilians;
4. Unfair distribution of resources and lack of trust among communities;
5. Inter-communal fighting, cattle raiding and theft;
6. Hate speeches and social media propaganda;
7. Weak institutions of social harmony;
8. Erosion of the foundation of social capital;
9. The politicians inciting the citizens against each other;
10. Conflict of civilizations (cultures);
11. Lack of conservation of cultural heritage and historic places such as slave trade relics in Uyu Juku (Deim Zuber);
12. Neglect of Orphans, widows, and street children (i.e. children without parental care);
13. Lack of accountability;
14. Lack of civic education; and
15. Lack of basic services for nurturing social cohesion and peaceful coexistence.

V. The Way Forward

The people of South Sudan have spoken through the grassroots consultations, which also included meetings with those who have taken refuge in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan. These consultations have provided, on the one hand an opportunity for the stakeholders to express their views of the challenges facing South Sudan as a country and people, and how to address these challenges on the other. In this regard, the Secretariat recommends that the Table 1 below be used to help the Steering Committee to categorize issues under each cluster into those to be addressed at the three levels of our system (i.e. local, regional, and national). That is, the summary of the views of the people at the grassroots level and refugee camps in the neighboring countries is presented to enrich the deliberations of the Regional Dialogue Conferences.

The people have identified some of the root causes of the problem of South Sudan and subsequently provided possible solutions. The Secretariat has kept the solutions as proposed by each of the fifteen Subcommittees for records and ease of comparative analysis.

Table 1: Classification of Emerging Issues by Cluster and Level of Forum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Grassroots (Local)</th>
<th>Forum Level</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>a) Land management</td>
<td>a) Land &amp; border issues</td>
<td>a) Federalism &amp; the nature of South Sudanese State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Peace, security &amp; rule of law</td>
<td>b) Peace, security &amp; rule of law</td>
<td>b) Land policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Role of chiefs and traditional authorities in enforcing the rule of law</td>
<td>c) Tribalism &amp; nepotism</td>
<td>c) Peace, security &amp; rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d) Cattle raiding</td>
<td>d) Transparency &amp; accountability</td>
<td>d) Tribalism &amp; nepotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e) Child abductions</td>
<td>e) Inclusive political &amp; economic institutions</td>
<td>e) Transparency &amp; accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f) Political &amp; cultural pluralism</td>
<td>f) Inclusive political &amp; economic institutions</td>
<td>f) Inclusive political &amp; economic institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i) Corruption</td>
<td>g) Political &amp; cultural pluralism</td>
<td>g) Political &amp; cultural pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>h) Service delivery</td>
<td>h) Service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>i) Corruption</td>
<td>i) Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
f) Lack of service delivery  

h) Social capital  
i) Corruption  

2. Security  
a) Disarmament of youth and civilians  
b) Child abduction  
c) Cattle rustling  
d) Peace, security & rule of law  
e) Role of chiefs & traditional authority in resolving intra- and inter-communal conflicts  

a) Disarmament of youth and civilians  
b) Child abduction  
c) Cattle rustling  
d) Peace, security & rule of law  
e) Proportionate representation in the security sector  
f) Inter-state security arrangements  

a) Permanent ceasefire  
b) Security sector reform  
c) Policy to eradicate child abduction  
d) Policy to end cattle rustling  
e) Disarmament of youth and civilians  
f) Peace, security & rule of law  
g) Inter-state security arrangements  

3. Economic  
a) Economic empowerment of women & youth  
b) Community economic development  
c) Property rights, e.g. land  
d) Fiscal & administrative sustainability of counties  
e) Natural resource management (Oil,  

a) Stabilize the economy in the context of National Development Strategy (NDS)  
b) Fiscal & administrative sustainability of states  
c) Free movement of people, goods & services across states  
d) Land tenure  

a) Inclusive economic institutions  
b) NDS  
c) Fiscal federalism  
d) Monetary policy  
e) Fiscal policy  
f) Trade policy  
g) The role of national private sector in the economy  
h) Agriculture as an engine of economic growth
forestry, fisheries) e) The role of national private sector in the economy

4. Social cohesion

a) Social capital
b) Ethics & moral values
c) Harmony & peaceful coexistence
d) Household as institution for promoting culture of peace, social values and morality
f) Substance abuse (drugs and alcohol) due to lack of guidance

ea) Issues concerning nepotism, tribalism & hatred
b) Lack of faith & immorality
c) Inter-communal & intra-communal fighting, cattle raiding and theft
d) Guns in the hands of civilians
e) Unfair distribution of resources and lack of trust among communities
f) Hate speeches and social media propaganda
g) Weak institutions of social harmony

a) Lack of conservation of cultural heritage and historic places such as slave trade relics in Uyu Juku (Deim Zuber
b) Orphans and widows neglected
c) The politicians inciting the citizens against each other
d) Conflict of civilizations
e) Lack of social responsibility & accountability
f) Lack of basic services for nurturing social cohesion and peaceful coexistence
g) Establish national schools to promote harmony and national cohesion
h) Inter-regional/state policy on sports (Wrestling, football, basket ball, volley ball)

The challenge for the Steering Committee of SSND is to conceptualize a South Sudanese State, which is based on the views of the grassroots consultations as presented in this document. A viable South Sudanese State will be the one that incorporates the positive aspects of our traditional values with those of the 21st global village. In this regard, a conceptual framework for a South Sudanese State, which captures the views of the grassroots consultations, is presented below (Figure One) in the form of a circular flow chart. The State is conceptualized as consisting of four dimensions or standing on four pillars: a) citizenry; b) democracy; c) leadership; and d) development. The viability of the State is anchored on democracy and development; while its foundation is cemented on the citizenry and leadership.

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2 On the concept of tradition and modernity, see Deng, Francis M. (1978). Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law Among the Dinka of Sudan. New Haven: Yale University Press. This book would be useful, though it is about the Dinka nationality, in the deliberations of the delegates at the RDFs and NDF/NDC
The relationship between the pillars as well as with the State requires further elaboration. The first pillar is the people (citizenry) who have a social contract (or Charter) with their State; a contract/Charter in which they receive basic services, including security in return to defending the sovereignty of the country from any foreign aggression. Democracy, which is the second pillar, provides the viability of the State for it is the only viable system of governance through which the people have guaranteed basic freedoms. All South Sudanese have the rights to elect or be elected to any office in the land. It is through democracy that justice, accountability, inclusivity, responsibility, and openness (JAIRO) are respected and maintained in a country that is at peace with itself and with its neighbors. Moreover, the people select and remove their leaders through a democratic process and thereby ensuring the Lincoln’s “government of the people, by the people, for the people” vision.

Leadership is the third pillar of the State. It is now established empirically that leadership is the primary driver of economic development. The following passage from David Brady and Michael Spence will explain this point:

Our approach has been to separate the development process into different periods and to analyze leaders’ roles at the various stages. The obvious first stage is where the leadership chooses an economic model or strategy, a general overall approach to development and growth, and then builds coalitions, institutions, or both, capable of sustaining a politics that allows the plan time to bring dividends in terms of growth. The second stage is in some sense not delimited in time because it concerns how leaders adjust strategies and choices to

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3 Leadership and Politics: A Perspective from the Commission on Growth and Development by David Brady and Michael Spence, (2009:5)
changing circumstances—economic and political. These adjustments can be responses to shocks or unanticipated external events, but they also occur in response to the endogenous evolution of characteristics of the economy in the course of growth. These latter challenges can and do range from rising income inequality, a rising middle class, competitive pressures from the global economy, rising incomes and wages causing shifting comparative advantage, and institutions not adapted to the evolving characteristics and state of development economy.

Development, which is the fourth pillar of the State, is articulated by the new three-year (July 2018 –June 2021) strategy of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) of South Sudan. It is called National Development Strategy (NDS) with the overarching objectives of consolidating peace and stabilizing the economy. The guiding principles of the NDS are: a) peace, security, and the rule of law; b) democracy and good governance; c) socio-economic development; and d) international compacts and partnerships. These guiding principles and objectives of the NDS are consistent with the views of the people of South Sudan at the grassroots level. In this regard, sustained incremental improvement in the quality of the citizenry is embedded in the NDS.

The National Development Strategy document has this to say about the National Dialogue:

As the first truly national conversations (sic), since independence, amongst South Sudanese to redefine the social contract, the National Dialogue provides an opportunity for every South Sudanese, including people who feel left out of the political process, to articulate a vision and contribute to establishing actions that will be required to put South Sudan on a sustainable path to peace and development (2018:12).

It is clear from the above passage that the Leadership of the country is committed to the implementation of the resolutions of the National Dialogue. This is farther elucidated by Table 2 below, which the Secretariat has developed to illustrate the synergy between the NDS and ND. The emerging issues from the grassroots consultations have been grouped into four clusters as provided in this document. And there are four guiding principles of the NDS. The ND clusters and NDS guiding principles give a policy matrix for the synergy between the two processes.

### Table 2: A Policy Matrix on the Synergy between ND and NDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guiding Principles</th>
<th>Clusters of Emerging Issues from Grassroots Consultations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace, security, and rule of law</td>
<td>Lack of the rule of law falls under this cluster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 See National Development Strategy: Consolidate peace and stabilize the economy. Published by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, as party of the proposed FY2018/19 budget
authority in resolving intra- and inter-communal conflicts

3. Security sector reform

4. Disarmament of youth and civilians

5. Formula for ensuring representation of all nationalities of South Sudan in the security sector

6. Inter-state security arrangements

7. Cattle raiding

8. Child abductions

Democracy and good governance

1. Federalism & the nature of South Sudanese State
2. Tribalism & nepotism
3. Transparency & accountability, Inclusive political & economic institutions,

1. The Rule of law
2. Basic freedoms
3. Proportionate representation in the security sector

1. Free movements of people, goods & services across states
2. Inclusive economic institutions
3. Transparency & accountability in the use of public funds
4. **Political & cultural pluralism**

5. **Service delivery**

6. **Corruption**

7. **Nation-building**

8. **Consolidate peace as foundation of democracy**

---

### Socio-economic development

1. **Transparency & accountability in the management of public resources**

2. **Equitable distribution of public resources**

3. **Equal access to employment and business opportunities**

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4. **Economic empowerment of women, youth, & indigenous private sector**

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1. **Security of all the economic agents**

2. **Unlawful roads block**

3. **Inequitable services to the army, such as: delay in paying their salaries on time, lack of uniforms, inadequate feeding and healthcare. Hence crimes caused by the army**

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1. **Economic management**

2. **Inclusive economic institutions**

3. **Structural policies**

4. **Policies for social inclusion & equity**

5. **Public sector management & institutions**

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1. **Social safety net**

2. **Pervasive poverty**

3. **Limited coverage and access to quality social services**

4. **Inadequate financial and human resource capacity**

5. **Poor infrastructure for social services**

6. **Inadequate commodities, equipment and supplies for the social services**

7. **Inadequate enabling frameworks for**
management, coordination monitoring and evaluation of social services

International compacts and partnerships

1. Democratic governance
2. Strategic engagement

Local insecurity has negative consequences to the region and rest of the world
Development assistance has been redirected to humanitarian assistance
Development partners have reduced their presence and activities due to insecurity in the country

1. More than 80% of health and education budget is supported by international development partners
2. International humanitarian assistance has created a culture of laziness & Dependency

The above policy matrix has shown that development partners support annually more than 80% of health and education expenditures. Moreover, humanitarian assistance has created a culture of laziness and dependency that must be addressed by the delegates at the RDFs/RDCs. In this regard, for South Sudan to exit from this dependency trap, delegates to the RDFs should urge TGoNU to support the approach of the Minister of Finance and Planning for introducing public investment program (PIP) as one of the vehicles for implementing the NDS. And with the recently signed Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) delegates to the RDFs are well placed to begin to brainstorm on the most appropriate strategies for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants into productive economic activities of the economy. Hence, the PIP would address this culture of dependency by beginning the slow process of re-engaging young males and ex-combatants from the process of “getting and spending” funds they have never worked for.

However, the delegates must be aware that experience has shown that civil conflict is often more remunerative than regular productive work. This implies that priority must be given to alter the “benefit-cost calculation” of young men so that steady work becomes more attractive than soldiering. This is because those who cannot envision a more promising future often become fixated on the past. In this regard, consolidating peace and stabilizing the economy would depend on the future of productive work being seen as more compelling than a future of combat.
Finally, delegates must deliberate on issues of social cohesion. Such a deliberation, in the view of the Secretariat, is anchored on the Charter that the Leadership of the Steering Committee of the SSND has presented to the Steering Committee before the recess.
The technical notes are prepared to inform the debate at the Regional Dialogue level on the emerging issues from the grassroots consultations. They briefly highlight what have been identified by the people of South Sudan to be the root causes of the crises of governance and leadership in the country.

I. The Governance Cluster of Emerging Issues from The Grassroots Consultations: A Technical Note

Issues of governance are prominent among the priorities that have been identified by the people of South Sudan through the grassroots consultations, which were conducted by the fifteen subcommittees of the National Dialogue Steering Committee. This technical note is prepared in the context of the on-going National Dialogue where discussions on governance have featured highly. The objective of the note is three-fold: First, the note aims at elucidating governance so as to situate the concept within the South Sudan context. Second, it aspires to highlight critical governance challenges in South Sudan including those that have emerged through the grassroots consultations. Lastly, the note attempts to provide important considerations to guide the regional and national dialogue forums/conferences on governance issues.

The note starts with emerging issues of governance from grassroots consultations, followed by the definition of governance. This definition is intended to contextualize governance within the South Sudan’s context—looking at both normative framework and real experiences. The note concludes with important considerations for the regional and national conferences.

A. Emerging Issues of Governance from Grassroots Consultations

During phase I of the National Dialogue, extensive grassroots consultations were carried out to largely document the views and grievances of citizens. All issues related to politics, state-society relations, structure of state and government, constitutional matters, matters of the rule of law, intergovernmental linkages, foreign policy issues, distribution and redistribution of resources, were all clustered as governance issues. This section therefore highlights key issues of governance emerging out of grassroots consultations process as summarized below.

1. Lack of respect for the rule of law and the constitution;
2. Weak institutions of governance and lack of accountability and transparency;
3. Power struggle;
4. Loss of vision and unclear priorities;
5. The need for a federal system of government;
6. The question of the number of states (creation of more states vs. reduction of states);
7. Political differences in the SPLM are responsible for the crises in the country;
8. SPLM is being hijacked by strangers;
9. Division and grouping in the SPLM;
10. Lack of political will to follow through with treaties the country had signed;
11. Weak diplomacy and lack of a well-defined foreign policy;
12. No democracy to conduct timely elections;
13. Borders encroachment by the neighboring countries;
14. Inclusivity and equitable distribution of powers at federal level;
15. Marginalization of some ethnic communities;
16. Divisive policies used by the government;
17. Administrative failure and poor governance;
18. Tribalism and nepotism practiced by politicians;
19. Unfair distribution of national resources;
20. Rewarding the rebels with high political and military positions;
21. Land and border disputes;
22. Lack of service delivery to the citizens;
23. Cattle rustling and child abduction;
24. The politicians inciting the citizens against each other;
25. Pastoralists are seen as the main source of conflicts in former Central Equatoria State, particularly in Yei River State;
26. Corruption: Most government officials are corrupt and steal from public funds, but they are not accountable for their actions;
27. President and Riek Machar to step aside voluntarily; and
28. Voices of activists and media should be free and heard.

A.1 Defining Governance

It is needful to start all discussions related to governance in South Sudan with the question, why do we need a state? This question is fundamental considering the fact that the people of South Sudan have lived without a functional state or government for so long. Thomas Hobbes was among the first philosophers to theorize why humans need a state. Hobbes asked us to imagine what life would be without government? He believes that people would be in constant state of fear. This conclusion is drawn from four premises that Hobbes postulated:

1. By nature, each person is roughly equal in the faculties of bodies and mind.
2. In each person’s nature, there are three desires: desire for things, desire for safety and desire for social standing.
3. If there are conditions of natural equality and human beings possess the above desires, and there is no external checking force, then there would be a state of war where every man is an enemy to every man.
4. The state of nature is a condition in which there is no external checking force.

It can therefore be concluded that, if there is a state of nature, there will be a state of war where every man is against every man (Hobbes, 1651, Ebook released Octbor 2009). To escape the state of nature, Hobbes recommends the creation of a common power that would protect men from war of all against all. In doing so, men would have to submit their will to the sovereign, which to Hobbes believes has absolute power (Hobbes, 1651, Ebook released
October 2009). By common power, Hobbes was talking about the state. State would primarily promote peace and consequently happiness for all and protect them from foreign power and prevent people from causing harm and injury to one another. This limited scope of the state was originally conceived to resolve state of nature concerns. In context, it appears our state is still unable to meet the very basic, yet fundamental role, that of promoting peace, protection and happiness.

While the state was initially conceived to offer limited function as discussed, state has since grown in power and scope and now debates rage in the world between those who want state powers to be rolled back and those calling for a more involved state in nearly every aspect of life. Within the state, the government is the body that exercises authority and decision making. At the very basic level, people use the word “government” and “governance” interchangeably to describe the exercise of authority and decision making in any country, an organization or institution (Raadschelders, 2008). However, emerging scholarship distinctly separates the two. Political scientists define government as the entity that exercises authority while governance is about the rules, structures, and systems that bound and limit the exercise of that authority and delineate rights and obligations of actors.

Max Weber claims that governance emerged in Western societies through the process of rationalization including the extent to which ideas gain in systematic coherence and consistency and by what he calls “displacement of magical elements of thoughts” (Raadschelders, 2008). Weber went on to assert that the emergence of rational societies is critically dependent on the way domination has been exercised. To him domination is the “possibility of imposing one’s will on the behavior of other persons despite their resistance” (Raadschelders, 2008, p. 27). Weber conceives domination to take two forms: One based on constellation of interests and another one based on authority, where domination based on the constellation of interests is found in religious and economic associations and the domination based on authority is found in legal and bureaucratic relationships (governance) (Raadschelders, 2008). For the purposes of this note, we focus on the domination by authority.

According to Weber (1947), domination based on authority depends on obedience from those over which authority is exercised and obedience also depends on the perception of legitimacy of the authority. Authority is simply defined as the legitimate power. Power on the other hand is the ability to sway the conduct of others and authority is the right to do so. Authority is bestowed upon an individual or entity through legitimately accepted means, but not through coercive or manipulative processes. Weber distinguishes between three kinds of authority, according to their source of legitimacy; traditional authority originates from history, charismatic authority stems from personality, and legal-authority is grounded in a set of impersonal rules.

By democratic or good governance, people often refer to a system based on legal-authority and which is effectively delivering basic services to the population. Weber declares that the modern state is characterized by a body of laws, bureaucracy, compulsory
jurisdiction over territory, and the monopoly over the legitimate use of force (Raadschelders, 2008, p. 34). Administration (governance), according to Weber, is bound by the rule of law and is conducted in accord with generally formulated principles.

Weber lists features of what he calls “ideal-type” bureaucracy to include: First, administration is carried out continuously, but not by the pleasure of the leader. Second, bureaucratic tasks are divided into functional areas, each with requisite authority and sanctions. Third, offices are arranged in the form of hierarchy. Fourth, resources of the bureaucratic organizations must be distinct from those of members as private individuals. Fifth, the officeholder cannot appropriate the office, meaning the office cannot be sold by the official or passed on by heredity. Sixth, administration is based on written documents. Lastly, control in the bureaucratic organization is based on impersonally applied rational rules (Weber, 1947) as cited in (Raadschelders, 2008, p. 36). Weber’s thoughts on the nature of state and its bureaucracy represent the classical Western views about the state.

Breton Woods institutions and other international development institutions have internalized Weberian view of the state, although terminology has evolved overtime. The World Bank defines governance as 'the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs and 'good governance' involves: an efficient public service, an independent judicial system and legal frame-work to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government: a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press (World Bank, 1992). The UNDP departed slightly from the state centric definition of governance in its 2004 Conceptual Framework on Good Governance, so it defines governance as “complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences” (Maguire, 2004).

By good governance, the framework speaks of the degree to which the country’s institutions (such as parliament) and processes (such as the role of political parties in elections) are transparent, accountable to the people and allow them to participate in decisions that affect their lives (Maguire, 2004). “Good” or “democratic” governance is when the authority of the government is based on the will of the people and it is responsive to them (Maguire, 2004). The framework asserts that “Good governance addresses the allocation and management of resources to respond to collective problems; it is characterized by the principles of participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity and strategic vision” (Maguire, 2004).

These principles would of course translate into actionable or tangible processes such as free, fair, and regular elections, representative government, independent judiciary, guarantee and protection of human rights, and transparent and accountable institutions (Maguire, 2004). From this perspective, good governance then entails decentralization of power, authority, and resources to local governments and it gives citizens a greater role in setting priorities and making the needs of the most vulnerable people in society known (Maguire, 2004).
Therefore, “governance is good if it supports a society in which people can expand their choices in the way they live; promotes freedom from poverty, deprivation, fear and violence; and sustains the environment and women’s advancement” (Maguire, 2004).

In recognition of the changing trend and multiplicity of actors in governance, Guy Peters and John Pierre, in their 1998 article, call our attention to the diminishing nature of government. They claim that, “the idea that national governments are the major actors in public policy and that they are able to influence the economy and society through their actions now appears to be in doubt” (Pierre, 1998). The cause of these doubts results from increased importance of the international environment and of an arguably diminished capacity of those governments to insulate their economies and societies from the global pressures (Pierre, 1998).

In follow up to this, Stoker (1998) asserts that the essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not necessarily rest on the recourse to the authority and sanctions of government (Stoker G., 1998). To him, governance is ultimately concerned with creating conditions for ordered rule and collective action, although its outputs are not any different from those of government, but rather it is a process that is different. Stoker et al (2009) proposed a new encompassing definition of governance stating that:

**Governance is about the rules of collective decision-making in settings where there are a plurality of actors or organizations and where no formal control system can dictate the terms of the relationship between these actors and organizations**” (Stoker V. C., 2009, p. 3).

Stoker et al (2009) advised that the processes of governance should be understood analytically and empirically as a set of practices, rather than through the lens of a ‘wish-list’ of principles to be followed (Stoker V. C., 2009). This, in their view, is because governance is not a science with clear causal pathways to be identified, nor can it be adequately captured by laws, statutes or formal constitutions, governance is a practice (Stoker V. C., 2009). This suggests that we need governance to address our limited capacities. Specifically, they reason that “if we are all-seeing and knowing and could faithfully predict each other’s behavior then the frameworks and rules of governance would be unnecessary” (Stoker V. C., 2009, p. 6). Governance exists in part because it provides us with effective ways to cope with the limitations of human cognition and understanding. It provides architecture for choice in the context of our bounded rationality (Jones, 2001) as cited in (Stoker V. C., 2009). Stoker et al (2009) posit that one characteristic of effective governance mechanism is that it steers actors and the organizations they lead to certain types of desired behavior in the context of bounded rationality (Stoker V. C., 2009).

### A.2 Summary: Elements of Good Governance

The following are the main elements of good governance:
1. Good governance starts with a strategic vision about the nature and scope of the society that is desired.

2. To achieve the vision, there has to be a legal (constitutional) framework that lays out the rules of political game, decision-making mechanisms, rights and obligations of individuals and institutions, which must be adhered to and respected consistently.

3. Then you need a competitive political space with pluralistic institutional structure, a representative and responsible legislature, and independent judicial system, accountable and efficient public service.

4. Non-state actors are as important to governance as government actors are and free press, active civil society, trade unions, private sector must be encouraged, and space created for their growth and development.

5. Protection of individual liberties, human rights, and people’s rights must be guaranteed because the end game of the state is to create the worth and dignity in every person.

6. Prudent and sustainable management and allocation resources to respond to collective social problems; that observes the principles of equity, including intergenerational equity participation, transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness.

7. Mobilizes and steers the society to certain types of desired behavior and outcome in the context of bounded rationality.

8. Creation of governing mechanisms, which do not necessarily rest on the recourse to the authority and sanctions of government.

9. Full understanding of threats and opportunities presented by globalization and therefore designs a comprehensive foreign policy linked to its strategic vision.

10. It is evident that governance is more complex, and it is broader, although inclusive of government.

11. The state centric governance conceptualization has long been disputed; there is multiplicity of actors sharing space with government.

12. Provision of necessary coordinating mechanism for the many networks of actors demanding influence and services and to facilitate the process of rulemaking and enforcement.

13. Governance is not about a set of principles and rules, it is a practice, so rules of governance must be revisited regularly to accommodate new situations because humans have cognitive limitations.

B. State of Governance in South Sudan before 2013

This section attempts to make sense of governance as a norm and as a practice in South Sudan. Governance in South Sudan appears to have two elements: there is a well-articulated normative framework enshrined in the South Sudan Transitional Constitution 2011, emanating largely from the SPLM vision, and the application of this normative framework in daily life. We consider the written governance framework the normative framework while the experience with governance is the application of the written rules and norms. We reason that what is written is likely to vary greatly from what was actually done. We consider the normative framework first and the experience second in the sections that follow.
B.1 The Normative Governance Framework

The point of departure when discussing governance in the context of South Sudan, at least the normative framework, is to look at what the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan say about governance. In his speech during the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9th January 2005, Dr. John Garang de Mabior had this to say about what SPLM envisioned in governance:

The transformation which shall be engendered by this Agreement, to which I have alluded, shall be reflected, first and foremost, in a veritable democratic mutation and to which the SPLM is fully committed. Surely, by democratic, we do not mean return to the sham procedural democracy of the past which was but a camouflage for the perpetuation of vested interests. In that sham democracy, civil rights were subject to the whims of rulers; the majority of Sudanese in the regions remained peripheral to the center of power and was treated as an expendable quantum only to be manipulated through political trickery and double dealing. The so-called national governments in their civilian guise or military aberrations seemed to have been treating the Sudanese people with contempt (Mabior, 2005, p. 9).

These powerful words seem to lay bare the intentions of the SPLM leader to build a democratic political system where citizens are situated at the center and where political leadership is kept in check restrained by democratic institutions. He recognized the center-periphery dichotomy, which has come to define the Sudanese state and the SPLM was poised to end this state of affairs. Dr. Garang further elaborated this important point in the same speech stating:

The transformation envisaged in the CPA... represents a political and socio-economic paradigm shift which entails the recognition of political diversity by guaranteeing full freedom for political pluralism, the entrenchment of human and people’s rights in the constitution, the upholding of the independence of the judiciary including the creation of an inviolable constitutional court and commitment to the rule of law by both government and the governed, and the establishment of a truly independent and competent civil service at all levels of government. It also conceptualizes and seeks to realize a recreation of the legislature in a manner that shall ensure rigorous checks and balances and guarantees powers to the GOSS and the States, powers which can neither be withdrawn nor impaired by other centers of power (Mabior, 2005, p. 9). ...Democracy whether in the North or South, should no longer be viewed as solely a struggle for power but rather as a competition on providing good governance, development and delivery of services for our people and restoring the dignity and worth of every man and woman (Mabior, 2005, p. 15).

The stage was clearly set by Dr. Garang for the SPLM to depart from governance and democracy that is only procedural, but one that truly reflects the will and the aspirations of the people. He did not stop at this; he went as far as laying out what government priorities were to be:

The next period will be payback time by the SPLM to the Sudanese people who fought and sacrificed for the last 21 years. The major problems and programs that will require extensive attention by the SPLM-based GOSS and the State Governments of the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei during the Interim Period and beyond fall in the areas of physical infrastructure, good governance, financial infrastructure and viable...
markets, development and provision of social services and basic necessities: health, education, water, food security, employment opportunities, building the SPLA as an army that will safeguard the agreement, building the SPLM in both North and South to lead the political transformation of Sudan, and above all, dignity rather than elitism (Mabior, 2005, p. 11).

Most of Dr. Garang’s vision is enshrined in the SPLM Constitution 2008 as well as the party’s manifesto. These norms have also found their way into South Sudan’s Transitional Constitution 2011. Especially, the Constitution’s preamble sets out clearly the aspirations of the people of South Sudan as follows:

We, the People of South Sudan, ...Recalling our long and heroic struggle for justice, freedom, equality and dignity in South Sudan; ...Remembering and inspired by the selfless sacrifices of our martyrs, heroes and heroines; ...Dedicated to a genuine national healing process and the building of trust and confidence in our society through dialogue; ...Determined to lay the foundation for a united, peaceful and prosperous society based on justice, equality, respect for human rights and the rule of law; ...Committed to establishing a decentralized democratic multi-party system of governance in which power shall be peacefully transferred and to upholding values of human dignity and equal rights and duties of men and women; ...Conscious of the need to manage our natural resources sustainably and efficiently for the benefit of the present and future generations and to eradicate poverty and attain the Millennium Development Goals (Ministry of Justice, 2011, p. 1).

This preamble is unequivocal about the nature of state and government that the people of South Sudan want. Article 35 (2) expands this by laying out the obligations of the state towards citizens:

This Constitution shall be interpreted and applied to advance the individual dignity and address the particular needs of the people by dedicating public resources and focusing attention on the provision of gainful employment for the people, and improving their lives by building roads, schools, airports, community institutions, hospitals, providing clean water, food security, electric power and telecommunication services to every part of the country (Ministry of Justice, 2011, p. 10).

The Constitution and the SPLM vision are quite clear with regards to the type of system and governance structure that was envisioned for South Sudan. The question that arises out of this rosy picture in the normative framework is, does South Sudan actually live by this vision?

B.2 South Sudan’s Experience with Governance 2005-Present

In the normative framework section, the focus was largely on the idealistic perspective on governance. It was simply an iteration of how South Sudan ought to be governed in an ideal situation. Ideals are the expected norms but in the process of application of the norms in practice, there are usually deviations. This section reviews the practices of governance in South Sudan from 2005 to the present. A number of assessments on governance have been conducted to establish South Sudan’s performance on governance. As a start, the Fund for Peace Fragile State Index (FSI) is an important international index that ranks countries on the basis of the sustainability of the political, economic, social, and
development systems. Since 2015, South Sudan has been ranked the most fragile country in the world; worse than Somalia, Central African Republic and Syria. Since 2011, South Sudan ranked in the top three fragile countries, making others to conclude that South Sudan was born as a failed state.

Another report, with very clear indicators was conducted by Tetra Tech ARD on behalf of USAID in 2012 and repeated in 2015. The report gauged the conditions for governance, human rights, and democracy in South Sudan. The assessment looked at five major indicators of good and democratic governance: a) political consensus, b) rule of law and human rights, c) competition and political accountability, d) inclusion, and e) government effectiveness. We look at each of these indicators and what the assessment found in South Sudan.

B.2.1 Political Consensus

In governance, consensus is not necessarily about unanimity in decision-making, it is about all sectors of society having agreement about how to set up the state. For instance, consensus is needed on the nature and structure of the state and its relation to individual citizens and groups; the fundamental rights of citizens and groups: who has what rights and responsibilities; who is a citizen and who is not; the basic rules of the political game regarding the acquisition of power and authority; and when and how it must be gained and relinquished (Hyman, 2013). Once there is such an agreement on the nature of state and the accompanying governing instruments —all sectors of the society would feel a sense of belonging; a condition that is necessary for the formation of national identity and culture.

Immediately after independence, the existential question South Sudan faced was whether and to what extent it is able to supersede the communal identities with a new national identity, at least enough to foster a sense of national identity that can mitigate the tensions and conflicts between ethnic groups (Hyman, 2013). In short, to what extent is there now or will there be a primary national identity that transcends the various communal identities? The aforementioned report found that South Sudan was struggling to forge a national identity and warned that if the sub-national identities remain strong enough to challenge the national identity, and therefore the national government, in areas fundamental to the integrity of the new state, those challenges and struggles will threaten not only the viability of the state (particularly if Khartoum or other external actors encourage its failure or dissolution through sub-national conflicts) but also the viability of democratic governance (Hyman, 2013). This warning was issued in 2012.

Evidently, the events of December 2013 to the present speak to the fact that this warning was not heeded to, and all hell was let loose. To be precise, consensus collapsed, hence the need for the National Dialogue and ARCSS to re-establish it. This is to say, at the moment, there is no political consensus in South Sudan and without it, there is no nation. The work of the Steering Committee is to essentially facilitate a process that builds consensus on new basis. This consensus is emerging from the grassroots consultations, which will be discussed
further at the Regional Dialogue Forums/Conferences and subsequently at the National Dialogue Forum/Conference.

**B.2.2 Competition and Political Accountability**

The report concluded that the rules of the democratic game are weak at best or at worst absent in South Sudan. The report raised concerns about lack of the rules of the political game, stating specifically that, “More challenging by far to a successful democratic transition in South Sudan is the weakness, almost absence, of consensus about the rules of the democratic political game” (Hyman, 2013, p. 11). The rules of the democratic game are mainly a subset of the legal system, which is also weak, although there are also informal, unwritten rules unenforceable in a court of law but enforceable on permanent competitors through years of regular electoral and other contests (Hyman, 2013). The report points to the fact that there is both the lack of consensus about the rules, and the willful disregard of democratic practice by elements of the power elite who are clearly familiar with how democracy functions in other countries but choose not to be bound by such rules (Hyman, 2013).

The report asserts that democratic politics is inherently peacefully contested politics, and so for it to remain democratic, the rules for that contest must be clear, fair, followed, and accepted by all stakeholders (Hyman, 2013). Obviously, when the rules are not respected or accepted, there is the risk of de-legitimization of peaceful processes, ultimately resulting in violence, as in cases in which electoral outcomes are disputed through violence (Hyman, 2013). The implosion of the SPLM and the ensuing struggle for power and degeneration into the civil war speak to the unclarity of the rules as well as the complete disregard for these rules. The same could also be said about the collapse of ARCSS in 2016, it was not necessarily about the lack of clarity of rules, it was a complete disregard for them.

By 2013, DRG assessment report raised a number of fears with regards to competitive democratic space in South Sudan. First, the assessment found that there was a growing concentration of power and resources in the hands of a power elite in South Sudan; a point, which is supported by the views from the grassroots consultations. The report defines power concentration “as the rise of governmental, military, and party elites that are increasingly powerful and able to act with little meaningful accountability” (Hyman, 2013, p. 4). The report found the power elites to have been concentrated primarily in Juba, especially at the top levels of the executive branch of government, and within the upper echelons of the SPLM. The report also found that some powerful SPLA officers can and have acted independently of the President and broader executive branch. This power concentration was manifested in four areas: dominance of central government over the states, indeed over the rest of South Sudan (center versus periphery); the executive branch of government vis-à-vis the legislative and judicial branches; the SPLM vis-à-vis other political parties; and the power elite within the top echelons of the SPLM vis-à-vis rank-and-file of the SPLM members (Hyman, 2013).
Two structural realities have created the concentration of power and resources in South Sudan. First, South Sudan emerged from its long war of liberation as essentially a one-party state led by a liberation movement rather than a true political party. The SPLM is not a Leninist party with near-absolute party discipline; rather it is ‘lumpy’ with many power centers within the party, all of which revolve around individuals, and in some cases, communal loyalties, not so much around competing visions or ideologies (Hyman, 2013). The report noted that although the SPLM is not a highly disciplined party, it does remain a relatively effective enforcer of national will in the states and will continue to serve its role as an institution of centralizing power and resources in a one-party state (Hyman, 2013). Contrary to expectations that there would be minimal enforcement of central decisions in the states, given the weakness of institutions, ethnic and tribal diversity, a history of conflict, and the sheer newness of the state, this assessment found generally robust levels of enforcement of central decisions in the states visited (Hyman, 2013).

The second and the more consequential factor allowing for the concentration of power in South Sudan is oil. The report calls attention to a well-established, strong correlation between renter states and political authoritarianism (Ross, 2012). The causal argument is on the balance of resources between state and society; that is, oil revenues give the state significant resources vis-à-vis its own society, allowing the state to remake key institutions of society (Hyman, 2013). The report contends that having access to oil revenues, states no longer need their own societies as a source of revenues to run the institutions of power and governance, and thus societies lose their key leverage to force political openness on the state (Hyman, 2013). That is, with no real taxation of society, there will be no meaningful representation of society’s interests within the state. Given this imbalance of resources between state and society, any political actor will tend to tone down criticism of the state in the hope of retaining patronage payments from the state. In renter states, the state is nearly always the largest employer in the country by far, and those people not directly employed by the state are often indirectly employed through tendering processes that favor loyal companies (Hyman, 2013).

In addition to the two factors discussed, other dynamics within South Sudan exacerbate the concentration of power according to the report. Among these, the lack of a strong national identity and the strength of communal identities lead in some cases to political complaints being framed as Dinka and Nuer domination (Hyman, 2013). A number of reports put the Dinka and Nuer population combined up to about 60 percent of the total population and appear to be disproportionately represented in top SPLM and SPLA leadership positions (Hyman, 2013). The concern is that the reinforcement of concentrated power with ethnic cleavage is a potentially very dangerous situation, especially in a situation where politics is viewed through the lens of ethnicity and tribe (Hyman, 2013). By the time the assessment was repeated in 2015, this situation was already a reality in South Sudan.

Lastly, the SPLM’s ties with the SPLA and its conflation with the government present many challenges to democratic governance. It has been difficult to disentangle the power elite
with overlapping military (SPLA), political (SPLM), and governmental identity (Hyman, 2013). The report raised the concern that, the interconnected political, military, government, and most recently economic structures and personnel are really the defining character of South Sudan’s emerging political economy. By the time of this assessment, “a complementary small group of business leaders with close ties to the inner core—and lucrative government contracts and licenses—is also forming and emerging and will likely become more powerful” (Hyman, 2013). At the present, this situation is more worrying than it was in 2013.

**B.2.3 Electoral Competition**

Competition is at the heart of democracy, primarily (but not exclusively) through elections (Hyman, 2013). Apart from its centrality to democracy, true competition is also the primary, if not the only, remedy to the concentration of power; that is to say that centralization, concentration, and monopoly over the political space are the antithesis of competition, and vice versa (Hyman, 2013). By the time of the report, South Sudan was under the political monopoly of the SPLM and the SPLA, which is, as discussed previously, the core of the power elite. It is important to note this situation is not necessarily the same since the war broke out, but there is a great possibility that the elite pact may be restored after the peace agreement.

The SPLM was not challenged in the 2010 election because when smaller parties tried to compete, they were intimidated and denied access to the population. Many obstacles were deliberately created to deny permits to rally or even to meet; they were hounded by the police, sometimes even the army; they were charged with petty offenses; they were detained; they were denied access to the public media; and the like (Hyman, 2013). The SPLM had near absolute advantage as a liberation movement, plus its policy of accommodating its potential opponents, now combine this with the harassment of its actual opponents, the 2010 electoral processes are not very meaningful beyond the role they have played primarily as rituals of independence (Hyman, 2013). In other words, power and authority were not at stake during the 2010 elections (Hyman, 2013). The point being made here is that South Sudan is yet to be tested in organizing and conducting a competitive democratic electoral process.

**B.2.4 Non-electoral Competition**

There are also the less direct, less potent forms of competition characteristic of a thriving democracy; they are also very weak in South Sudan. These include a vibrant independent media, active and robust civil society and academia, trade unions, and a thriving private sector and middle class. If these sectors were functioning in full capacity, they could pose a substitute for electoral competition or a material threat on the closing political space and the growing concentration of power. The report found in 2013 independent media to be very frail and in general, civil society is weak, in part because of financial constraints, but also because
the power elite discourages alternative, competing voices and organizational mobilization outside the SPLM.

In other words, South Sudan does not have a robust civil society with analyses, programs, and organizational forms not only as alternatives to the SPLM, but also to one another. As a result, the give and take and debate between different groups and perspectives policy matters are extremely feeble in South Sudan, much to the advantage of the power elite (Hyman, 2013). While the situation of civil society and media was bad in 2013, it is nearly collapsed now and quite insignificant.

The World Press Freedom Index ranked 180 countries from 1 being the best rank to number 180 being the worst performing country in press freedom. The Index started ranking South Sudan starting 2013 to 2018. South Sudan has consistently been declining in ranking. For example, in 2014, South Sudan was ranked 119/180. By 2016 and 2017 it dropped to 140 and 145/180 respectively. The decline shows worsening press freedom in the country. In justifying the ranking, Reporters Without Borders had this to say:

The already fragile situation of journalists in this young country, created in 2011, has been magnified by a civil war that began in late 2013. Forced by the government to avoid covering issues linked to the conflict, the media are very sparing in their reporting on important developments. In 2015, President Salva Kiir’s verbal threats against journalists who worked “against their country” were followed by the murder of reporter Peter Moi in Juba just three days later. Four months after Isaac Vuni, a reporter for The Sudan Tribune and The Juba Monitor, was kidnapped in June 2016, his body was found at a farm near Kerepi. Harassment of the foreign media increased dramatically in 2017. The Al-Jazeera bureau in Juba was closed indefinitely in May, twenty foreign journalists considered too critical of the government were banned from working in South Sudan in June, and a US freelance war reporter was killed covering conflict between government forces and rebels in August. At least ten journalists have been killed since 2011. Harassment, arbitrary detention, torture, or execution-style murder is the price that journalists pay for refusing to censor themselves. Some have fled the country or simply closed their publications5.

B.2.5 Separation of Powers

Another important area to measure competition and political accountability is the separation of powers. The report found in 2013 that neither the judicial branch nor the legislative branch offers any real check on the continuing concentration of power in the hands of the executive branch. As noted earlier, the judiciary lacks capacity and the independence to check the executive and is itself centralized in Juba under the chief justice (Hyman, 2013). The report also noted the fact that legislature was almost entirely in the hands of SPLM members in 2013, who themselves cannot stand as candidates in an election without the consent of the SPLM’s central Political Bureau. In the 2010 elections, the SPLM Political Bureau, reversed several local-level party decisions about candidates, substituting its own (Hyman, 2013). The point is that if the elections are about the party and not the individuals, the result is that party members are not expected to go against the party; a situation that

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5 See Reporters Without Border: https://rsf.org/en/south-sudan accessed on 31 August 2018
exacerbates power concentration and weakens checks and balances among the branches of government.

Finally, the report found that the private sector in South Sudan is small and struggling. It provides few employment opportunities, and many of the opportunities that do exist are in the hands of foreigners. Even the lowest end of the market—small stands or shops, little restaurants, a limited taxi service, mechanics, carpenters, plumbers—is dominated by Kenyans, Ugandans, Ethiopians and Eritreans. The report concluded that, it is the virtual absence of private sector employment that makes public sector employment (and hence political patronage as one of the few roads to making a living) so critical and the competition over those jobs so fierce and important (Hyman, 2013).

B.2.6 Inclusion

There is a growing recognition worldwide that inclusive societies are more stable (Gastil, March 2006). In the multilateral system, women and youth have been particularly identified as prone to exclusion in governance around the world and efforts to reverse this at the UN level resulted in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) (Gastil, March 2006). The USAID evaluation of governance on South Sudan refers to inclusion as the systematic inclusion or exclusion of certain groups, mostly based on their identification (whether self- or external) in a group based on characteristics such as gender, race, religion, and ethnicity (Hyman, 2013). Inclusion is closely linked to consensus, because those who feel excluded may actually oppose the system (Hyman, 2013). A good system of governance ensures that all sectors of society are able to participate meaningfully in public affairs without prejudice on the basis of any identity marker. The report found no groups were formally excluded in South Sudan in 2012/2013. Currently, many groups feel excluded or marginalized.

B.2.7 Effective Governance

For most South Sudanese, the greatest challenge and the most important post-independence deficiency is poor governance (Hyman, 2013). Effective governance at the national level, according to Sager and Gastil (2006), refers to the processes, mechanisms and policies that equitably deliver essential public goods and services that citizens have come to expect. Government effectiveness is judged by citizens not just on procedural grounds but on whether it works (Hyman, 2013). A government that works effectively is one that delivers essential public goods, such as public safety; law and order; reasonable justice; basic infrastructure; basic social services such as education, water, and health care; and the instruments and policies for economic growth and some measure of prosperity (Hyman, 2013). If for any reason the government fails to address grievances and deliver what is expected, the government would be replaced through competition if the state is democratic (Hyman, 2013). The report noted that governance in South Sudan was not effective, and the main hindrance to effective governance was the lack of political will (Hyman, 2013).
Other reasons leading to ineffective governance can be summarized as follows:

1. A significant part of the problem is capacity, which means that the government is limited both in human, financial, institutional, systemic, and technical capacity to deliver its mandate.
2. A second part of the problem is nepotism and patronage. When the state picks and chooses who gets the benefits and who doesn’t on the basis of blood relationship, friendship, or loyalty, it is likely to be very inefficient in doing its job.
3. A third part of the problem is the growing economic, political, and social gap between the power elite and the rest of the country.
4. A fourth part of the problem is the imbalance in the economy, specifically the disproportionate costs of a bloated military budget vis-à-vis social service sectors.
5. A fifth part of the problem is the amelioration provided by donors who have delivered food and medicines throughout two or three decades of struggle, and continue to do so, although at a reduced level.
6. Fundamentally, South Sudan faces a kind of governance conundrum: A growing concentration of power in a government that itself has little capacity to meet its own objectives or to perform the tasks it has set for itself. Instead, an erratic and idiosyncratic exercise of authority, spotty and inconsistent, good in some places but not in most, characterizes the growing concentration of power in the political elite.

B.2.8 Rule of Law and Human Rights

The report found four major problems with the rule of law in South Sudan. First, there is a limited constitutional and legal framework in South Sudan. The 2011 Transitional Constitution and even the SPLM Constitution 2008, have largely reinforced concentration of power and created dissent and discontent. Second, the judiciary cannot be said to be a truly independent branch of government as it is still very much controlled institutionally by the executive branch. Third, the judiciary lacks institutional capacity, quite dramatically in the lower courts. Fourth, the utter lack of professionalism by the civilian police is a cause of instability in South Sudan (Hyman, 2013). The report also found two justice systems in South Sudan; the informal traditional courts system, which varies across regions and ethnic communities and the formal system under the judiciary. More often than not, these systems often contradict each other and there is no framework regarding which system prevails in such instances.

On human rights, many reports show that South Sudan ranks among the worst in the world on abuses. When we speak of human rights, we are not talking about abstract concepts, we are talking about the relationship between the state and individual citizens. In a well-governed state, citizens have the liberty to speak freely, to move as they desire, to own property, to assemble and to organize political action, media is free, and no one can be arrested without due process. Since war broke out in 2013, ethnic targeted killings took place, people were ambushed as they move about, media has been suppressed, many have been arrested without due process and properties have been destroyed wantonly.

C. Summary
The people of South Sudan have rightly identified governance as one of the four priorities that will have to be addressed by the National Dialogue. From the grassroots consultations it has become clear that, governance in South Sudan is characterized by militarization of state structures. This means that the military is also a political tool used in the game of political and economic maneuvers. That is, the security and military power is at the discretion of political leaders. With this discretionary power, political leaders can allot economic and financial resources as they wish and using security demands to justify utilization of funds—a strategy often used to deliberately stymie scrutiny. The economy is choked either deliberately or inadvertently and so the state became the sole proprietor of economic and financial resources in the country. This being the case, the state can simply pick and choose those to whom favor is awarded. This obviously results in a clientele state where loyalty to the system is sought not for the sake of working for it, but to gain favor, a card necessary to access economic and political benefits. Those who are disfavored or fall victim to the system or fell off it, can only seek re-entry either through demonstrable prove of loyalty or through violent means. It is not surprising that armed rebellions have proliferated in South Sudan with little articulation of alternative visions for the state. They are simply fighting to get in, to do exactly the same. Hence, the struggle is over the wealth of South Sudanese State, which is in turn utilized for personal gains instead of improving the livelihoods of ordinary people through the provision of public goods and efficient service delivery.

Besides militarization and securitization of politics and distribution of economic benefits, ethnic and regional cards are colorfully displayed and stoked quite often in South Sudan. The rationale is simple, if you cannot sustain the clientele, because it is expensive, you can simply reach for ethnic loyalty. The benefit of ethnic politics is that, it doesn’t cost much to put together and maintain. All you need is a proper articulation of a common threat to ethnic identity and the response is spontaneous. Hence, South Sudanese political leaders can simply create an environment in which ethnic communities feel threatened, and loyalties can simply shift from party, religion, military or profession to that of an ethnic community. This of course gives the leaders stable and reliable constituencies and when combined with the military and economic power, create a strong political power, but not sustainable in the long-run. The grassroots consultations have revealed this situation and the purpose of this technical note is to enhance the understanding of the delegates to the Regional and National Dialogue Forums/Conferences in understanding governance and its main elements.

The state and government in this regard are no longer to the will of the sovereign; they have become tools also at the discretion of the political leaders whose functions are bent towards achieving political interests. In such a situation, merits are not worth much, what seems to get the trick in terms of social mobility and career development is loyalty to the system. Hence, government positions, military promotions, contracts and even business opportunities are awarded centrally to ensure that the political loop that is running, feeds the egos of those at the pinnacle of power. Those who hold dissenting viewpoints are seen as disrupting the flow and so they must either be silenced or jettisoned. One can imagine a cloaking of such a system as people are constantly rivaling for access and influence and
gatekeepers ensure that entry is restricted, and barriers are erected to pervert critical eyes. Those who are not blessed with luck in accessing the system constantly pull out of the system frustrated while others are trumping for a chance to get a glimpse. The people of South Sudan are, however, aware of this system and have expressed their views unambiguously as captured in the reports of the Subcommittees.

If such a system were to persist, it is plausible to imagine that it will become more oppressive and it will invariably benefit only those that are awarded favors. It is inconceivable that such a system would care about the general welfare much less democracy. Unfortunately, this is the system we have got in South Sudan. It cannot be debated; we have an authoritarian state in South Sudan, a situation that is antithesis to the cause of our struggle.

D. Considerations for the Regional and National Dialogue Forums/Conferences

This section simply gives suggestions to the conferences what issues to consider on governance, which have emerged from the grassroots consultations. These are:

1. South Sudan needs a new vision for the state around which consensus could be built. Without a vision, everything else we do would simply be unguided and aimless.

2. Consensus is needed on the structure of the state. Particularly, the question of federalism and the question of the number of states rose to prominence since the outbreak of conflict in the country. The Equatorians in particular have been very vocal on the question of federalism, although the Sudd Institute’s 2016 survey found 83% of the respondents around the country in favor of federalism. This has also come out from the grassroots consultations.

3. Concentration of Power. Presidential, gubernatorial and MPs term limits, dealing with the SPLM which is likely to continue to maintain a one-party state, limiting the powers of the executive, strengthening powers of the legislature, creating conditions for the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary. Creating robust and balanced vertical powers between central, state, and local governments. Nationalizing and professionalizing civil service that will be merit based, auditable, accountable to political leadership and the public at large and effective in delivering government mandate.

4. Competition. Create very clear, democratic, and inclusive rules for the management of politics. Emphasis to be placed on demilitarization of politics, depoliticization of the military and security sector at large, de-regionalization and tribalization of politics, strict adherence to the constitution and the law, independent, trust worthy, and effective elections commission, fair and acceptable political parties act that clearly outlines democratization of the parties and their structures as a condition for registration and participation in elections.

5. Constitution. A new constitution whose primary objective is to restrain the state, mobilize, organize and empower the people of South Sudan towards a common vision, decentralize power in a federal system, revisit presidential system and perhaps adopt quasi-parliamentary system where the parties have the power to recall the president or the head of government. Create many veto points for citizens who should be consulted regularly and to hold the state and government accountable. The constitution should consciously limit the powers of the executive and empower the parliament and the judiciary. States should have rights that cannot be given or
withdrawn by the central government. All powers not given to the state and
government are reserved for citizens. The constitution should address in no uncertain
terms inflicting violence on citizens by the state or non-state unjustifiably is
unforgiveable crime.

6. Development of Media and Civil Society. The constitution should be very forceful on
the development of free press and media and the development of civil society as a
responsibility of state and government. Hence, political and civic spaces must be
widely opened although regulated and resources should be made available. Media and
civil society development should be seen as a public good.

7. Protection of Liberties and people’s rights. John Stuart Mills said this “The struggle
between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of
history”. According to Mill, Civil, or Social Liberty relates to the nature and limits of
the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. He
asserts, “There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with
individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment,
is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political
despotism” (Mill, 1859, p. 9).

8. Natural resources. Who owns the oil and minerals? Is it the central government, is it
state government, is it citizens? Who decides what to do with the revenues from the
rents and why?

9. History. Dealing with the legacy of past injustices (Kokora, 1991 and other related
massacres, 2013-present atrocities). As well, we have to deal with divisive issues such
as the claim that the ‘Dinka and to some extent the Nuer liberated the country, the
Equatorians didn’t contribute much and other similar issues that stir emotions should
be addressed once and for all.’

10. Inclusion. Facing directly fears of domination by the Dinka and the Nuer and fears of
marginalization by smaller groups (managing diversity and protection of minority
rights). The rights of women, youth, people with disabilities and minority religious
groups should also be taken seriously.

11. Discussing issues of citizenship, residency, and political participation. Can you vote,
be elected to office, or pay taxes in state of your birth or in the state of residency?
How long does one have to be a resident to be eligible? Who decides on these issues
(central government or state).

12. Military/Security. Do we need an army (to do what for whom and against whom?),
how big and with what characteristics? What about national security, do we need it, to
do what for whom and against whom? How big do we need it and what should be its
characteristics? What about police, should it be nationalized, or should each state
recruit its own police?

13. Land ownership, management, farming and animal husbandry (who owns what land,
who manages it, who can farm where, who can move their animals where, who
decides on these issues (central or state government)?

14. Cattle Rustling. Should people have a right to take other people’s cows? Who decides
on this? Should people move across states with their cows, who regulates this?

15. Child Abduction. Should people steal other people’s children? What if they do, what
happen to them? Whose responsibility is it to prevent this?
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Awolich, A. A. (February 2014). *The Unwarranted Carnage in South Sudan.* Juba, South Sudan: The Sudd Institute.
II. The Security Cluster of Emerging Issues from The Grassroots Consultations: A Technical Note

_In my capacity as the President of the Republic, I feel a great responsibility to protect and preserve the unity of the people of South Sudan and end their suffering._

This technical note is organized into five sections. Section A is the introduction. Section B is on a brief discussion of the general concept of security. Section C provides an overview of the sector reform in South Sudan since 2005. Section D is on lessons of experience of security reform from selected countries in the region; and Section E suggests the way forward for security reform in the country.

The speech of President Salva Kiir Mayardit in December 2016 in which he announced to the South Sudanese nation, through the Transitional National Legislature, his initiative of the National Dialogue. The President highlighted the importance of the initiative, and outlined its objectives as:

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6 President Kiir, Concept Note on the South Sudan National Dialogue, 2016
1. To end political and communal violence in the country and resolve how to properly transform the military;
2. To settle social disputes and sources of conflict (cattle raiding and rustling, child abduction, communal violence related to marriages, territory, murder and other, cattle and human migration-related matters);
3. To develop and re-establish stronger national unity;
4. To redefine and re-establish stronger national unity;
5. To settle issues of diversity (deal with fear of political domination, address issues of the national army, civil service, foreign service, etc.);
6. To resolve issues related to resources sharing and allocation;
7. To set a stage for an integrated and inclusive national development strategy;
8. To agree on steps and guarantees to ensure safe, free, fair and peaceful elections;
9. Agree on strategies to return internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes; and
10. To develop a framework for national peace, healing and reconciliation.

In line with the above ten objectives, the First Plenary Session of the Steering Committee of the National Dialogue established fifteen Subcommittees to seek the views of the people, through a bottom-up approach, about the root causes of our crises. In this regard, the Secretariat of the National Dialogue has prepared this technical note on the Security Cluster based on the security-related issues that emerged from the grassroots consultations. The following twenty-six issues that emerged under this cluster as reported by the Subcommittees are:

1. The urgent need for immediate cessation of hostilities as a necessary condition, though not sufficient for the conduct of the SSND process;
2. The need for “military rehabilitation” (which is herein broadly interpreted to mean security sector reform or transformation) or security sector reform;
3. Politicization of the army and political promotions;
4. The tendency of appeasing rebel fighters and their commanders, which inflates the army (rewarding rebellion);
5. Army is disorganized, corrupt, tribal and unprofessional;
6. No security amenities for the organized forces to do their job such as vehicles, guns, uniforms and boots for the security to be maintained;
7. Ranks are scooped along tribal lines;
8. Low and/or delayed salaries for the security forces;
9. Army is individualized;
10. Appointment of army officers to political positions;
11. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians;
12. No or biased disarmament exercise;
13. Lack of care for wounded soldiers and families of martyrs;
14. Lack of pension policy, organized retirement and welfare for the forces;
15. Lack of proper armament and training;
16. Insecurity in urban areas and along roads and highways caused by “unknown” gunmen;
17. Forces taking sides in communal conflicts;
18. Arbitrary arrests and detention;
19. Rape and other abuses against women and children;
20. Abduction of children;
21. Looting, murder, killings, vandalizing houses and property, and other abuses or crimes;
22. Illegal arms in the hand of civilians;
23. Movement of cattle into farms and agricultural areas;
24. Restoration of security, transformation and formation of National army;
25. Cattle rustling/raiding; and
26. Politicians inciting the citizens against each other.

Looking at the issues listed above, it is obvious that the grassroots consultations outcome focused on the transformation of the security forces. The issue of transformation of the security forces was also raised seriously by the security forces themselves during the National Dialogue Consultative Workshop on 4th – 5th August 2017. The security forces contributions to the National Dialogue were published in a pamphlet titled: “Security Forces Contribution to the National Dialogue.”

All in all, the demand derived from the grassroots consultations for security sector reform, is calling for enhanced capabilities of the respective institutions, which would in turn lead towards the achievement and sustenance of peace and stability of the country. The importance of the reform was echoed in the speech of H.E. the President during the University of Juba graduation of August 2018 where he highlighted the need to balance the forces through recruitment based on national character. This is in line with the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCSS, 2011 Amended 2015) which in Chapters I and II specifically outlines the character, roles and functions of the security forces.

Apart from the leadership of the various security organs/forces, the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan mandates other security management and oversight bodies. These include:

1. The Presidency of the Republic of South Sudan;
2. The National Legislative Assembly;\(^7\)
3. The National Security Council/Committee;
4. The National Defence Council; and
5. The SPLA Command Council.

These institutions generally provide an oversight role (development of strategic security policies or guidelines, coordination, implementation and management of other security matters including reform). As Hanggi and Bryden clearly spelt out:

*From a governance perspective, the security sector covers the elements of the public sector responsible for the exercise of the state monopoly of coercive power and has traditionally been a key feature of the modern nation-state... This includes the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for management and*

\(^7\) Including its specialized security committee;
control of the security forces, such as the executive government, the relevant ministries (defence and interior), the parliament and its specialized committees.\(^8\)

Nonetheless, in South Sudan, despite the existence of these organs, the security management and oversight role is blurred. This, in a nutshell, explains the resurgence and reoccurrence of conflicts.

A. The Meaning of Security and the Linkage between Security and Development

This section comprises of a) the meaning of security; and b) linkage between security and development.

A.1 The Meaning and Concept of Security

Although the emphasis, from the grassroots consultations, was on the military, however, this document considers the emphasis by the grassroots consultations to mean all the security forces (the military, police, prisons, wildlife, and national security). The overemphasis on the military seems to have resulted from the lack of proper and broader explanation of the meaning of the security sector by the facilitators considering the fact that the concept itself remains ambiguous in terms of definition.\(^9\) This ambiguity of the security sector concept is further illustrated in the table below:

Table 2.1: Definitions of Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Definition A</th>
<th>Definition B</th>
<th>Definition C</th>
<th>Definition D</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security forces</td>
<td>Groups with a mandate to wield instruments of violence</td>
<td>Core security actors</td>
<td>Organisations authorised to use force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Civilian management and oversight bodies</td>
<td>Institutions with a role in managing and monitoring</td>
<td>Security management and oversight bodies</td>
<td>Civil management and oversight bodies</td>
<td>State-centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil court, penal system, human rights, ombudsmen</td>
<td>Security management and oversight bodies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broader</td>
<td>Non-statutory</td>
<td>Non-statutory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^8\) Hanggi and Bryden, p 8

Despite the under-emphasis, the grassroots are eager for holistic transformation of the security sector. The transformation here would mean avoiding promotion based on nepotism and politics, interference with established rules and regulations for recruitment, and accountability. It also means proper staffing of the security forces with qualified and professionally trained personnel at all levels.

Although there seems to be a consensus that security implies freedom from threats to core values both individuals and groups, scholars have continued to be sharply divided over the concept of security. A major area of disagreement is about whether the main focus of security should be on ‘individual’, ‘national’, or international level. According to Barry Buzan, security discussion should focus on the pursuit of freedom from threat. Furthermore, he argues that when this discussion is in the context of the international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity. On the other hand, Henry Kissinger, an American national security Strategist, defines security as the ability of a country to protect its core values from external threats. Another national security strategist, Robert MacManner, says national security is development and that without it there is no security. In other words, security and development are interrelated.

The Filipino academic Aries A. Arugay (2007) favours the maximalist notion that includes almost every institution and group in the government and civil society. This notion brings on-board every institution or segment of society that exerts any degree of influence on security rather than the traditional or minimalist notion, which only identifies core security forces such as the military, police, and paramilitary forces as the security sector. Indeed, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) supports the broader approach by defining the security sector as comprising of:

1. Core security forces or actors (armed forces, paramilitary forces, intelligence services, police, border and customs officials);
2. Security management and oversight bodies (executive departments, congressional committees, human rights institutions);
3. Justice and law enforcement institutions (ombudsman, courts);

Source: Hanggi and Bryden (2004)

4. Non-statutory security forces (private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia); and
5. Societal groups (civil society organizations, the academia, policy think-tanks, peace and human rights movements, and investigative media).

It is within the fundamental aims of the National Dialogue that the security institutions be transformed in order to be able to shoulder their responsibilities well and continually contribute to the defence of the nation and the provision and maintenance of law and order. This need brings into focus the urgency of dealing with all aspects of transformation within the respective security institutions. In order to appreciate the security dilemma in South Sudan, it is crucial to put the rapidly changing security dynamics into global perspective. The security challenges being experienced are not peculiar to South Sudan, but to the entire world, although contexts and kinds of security threats may vary from one country to the other. Human history is dominated by struggles of peoples to understand, analyze and address this challenge.

Admittedly, the Republic of South Sudan continues to face unprecedented security challenges since its independence on 9 July 2011, even beyond that period. Some of these challenges are home grown, while others are externally influenced. For example, issues of disputed boundaries and divergent interests in the country explain this external influence. The South Sudan security forces\footnote{In their submission to the National Dialogue Steering Committee titled: “The South Sudan National Dialogue: Security Forces Contribution,” 2017.} identified four root causes as being the reasons for the country’s problems: political, security, economic; and social. Of the four, security tops the list with 35%, followed by economic causes with 25%, political causes with 10%, and lastly social causes with 5%. These figures emphasis that security is the single biggest challenge to the new nation.

A.2 The Linkage between Security and Development

defence and the police for maintaining domestic order only. This is because the security sector is made up of intricate links that make it form a chain. These links include the military, intelligence services, police, judges, and prisons. All of these need to work in tandem in order for the system to function and maintain itself.14

Nationally, regionally and globally, much attention is now being given to the security sector. This is not only true of post-independent South Sudan, but also the Horn of Africa, East Africa and indeed of Africa as a whole. Beyond the continent, similar concerns are being echoed, especially in developing countries such as Venezuela, Myanmar and Yemen where formidable security challenges exist.15 The attention given to the security sector emanates from its significant relationship with democratization, development and good governance. Due to the closeness of this relationship, there is now a growing emphasis by communities, local civil society groups, regional and inter-governmental organizations, and the wider international community for security sector reform.16

In the words of the Ethiopian academic Medhane Tadesse (2010),17 “nowhere in the world has human security in all its aspects proved more elusive than on the African continent.” He argues that “Africa has been the stage of some of the longest-running wars in the world, [where] basic security has proved elusive for both individuals and nations.” Sadly, the territory of South Sudan has been hosting some of these wars that Tadesse talks about, both before and after its independence from Sudan. Hence, engaging in strategic security sector reforms is vital to the honest quest for peace and stability in the new republic. This is one of the tenets of this noble quest upon which the national dialogue initiative is pillared.

In view of the above analysis, it must therefore be emphasized that the special focus by the National Dialogue on the security sector is strategically deliberate. If South Sudan is to save itself from the ongoing menace and embark on sustainable development, it must necessarily first and foremost embark on a rational transformation of the security sector. Indeed the new but rapidly developing paradigm of the security-development nexus believes that security and development are inextricably linked, and emphasizes on the necessity for governments and communities to construct and pursue a security and development policy based on a human security paradigm.18 The security-development nexus may be illustrated using two diagrams representing two perspectives. Figure 2.1 is how the World Bank conceptualizes the security-development nexus, while Figure 2.2 gives the perspective of the Brookings Institution, which is a Washington, D.C. based think-tank. .

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16 Ibid
18 Ibid
The security-development nexus in Figure 2.1 above, believes that war is development in reverse, and that violence and the threat of violence within communities are big obstacles for countries (such as South Sudan) trying to ignite a development process. It perceives most wars as intra-state conflicts with far-reaching regional as well as international dimensions and ramifications. It holds that wars rapture a country’s development, and that their occurrence is often the consequence of the failure of a country’s development efforts. The security-development nexus emphasizes the need for conceptual, policy and programming innovations at the intersection of development and security. Viewed this way, appropriate strategies for responding to the multifaceted socio-economic, political, environmental, and security challenges in conflict-prone, conflict-torn, and post-conflict countries thus become imperative.19

Figure 2.2 views the nexus as starting from development interventions, which produces security outcomes that in turn leads to development outcome.

19 QUOTE
Others are concerned with human security as a three-way relationship between safety, rights, and equity. This seems to have come out clearly from the grassroots consultations. Figure 2.3 below, which consists of three Venn’s Diagrams is used to illustrate this relationship.

**Figure 3: Human Security as the Nexus between Safety, Rights and Equity**
B. Overview of Security Sector Reform Efforts in South Sudan: 2005-2018

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s (CPA) Security Protocol set the stage for security sector reforms. Further, the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (TCSS, 2011) has mandated different roles to each of the security forces in the country. For the SPLA in particular, the Constitution states that it shall constitute the national armed forces of the Republic of South Sudan, and that it shall be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, regular, professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate and accountable to the civilian authority. Viewed this way, the mission of the SPLA is to protect the constitution, sovereignty, territorial integrity, values and the resources of South Sudan and the security of its citizens, in order to contribute towards the creation of a peaceful and stable environment for national economic and social development.

All in all, the overall goal of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan is to promote the prosperity and welfare of its entire people through national economic and social development. In a developing and unstable country like South Sudan, economic and social development cannot occur without human security for its citizens. At the same time, this economic and social development will, over time, reduce the factors (such as poverty and lack of education) that currently undermine security. Therefore the role of the SPLA, as one of the country’s principal security forces, is to ensure the respect for the human security of the nation’s citizens whilst contributing to economic and social development.

While relentless efforts have been exerted since 2005, the security sector reform process has hitherto basically not met the expectations of the South Sudanese people. This is because the reform agenda is interrupted by the recurrent rebellion and integration, the lack of clear policy direction, limited resources, corruption within the forces, lack of effective pension and DDR policies, and most importantly, a seriously debilitating lack of political will to ensure that badly needed transformation activities are undertaken and completed within a given time frame. The little transformation processes that have taken place have basically been unsustainable and/or on ad-hoc basis only, and are therefore not built within the grand strategy policy of the country, not even after the internationally celebrated independence in 2011.

This Technical Note, however, cannot in any way claim to provide accurate information on the status of security sector reform in the country. That said, it must nonetheless be pointed out that the SPLA for its part has undertaken serious and tangible transformation process. It has developed a number of policy documents. These include The White Paper on Defence, 2009; the SPLA Rules and Regulation, 2008; and the SPLA Act, 2008; all of which are critical to the expected functioning of the army. In 2012, the army

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20 The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011
21 South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013, July 2011
further developed a comprehensive Transformation Strategy known as The SPLA Objective Force 2012-2017, which envisioned to right-size the force to 120,000. Through this important document, the transformation process of the SPLA could have been completed by 2017. The Objective Force was interrupted by the 2013 crisis and the ongoing conflict. During the 6th SPLA Command Council Conference, however, the command resolutely extended the Objective Force for another five years: from 2018-2022. It has been projected that the delayed transformation of the army would be completed by the elapse of the said period.

Chapter II of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), which is being revitalized now, places considerable emphasis on comprehensive security sector reforms. Pursuant to the agreement, a critically important body was established, the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB). The SDSRB is mandated to play a critical role in conceptualizing and shaping security sector reform, and provide a roadmap for security sector transformation, including designing the national security architecture for the new nation. On its part, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs and the SPLA have initiated an internal review of their own structures and guiding documents with the intention of transforming the defence sector.

Given the country’s trajectory thus far, it is only when the agreement is implemented and critical mechanisms such as the SDSR board complete their work and funding and political will secured, that a comprehensive security sector reform would be achieved. Otherwise, the efforts being exerted, including in the drafting of this very technical note in fulfillment of the objectives of the national dialogue initiative would hardly realize the intended objectives.

C. Security Sector Reform Experiences from Other Countries

Security sector reform has found a growing acceptance in post-conflict societies emerging from internal or inter-state conflict. To appreciate this global reality, a selected number of countries are hereunder examined in order to draw lessons and parallels for contemporary post-independence South Sudan.

C.1 The Liberian Experience

In the case of Liberia, the security sector reform efforts focused on mechanisms for, and approaches to, a collective broad-based vision of security, and to the promotion of local ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction. In their experience, lack of effective oversight was related to excessive presidential powers, lack of independent and credible parliament, and lack of capable parliamentary administration. Overlapping functions of security institutions was also found to have affected the oversight such as legislative oversight committee, committee on national security, committee on national defense, and committee
for judiciary. Furthermore, lack of regular remuneration was found to have caused lack of professionalism among the forces. For example, a soldier’s salary was only fifteen ($15) dollars and was not regular. Because of this underpayment, coupled with the economic challenges, soldiers supplemented their incomes by accepting bribes, illegal assignments and other forms of corruption and nepotism. Moreover, Liberia also experienced problems emanating from proliferation of small arms because of a significant gap between demobilization and disarmament on the one hand, and reintegration and rehabilitation on the other.

Liberia embarked on a new security framework that enhances opportunities and promotes an enabling environment for sustainable development; a security system, which is effective and efficient in the performance of its legal functions, above all, one that is under democratic oversight and control. The country also envisaged security institutions, which are law-abiding and respect human rights and dignity of citizens; a security system in which the mandate of each institution is clear and does not overlap or conflict with the duties and responsibilities of other security establishments. Liberia envisaged a security system, which is composed and reflective of all Liberian ethnic and religious groups and which is accountable to civil authority. A security system, which allows for and encourages constructive civil society input; composed of suitably qualified and well-trained personnel who are recruited in a transparent process. The urgent need was seen for reintegration and rehabilitation of demobilized combatants and the disarmament of the civil population, coupled with constitutional reforms to address the overlapping responsibilities of security institutions. All members of security institutions were retrained, with a special attention on civic education, which injects nationalism and promotes civil-military relations.

C.2 The Rwandan Experience

For years, Rwanda was a country bedeviled by problems of deep-rooted ethnic prejudices and discrimination. The tensions were aggravated by a government policy that favored one ethnic group against the other among the country’s three ethnic groups – the Hutu, Tutsi and the Twa. In fact, the Hutu and Tutsi in the nations of Rwanda and Burundi share the same territory, speak the same languages (Kinyarwanda in Rwanda, Kirundi in Burundi), share the same customs, practice the same religion, and frequently intermarry. Gérard Prunier (1997) argues that the real difference, which led to the genocide between the majority Hutu (who make up between 80 and 85 percent of the population in Rwanda and Burundi) and the minority Tutsi (between 12 and 15 percent in both countries) was socio-political. During colonial Rwanda, the European imperialists exploited existing differences between the two peoples to exert their rule. It was a socio-political structure that promoted Tutsi aristocracy

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22 The Hutu are the majority, comprising about 80%, followed by the Tutsi who comprise 19%, and the Twa, who are only about 1% of the population.


24 Rwanda was colonised first by the Germans, and later by Belgians.
and Hutu clientelism. At the time of independence, Rwanda gained rule under Hutus. The Hutus dominated the government and all spheres of life.

In summary, in the name of social and historical justice, the Hutu-dominated government in Rwanda enacted unabashedly anti-Tutsi policies in an effort to avenge years of Tutsi domination. Using ethnically based quotas, the government's “Hutu Power” ideology, a mix of ethnic and social theories whose common theme was Hutu superiority, limited what jobs and social positions could be held by Tutsis. Those Tutsi who stayed behind became second-class citizens, while those who fled abroad were not allowed to return.

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under the leadership of Paul Kagame came to power in 1994 and as part of its broader security reform efforts, the government established a ban on ethnic politics, and ushered in a new constitution in its post-genocide reconstruction, and introduced national elections. There was an urgent need to transform the security sector in the country. It focused on the prosecution of individuals responsible for the genocide, with the intention of ensuring that the killings never get repeated. To achieve this, the reform efforts also focused on the enhancement of the capacity of the justice system. Building and consolidating the rule of law became a leading agenda. It strengthened the demand for and process of prosecution. Attention was placed on the training of cadres to professionalize a new police force; and on the demobilization of thousands of soldiers and their reintegration into Rwandan society.

One of the leading qualities of the Rwandan security sector reform agenda is that it has retained and continues to retain a great deal of local ownership over those reforms. This is despite the fact that the country is still largely dependent on support from the international community. The insistence by the international community that the RPF government bears some responsibility for the genocide made it to reform the security sector, and especially the armed forces. The inward quest for it to be seen and appreciated as a reformist government played a strategic position in the transformation of the security forces, for it is viewed by the government as a major way of fending off criticism. Most of the reforms have improved the capacity of the Rwandan security sector, although significant challenges still remain: small arms trafficking, border skirmishes with Hutu rebels in neighboring countries, and the ongoing situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which exerts pressure on the police and the armed forces, perceived in many ways as testing the ability of these institutions. There are constant allegations of dictatorial tendencies labeled against Kigali, with the ruling RPF, which is dominated by the Tutsi, widely criticized for suppressing democratic freedoms and opposition in order to ensure stability.

Several programs were prioritized as central to Rwanda’s security sector reform. The process undertook a reform of the justice sector with the stated “aims of strengthening the capacity and efficiency of the key institutions of the justice sector.” These key identified

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25 Ibid.

institutions were the Ministry of Justice, the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, the Supreme Court, and the Rwanda National Police (RNP).

The government also introduced what it referred to as the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP). Programmed in phases, it sought to demobilize up to 5,500 combatants from armed groups, and about 500 child soldiers. In its design, the RDRP gave out an initial cash package to each ex-combatant, and each became eligible for a Recognition-of-Service Allowance, equivalent to remuneration consistent with their former rank. Furthermore, a Reintegration grant was designed, the purpose of which was to help demobilized individuals in setting up a livelihood for themselves. The grant was received both by former members of armed groups and personnel demobilized from the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF).

As part of its intervention, the international community established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) through United Nations Security Council Resolution 955. It was meant to prosecute persons responsible for the genocide and any other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the country between January 1 and December 31 1994. By the 31st December 2015 when it was officially closed, the ICTR had already completed 75 cases, while a further nine suspects were still at large.

The transitional justice reform efforts were introduced, included the introduction of what were referred to as the Gacaca Courts. Initially, these were historical community tribunals convened within traditional Rwandan society to resolve civil disputes. As the formal court system was in ruins, the government took to reinforce this traditional arbitration and transformed it into an informal court. The Gacaca Courts punished crimes committed during the genocide, established a history of what actually took place, eliminated the culture of impunity that existed prior to the genocide, and promoted reconciliation and national healing. Participation in the Gacaca Court system was mandated for all adult citizens never accused of crimes. After exerting significant influence within Rwandan society, the Gacaca Court system officially closed during its 10th anniversary celebration in 2012.

Overall, resource mobilization was a fundamental aspect of the Rwandan reform efforts. Both the government and the international community played a key role. The Japanese government and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), for example, raised the funds for the creation of the Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA), an institution conceived, implemented and run by the Ministry of Defence. The RPA specializes in training and research programs relevant to post-conflict challenges and reconstruction. It aims to enhance regional capacity for conflict prevention and management, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and peace building.

27 International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), 2013
The government and the UNDP also made massive financial and resource contribution towards justice reforms. The focus was on the creation of a justice system that is effective and that enables the full protection of human rights, i.e., human security. Specific support was made to strengthening the review and drafting of laws; the enhancement of citizens’ knowledge of the justice system and their fundamental rights and freedoms; enhancement of the justice system’s accessibility to vulnerable groups; and, strengthening the justice sector by improving coordination between judicial institutions and law enforcement. Also of critical importance to the security sector reform efforts, was the funding of the RDDR program, mobilized both from local sources and international partners. In securing and maintaining funding from international partners, transparency and accountability were critically important aspects. There was concern for the value of the investment being made.

Other than the government, the United Nations and the wider international community in general, the Rwandan civil society also played a very fundamental role. It partook in the formulation and articulation of citizens’ concerns, and in the broader sensitization and reordering of Rwandan society, and was an important intermediary between politicians and policymakers on the one hand, and the masses on the other.

D. Lessons Learned and the Way Forward

The Technical Note concludes with lessons learnt from Liberia and Rwanda security sector reforms. It then makes suggestions for consideration by the Regional and National Dialogue Forums/Conferences.

D.1. Lessons Learned

In the case of Liberia, lessons learned include:

1. Adoption of a new security framework for Liberia that enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of the security forces;
2. Collective broader vision of security for Liberia;
3. Valuing the role of women in the security forces;
4. Strong local ownership;
5. Building of security forces that reflect the character of the nation;
6. Transparent recruitment of suitably-educated personnel for training;
7. Democratic and civilian oversight over the security forces;
8. Independent legislature (parliament);
9. Non-partisan Judicial reforms;
10. Separation of mandates and roles to avoid overlapping responsibilities and conflicts among security institutions;
11. Timely and adequate salary payment of the security forces;
12. Youth unemployment which led to security challenges;
13. Economic challenges;
14. Illegal assignment of armed personnel in non-military activities;
15. Urgent need for reintegration and rehabilitation of demobilized combatants;
16. Serious disarmament of civil population;
17. Undertook constitutional reforms;

In the case of Rwanda, lessons learned include:

1. Strong political will from the leadership;
2. Transformation of the police force;
3. Transformation of the judiciary;
4. Strong local ownership of the security sector transformation process;
5. Commitment to security sector reform timeframes;
6. Ownership of the DDR process;
7. Mixture of the formal and traditional justice system;
8. Transitional justice (truth telling and confessions);
9. Development of new civic education curriculum that promoted national harmony and consensus that promotes the spirit of nationalism.

D.2. Suggestions on the Way Forward

From the grassroots discussions, it is evident that the ordinary citizens of South Sudan broadly demand a complete and robust reform of the army and the organized forces in the country so as to promote human security, development and national stability. This should not be surprising considering that the problem, which started in December 2013, began with the split in the army. The professionalization of the army and the other organized forces will enhance the protection of the people and sovereignty. In fact, since the CPA period, activities towards reforming the army have been ongoing. However, the recurrent rebellions, inadequate resources, and above all, lack of and/or uncertain political will have frustrated those attempts.

As shown by other countries, which undertook reforms (such as the two cases highlighted in this Technical Note), the success of security sector reform requires strong political determination. A professional army could be achieved if the present SPLA and the organized forces:

1. Are right-sized;
2. Are depoliticized;
3. Are highly disciplined;
4. Are of national character;
5. Are able to take care of the welfare of the wounded, veterans, and families of martyrs;
6. Are respectful of the rule of law;
7. Are governed by the rules and regulations of their respective institutions;
8. Are under a legitimate authority of the State;
9. Are well trained, equipped and staffed;
10. Are professionalized;
11. Are professionalized based on their constitutional mandate;
12. Have adequate retirement and pension schemes; and
13. Have monopoly of the use of legitimate force.
Reference


INFRASTRUCTURE, S., Support RAND.


SPLA White Paper on Defence, 2007

SPLA Objective Force, 2012-2017


South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013, July 2011


The Transitional National Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011


III. The Economic Cluster of Emerging Issues from The Grassroots Consultations: A Technical Note on the Root Causes of Economic Problems in South Sudan

The overall objective of this Technical Note on the economic issues that emerged from grassroots consultations is to assist delegates to the Regional Dialogue Forums/Conferences (RDFs/RDCs) to have informed-deliberations on these issues. In this regard, the following fifteen (15) issues have emerged as among the root causes of economic problems in South Sudan:

1. The market is being controlled by foreigners;
2. Skyrocketing prices of items in the market, which have eroded the purchasing power of the South Sudanese Pound (SSP);
3. Resource and budget allocations of the national government should be distributed proportionately based on the population of the states;
4. Nepotism affects access to business and job opportunities (i.e. corruption);
5. Multiple taxes at several checkpoints;
6. Land issues, especially in Greater Equatoria also reported under governance and security clusters;
7. Lack of regulation of price of items and market generally;
8. Awarding of letters of credit (LCs) to briefcase companies owned by politicians and generals (i.e. corruption and mismanagement of public resources);
9. Involvement of constitutional post holders and generals in business contracts (i.e. corruption);
10. Money laundering and repatriation of money by foreigners back to their countries;
11. Lack of economic development, especially in infrastructure;
12. Lack of pension funds and delay in the payment of wages and salaries to the public sector employees;
13. South Sudan has opened its borders to everyone;
14. Depreciation of the pound against the dollar; and
15. Lack of diversification of the economy.

The above fifteen issues are grouped into four categories of economic policy. For the purposes of comparative analysis with other countries, they are also grouped according to the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index, which measures the quality of institutions and associated policies. The categories are: a) economic management; b) structural policies; c) policies for social inclusion and equity; and d) public sector management and institutions.

A. Economic Management

This consists of monetary and exchange rate policy; fiscal policy; and debt policy. Three issues that have emerged from the grassroots consultations fall under this category. They are:

28 The CPIA has been developed by the World Bank
1. Skyrocketing prices of items in the market, which have eroded the purchasing power of the SSP;
2. Depreciation of the pound against the dollar; and
3. Lack of economic development especially in infrastructure.

B. Structural Policies
This category is comprised of four sets of policies, which are: trade; financial; and business regulatory environment. Here are the following four issues that have emerged from the grassroots consultations under this category:

1. The market is being controlled by foreigners;
2. Lack of regulation of price of items and market generally;
3. South Sudan has opened its borders to everyone; and
4. Lack of diversification of the economy.

C. Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity
This category is comprised of two sets of policies, which are: trade; financial; and business regulatory environment. Here are the following two issues that have emerged from the grassroots consultations under this category:

1. Resource and budget allocations of the national government should be distributed proportionally based on the population of the states; and
2. Lack of pension funds and delay in the payment of wages and salaries to the public sector employees.

D. Public Sector Management and Institutions
This category is comprised of six sets of policy issues, which are:

1. Nepotism affects access to business and job opportunities;
2. Multiple taxes at several checkpoints;
3. Land issues, especially in Greater Equatoria also reported under governance and security clusters;
4. Awarding of letters of credit (LCs) to briefcase companies owned by politicians and generals;
5. Involvement of constitutional post holders and generals in business contracts; and
6. Money laundering and repatriation of money by foreigners back to their countries.

The above four categories of economic policy are discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this Technical Note. It is how, however, important to put this in context as a way of introducing the root causes of the economic problems in South Sudan. For instance, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) received during the first six months (9 July – 31 December 2011) of independence a total amount of $3.3 billion from oil revenues. It could therefore be stated that the country was born with a “golden spoon” in her mouth articulated by very impressive average monthly oil revenues of $556.3 million. In

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29 See MPM Marketing Reports, Volume 1A, Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, Republic of South Sudan. Lual A. Deng (2016) has stated this point in his paper: “Protecting Purchasing Power From Skyrocketing Prices In South Sudan Through Partial Dollarization.”
fact, September 2011 witnessed the highest level (i.e. $675 million) of GRSS’ monthly oil revenues during this period. This steady flow of oil revenues was interrupted in January 2012 when the GRSS voluntarily and suddenly decided to completely shutdown oil production in a dispute with Sudan over transit fees. This decision was the beginning, in the view of many analysts, of the economic crisis, which is essentially a “man-made” episode.

The preceding paragraphs constitute an introduction to this Technical Note. The rest of this Technical Note is divided into three Sections. Section 3.2 provides a common understanding on how an economy operates by highlighting the determinants of economic growth. Section 3.3 develops a macro-meso-micro framework (or 3M Framework) for delegates to discuss and internalize the fifteen issues in the economic cluster. And Section 3.4 explains the consistency of the fifteen issues with the three-year (July 2018 - June 2021) South Sudan National Development Strategy (SSNDS), which has been formulated by the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) and approved by the Transitional National Legislature (TNL).

3.2 Determinants of Economic Growth

The fundamental function of the economy is to ensure, through sustained transaction; production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services in a given geographical area (space) and time (daily, weekly, monthly, or annually). The phrase economic growth refers to the capacity of the country (i.e. economy) to increase production, distribution, and supply of goods and services to its population. This is achieved through a system of sustained transaction and exchange among economic agents within the country and/or with the rest of the world. But, what determines the growth of the economy? There are three groups of factors underpinning the performance of the economy (i.e. economic growth): a) drivers (primary and secondary) of growth; b) fundamental causes of growth; and c) proximate determinants of economic growth. For ease of exposition, these factors are given in illustrative Figure 3.1 below.
Figure 3.1: Programmatic Illustration of Determinants of Economic Growth

The first group of factors is drivers, which is divided into primary and secondary drivers. Leadership is the primary driver of economic growth, which is anchored on savings and investment as secondary drivers. Visionary leadership ensures: a) conducive environment for domestic savings; b) mobilization of development assistance & effective utilization of foreign aid; c) efficient borrowing from both domestic & external sources; d) adherence to the rule of law, which would in turn encourage foreign direct investment (FDI); e) private property rights (e.g. land, house, cattle, farm, etc.); f) functioning markets underpinned by free movements of goods & services, including capital; g) efficient production of public goods, e.g. roads & bridges, railway, schools, power-generation, telecommunications; h) investment in human and physical capital; and i) efficient application of modern technology, which is science-based.

The second group consists of institutions, geography, and culture. Five definitions of institutions would suffice. These are: “Working rules of collective action in restraint, liberation, and expansion of individual action” John R. Commons\(^{30}\) (1959: 73). “Rules and conventions of society that facilitate coordination among people regarding their behavior”\(^{31}\) Vernon Ruttan and Yujiro Hayami (1984). “The rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” Douglas C. North (1990:3). “Social phenomena which restrict and pattern interactions in society like

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\(^{30}\) From 1990 edition
\(^{31}\) Quoted from Daniel Bromley (1989:22).

Daron Acemoglu articulates the role of geography in economic growth in the following long passage:

*By geography, we refer to all factors that are imposed on individuals as part of the physical, geographic and ecological environment in which they live. Geography can affect economic growth through a variety of proximate causes. Geographic factors that can influence the growth process include soil quality, which can affect agricultural productivity; natural resources, which directly contribute to the wealth of a nation and may facilitate industrialization by providing certain key resources, such as coal and iron ore during critical times; climate, which may affect productivity and attitudes directly; topography, which can affect the costs of transportation and communication; and disease environment, which can affect individual health, productivity and incentives to accumulate physical and human capital (2009:131).*

Putting the above description of geography into our context, it is imperative that the area and ecological zones of South Sudan are identified, so as to enable the delegates to deliberate on emerging economic issues with enhanced understanding of the country’s natural resources. South Sudan has an area of **648,051** square kilometers and a population of **12.3** million of which about 83% lives in the rural areas. There are five ecological zones in South Sudan. These are: a) the desert zone; b) the semi-arid zone; c) the central zone; d) the flood zone; and e) the equatorial zone. These zones will determine the nature of investment in each of them, bearing in mind that South Sudan is a landlocked country surrounded by six countries with a total land boundary of **5,413** km (CIA Fact book, 2012). Being landlocked, notwithstanding, the country is endowed with significant natural resources. Moreover, the country has a young population where 51% is less than 18 years old, and more dramatically, 72% of the total population of South Sudan is below 30 years old. It is a multi-ethnic country with about 64 ethnic groups and three main language families (i.e. Bantu, Nilotic and Sudanic). The delegates when deliberating on the emerging issues from the grassroots consultations must take all these features into account. They should also link the deliberations here to issues of governance, security, and social cohesion for there is a clear intersection here between the four key clusters of the emerging issues from the grassroots consultations.

On the role of culture, the legacy of over 50 years of the struggle for independence and the current conflict have resulted into a culture of dependency on relief and humanitarian assistance. This has in turn undermined attitudes toward hard work and propensity to save

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34 This paragraph is informed by a paper by Lual A Deng, Abdurohman Ali Hussien, and Augustino Ting Mayai: Identifying Binding Constraints on Growth in the Context of Fragility: The Case of South Sudan. A collaborative Research Project funded by AERC. July 2017
and willingness to accumulate physical and human capital. Moreover, violent conflict has affected social capital – trust and the degree of cooperation among individuals are often important foundations for productive activities in societies. The delegates to the RDFs/RDCs will have to address this culture of dependency by beginning the slow process of re-engaging young males and ex-combatants from the process of “getting and spending” funds they have never worked for. However, experience has shown that civil conflict is often more remunerative than regular productive work. This implies that priority must be given to alter the “benefit-cost calculation” of young men so that steady work becomes more attractive than soldiering. This is because those who cannot envision a more promising future often become fixated on the past\(^{35}\). In this regard, consolidating peace and stabilizing the economy would depend on the future of productive work being seen as more compelling than a future of combat.

Proximate determinants of growth constitute the third group of factors underpinning the performance of an economy. This third group consists of: a) physical capital; b) human capita; and c) technology. The importance of physical capital formation/accumulation is illustrated by examples from our own experience as South Sudanese, so as to assist the delegates to discuss the binding constraints on public investment. Here are two examples to illustrate this group:

1) Hydro-electricity: In February 2012, MoU was signed by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) with China Gezhouba Group for 540mw Bedden Dam project (estimated cost of US$1.4 billion). The delegates will have to ask as to what happened to this project. Other proposed schemes are Fula Rapids 42mw, Grand Fula 890mw, Laki 410mw and Shukoli 230mw. None of these schemes have materialized into confirmed functioning and/or started projects. What are the reasons? Mismanagement of resources came out clearly from the grassroots consultations as one of the root causes of our economic problems.

2) Roads: In October 2005 GoSS approved $700m project to build 400-km road from Juba to Rumbek. The project did not materialize. In January 2012 the Ministry of Roads and Bridges (MRB) announced a 10-year plan to build 12,640km network of roads. Actual road construction during 2005-2018 is limited to some roads in Juba, plus construction of US-funded 192-km Juba-Nimule road. A Japanese-funded project to build a second bridge over the Nile in Juba was launched in 2011; disruptions of the project because of conflict meant that as of August 2018 the bridge has not been completed. In addition, records of the Ministry of Roads and Bridges show that about $1.3 billion had been spent on roads during the period 2005 – 2013. The cost of a kilometer of tarmac road was by then estimated to be $1.3 million, which means South Sudan had 1,000km of tarmac roads. But, it had only 192km tarmac road (i.e. Juba – Nimule highway), which was fully financed from a grant from USAID.

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\(^{35}\) As articulated by Bromley, D.W. 2014. Toward Sustainable Livelihoods in South Sudan: The Necessary Institutions of Governance. Paper presented to the Development Policy Forum (DPF) organized by Ebony Center for Strategic Studies, Juba, South Sudan, in February 2014
On human capital formation, the country continues to ignore investing in the education of its young people who constitute about 73% of the total population. And without remunerative employment, youth especially in the rural areas are prone to leaving their homes for towns or to become involved in cattle rustling or worse in rebellion evidenced by the role of the so-called “community militia” in the current violence. The greatest challenge that will face South Sudan, after the ending of the current violent conflict, is the establishment of a sense of belonging to the nation underpinned by respect for life, liberty, freedom of expression, and pursuit of happiness. And feasible livelihoods tend to secure commitments to these ideals of dignified existence. The delegates will have to deliberate on this question of human capital formation from three dimensions – economic, security, and social cohesion.

3.3  Macro-Meso-Micro Framework

**Macro Component:** This concerns the overall macroeconomic outlook of the country. South Sudan performs poorly in the area of economic management and public sector management and institutions relative to other fragile states. In this regard, the views from the grassroots consultations as presented in the introduction of this Technical Note are consistent with the CPIA. That is, six out of fifteen issues (or 40%) fall in the category of public sector management and institutions. South Sudan scored\(^{36}\) 1.5 out of 6.0 in 2016 compared to 3.0 for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries that are eligible to credit from the International Development Assistance (IDA) of the World Bank (see Table 3.1 below). Four out of fifteen issues fall in the category of structural policies, which is the best performing category with 2.0 out of 6.0 of the CPIA. Structural policies cover trade, among other elements, which has opened up the country for foreigners to business in South Sudan. So, the two emerging issues - the market is being controlled by foreigners and South Sudan has opened its borders to everyone – are confirmed by the CPIA scores and delegates would therefore benefit from the four categories of the CPIA for South Sudan in their deliberations.

Three of the fifteen issues fall in the category of economic management, which is the worst performing category for South Sudan with a CPIA score of 1.0 out of 6.0. That is, South Sudan has mismanaged her economy evidenced by the letter of President Salva Kiir Mayardit of June 2012, which he sent then to 75 former and current senior officials and constitutional office holders. The letter alleged then that those 75 officials had stolen $4.5 billion. Moreover, Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) had received combined total oil revenue of about $20.0 billion during the period 2005 – 2013. Annual audited reports of the GoSS and GRSS by the Auditor General (AG) of the Republic of South Sudan show the nature and magnitude of financial mismanagement; a point that has been echoed by the stakeholders during the grassroots consultations. In this regard, the delegates will have to recommend, at the end of their deliberations of the economic cluster, robust actions to deal with the pervasive corruption in the public sector and associated impunity.

\(^{36}\) A score of 6 gives the highest quality of policies and institutions of a country. A score of 1 indicates poor quality (i.e. the lowest level) of policies and institutions
Finally, two issues of the fifteen issues fall in the category of policies for social inclusion and equity. This category is the second best performing for South Sudan with a CPIA score of 1.8 out of 6.0. The delegates will deliberate on the fifteen issues as grouped according to the four categories of the CPIA. That is, the CPIA will be used in prioritizing areas of investment in the four broad clusters of the CPIA (see Table 3.1 below). The impact of conflict on institutions is unambiguously captured by the sharp declined in the overall score of CPIA for South Sudan from 2.1 in 2012 to 1.3 in 2017. However, the current crisis provides an opportunity for the SSND to urge the TGoNU and South Sudan development partners to initiate a process of building institutions for effective governance as by way of creating sustainable livelihoods for ordinary South Sudanese citizens irrespective of their ethnicity, region, religion, gender, age, socio-economic status, and/or political inclination.

Table 3.1: South Sudan’s CPIA for 2016 in Comparison to Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
<th>SSA IDA Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Management</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fiscal Policy</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Debt Policy</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Policies</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Trade</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Financial Sector</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Business Regulatory Environment</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Gender Equality</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Equity of Public Resource</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Building Human Resources</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Social Protection and Labor</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Policies and Institutions for.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Sustainability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector Management and Institutions</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Quality of Public Administration</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are five areas in the above table where South Sudan has been performing poorly. These are: a) monetary and exchange rate policy; b) fiscal policy; c) debt policy; d) policies and institutions for environmental sustainability; and e) quality of budgetary and financial management. The delegates are encouraged to pay especial attention to focus debate toward the improvement of these areas of macro-level variables. They are expected to make implementable recommendations after their informed-deliberations on these four critical areas of macroeconomic policy performance.

**Meso Component**: The topics of this component would generally focus on fiscal federalism, property rights and the rule of law. Moreover, delegates are encouraged to discuss the necessity of the public investment program (PIP) in the following key areas:

1. Making agriculture the engine of economic growth and use oil revenues to fuel this engine;
2. Physical infrastructure, e.g. roads & bridges, power generation, river transport;
3. Oil & mining sector;
4. Social sector (education, health, water sanitation, etc.);
5. Wildlife & tourism;
6. Job-creation;
7. Youth empowerment scheme (YES);
8. Women Economic Empowerment (WEE);
9. Building inclusive economic institutions, so as to fight corruption and ensure equitable sharing of common wealth (i.e. national wealth, such as oil and other minerals); and
10. Development of South Sudanese private sector and replace foreigners who have taken over most of the businesses.

**Micro Component**: To examine opportunities for sustainable livelihoods in light of the meso-micro nexus, delegates could start their deliberations by asking a fundamental question – how do South Sudanese households: **a) meet their basic needs; b) acquire material goods; and c) accumulate wealth.** Since most individuals and households in the rural areas of South Sudan engage in unpaid work, this composite question could be addressed using consumption data. The data showed at the time (i.e. 2009) that food constitutes on average 80 percent of the consumption basket of a South Sudanese household. As expected, this figure is greater in rural than in urban setting. Disaggregating it further shows what seems at first a puzzling finding: food makes up slightly more of the non-poor’s (relative to the poor).

An important point for the delegates to ponder on, is how are these expenditures financed? In rural setting, studies conducted before the current war, have shown that barter and subsistence farming were the primary means of food consumption. Moreover, data from

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37 The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has constructed a consumption basket for an average adult South Sudanese to be consisting of ten (10) broad items: food, education, health, clothing, utilities, transportation (including expenses on communication), personal care, housing, recreation, and other.
the National Household Budget Survey (NHBS) of 2009 on the receipt of economic transfers (cash or in-kind) from government, organizations or persons living outside the household, would help in understanding the behavior of economic agents. Delegates are to be informed that these studies found only **15% of households in South Sudan reported** to have received a transfer, from: a) someone outside the household (40%); b) an NGO/charity (30%); c) food aid programs (20%); and d) government benefits (10%). What is more telling is that these economic transfers were small in size. About 80% of households receiving transfers then, got less than 500 South Sudanese pounds in a year. As such transfers could not at the time, explain household expenditures. This picture is now reversed because of the on-going violence, which has made households in the rural areas to depend on relief and humanitarian assistance. Hence, it is here imperative for the delegates to make recommendations on how to eliminate this dependency on humanitarian assistance. This should be within the overall strategy for repatriation, relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement (4Rs) of our returnees from refugee camps, IDPs camps, and POCs.

The 3M frameworks contextualizes the fifteen emerging economic issues from the grassroots consultations in Figure 3.2 below. Another way of looking at these issues, through the 3M framework, is to view them as challenges and opportunities at the level of: the national economy, state economy, and local economy.
3.4 Consistency of Findings of Grassroots Consultations with National Development Strategy

There are four guiding principles of the SSNDS. These are: a) peace, security, and rule of law; b) democracy and good governance; c) socio-economic development; and d) international compacts and partnerships. There is absolutely consistency between the emerging economic issues from the grassroots consultations and the SSNDS. The first guiding principle of SSNDS is essentially a prerequisite for addressing the four categories of the economic cluster. For instance, the rule of law is imperative if corruption in the management of public resources (i.e. under public sector management & institutions) is to be combated and eliminated. Likewise, democracy and good governance create an enabling environment for the formulation and execution of policies at the macro-meso-micro levels, which would in turn address the fifteen emerging economic issues.
The SSNDS document has this to say about the National Dialogue:

*As the first truly national conversations (sic), since independence, amongst South Sudanese to redefine the social contract, the National Dialogue provides an opportunity for every South Sudanese, including people who feel left out of the political process, to articulate a vision and contribute to establishing actions that will be required to put South Sudan on a sustainable path to peace and development (2018:12).*

The above passage is an important indicator that the TGoNU is ready to implement the recommendations of the National Dialogue with respect to the economic cluster. In this regard, the delegates to the RDFs/RCs have an opportunity to take part in the exercise “to put South Sudan on a sustainable path to peace and development.”

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38 See National Development Strategy: Consolidate peace and stabilize the economy. Published by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, as part of the proposed FY2018/19 budget.
IV. Social Cohesion Cluster of Emerging Issues from the Grassroots Consultations: A Technical Note on the root causes of social disharmony in South Sudan

We called for truth, justice and accountability: that is what we struggled for, but the first thing was the silencing of guns\textsuperscript{39}.

The above citation provides an important point of departure for this Technical Note (TN). This TN is intended to contextualize the emerging consensus, from the reports of the grassroots consultations, on the root causes of conflict in South Sudan that in turn undermined social cohesion. Some operational definitions of what is meant by social cohesion, is first provided, so as to allow the delegates to capture the main issues and recommendations on Social Cohesion from what the people have said. This Section of the TN, therefore, provides the analytical foundation of social cohesion (i.e. social capital), which is followed by context of social cohesion in Section 4.2; the views of the people at the grassroots level in Section 4.3; and Challenges to Social Cohesion in Section 4.4.

Two definitions of social cohesion would suffice the overall purpose of this TN. The first, from the Council of Europe, defines social cohesion as “society’s ability to secure the long-term well-being of all its members, including equitable access to available resources, respect for human dignity with due regard for diversity, personal and collective autonomy and responsible participation” (Council of Europe, 2005, p. 23)\textsuperscript{40}. The second is from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2011)\textsuperscript{41}, which conceptualizes social cohesion as composed of three major components: “social inclusion, social capital, and social mobility.” It is important here to provide additional definition and examples of social capital from Robert D. Putnam:

The central premise of social capital is that social networks have value. Social capital refers to the collective value of all “social networks” [who people know] and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other [“norms of reciprocity”]\textsuperscript{42}.

Putnam farther elaborates his definition by how does social capital work:

The term social capital emphasizes not just warm and cuddly feelings, but a wide variety of quite specific benefits that flow from the trust, reciprocity, information, and cooperation.

\textsuperscript{39}Rt. Rev. Peter Gai Lual Marrow Chairperson of the SSCC, quoted from Sister Elena Balatti, CMS (2018: 8): Trying To Build Peace in A Time of War.
\textsuperscript{40}Council of Europe. 2005. 
\textsuperscript{41}OECD. 2011. 
\textsuperscript{42}For more on this see http://robertdputnam.com/bowling-alone/social-capital-primer/
associated with social networks. Social capital creates value for the people who are connected and – at least sometimes – for bystanders as well.43

Moreover, social capital works through multiple channels, which Putnam identifies as44:

1. Information flows (e.g. learning about jobs, learning about candidates running for office, exchanging ideas at college, etc.) depend on social capital.

2. Norms of reciprocity (mutual aid) rely on social networks. Bonding networks that connect folks who are similar sustain particularized (in-group) reciprocity. Bridging networks that connect individuals who are diverse sustain generalized reciprocity.

3. Collective action depends upon social networks (e.g., the role that the black church played in the Civil Rights movement) although collective action also can foster new networks.

4. Broader identities and solidarity are encouraged by social networks that help translate an “I” mentality into a “we” mentality.

Finally, Putnam gives some examples of social capital in the following passage:

When a group of neighbors informally keep an eye on one another’s homes, that’s social capital in action. When a tightly knit community of Hassidic Jews trade diamonds without having to test each gem for purity, that’s social capital in action. Barn-raising on the frontier was social capital in action, and so too are e-mail exchanges among members of a cancer support group. Social capital can be found in friendship networks, neighborhoods, churches, schools, bridge clubs, civic associations, and even bars. The motto in Cheers “where everybody knows your name” captures one important aspect of social capital.45

The Rt. Rev. Peter Gai Lual Marrow Chairperson of the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) has, as articulated in the passage presented at the beginning of this Section, laid a solid foundation for sustainable peace in South Sudan that starts with truth and NOT with forgiveness. Truth is at the center of social cohesion for it is based on trust. But, truth is a function of spiritual & political morality as expressed by Rt. Rev. Peter Gai Lual Marrow and which the reports of the Subcommittees on the grassroots consultations have confirmed. Figure 4.1 below explains this functionality.

43 Ibid
44 Ibid
Spiritual morality is one of the two pillars of truth, which in turn enhances justice. The Scripture through John 8: 31-32, confirms this as follows: "You are truly my disciples if you remain faithful to my teachings, and you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free." This verse is fully grounded in the Ten (10) Commandments, which are mandatory elements of spiritual morality that the church and family must sow and nurture in the upright bringing of all South Sudanese. The people have spoken that there is a moral deficit within the political, business, civic, academic, and religious leaders of South Sudan. This leads to other deficits, e.g. corruption, fiscal deficit, and so forth. These deficits do essentially reflect the nature of political morality, which is the second pillar. Justice is in turn explained to be a function of moral and political accountabilities, which in turn lead to forgiveness, mercy, and national healing (see Figure 4.2 below).
The above two Figures complement the international perspectives on social cohesion. To what extent are these consistent with the views of the grassroots consultations, is evidenced by the following root causes of social disharmony in South Sudan as conceived by the people that were consulted:

1. Hatred, tribalism and nepotism;
2. Lack of faith and morality;
3. Guns in the hands of civilians;
4. Unfair distribution of resources and lack of trust among communities;
5. Inter-communal fighting, cattle raiding and theft;
6. Hate speeches and social media propaganda;
7. Weak institutions of social harmony;
8. Erosion of the foundation of social capital;
9. The politicians inciting the citizens against each other;
10. Conflict of civilizations (cultures);
11. Lack of conservation of cultural heritage and historic places such as slave trade relics in Uyu Juku (Deim Zuber);
12. Neglect of Orphans, widows, and street children (i.e. children without parental care);
13. Lack of accountability;
14. Lack of civic education; and
15. Lack of basic services for nurturing social cohesion and peaceful coexistence.

4.2 The Context
South Sudan is a country composed of about 64 nationalities (or ethnic groups) with many languages. There is a popular perception that only two nationalities – Dinka and Nuer – have marginalized the rest of the ethnic groups in the country. They controlled wealth and power. Consultations in Juba by the National Capital Subcommittee also revealed a perception that the government is being “run by the Dinka for the Dinka.” Although independence in 2011 had generated a sense of community, but concerns are now high that the euphoria of nationhood may well give way to frustration of idleness and the absence of vision, nation-building, hopes, and aspirations. An important aspect of social cohesion in South Sudan is how social institutions (laws, customs, habitual practices) contribute to overall economic well-being. Access to land and its regulation has caused discontent among different communities, leading to lack of social cohesion and ethnic violence that disrupts economic well-being (Jok 46, 2011; Watts & Holmes-Watts 47, 2008). A second important aspect of social cohesion is related to service delivery and public sector accountability and trust in government. A survey undertaken in 2010 found that Southern Sudanese felt that

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SPLM’s vision of service delivery is not being realized because of their lack of access to “good health care, education, clean water or roads” (Levy and Cook 2010, p.45)\(^{48}\).

Lower trust among groups in society has been shown to have direct economic consequences. Hjort (2011)\(^{49}\) found that inter-ethnic rivalry following election violence in 2008 reduced allocative efficiency in Kenya. National programs that reach all ethnicities equally can increase generalized trust (Rothstein, 2005)\(^{50}\). While certain jobs presumably create social cohesion among distinct social elements, the nature of pre-existing ethnicity-specific groups’ relations can impede this desired harmony. Hjort (2011) has explored the influence of ethnic disparities on firm-level productivity between two Kenyan rival ethnic groups (the Kikuyu and the Luo). Results suggest that the level of productivity falls under ethnically heterogeneous teams, and increases under ethnically homogeneous teams.

In the African context, the most relevant case of engineering “social cohesion” is that of Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania, based on the concept of *Ujamaa*. This was an explicit policy to eliminate tribal identity and indoctrinate all Tanzanians through free and compulsory education. The role of universal education cannot be underestimated in the context of country with illiteracy rates as high as those of South Sudan. But the plan also included highly undemocratic elements such as the creation of a one-party political system and discredited policies like nationalization of the economy. Using Nyerere’s framework, social cohesion can be examined at three critical levels. The first level is the macro-level (national level) where a call for social cohesion is synonymous with a nation-building project\(^{51}\). And creating jobs that enhance social harmony should be among the priorities of a nation-building project. The Secretariat would like to suggest that what matters at the national level is not the nature of jobs but rather the context (or environment) in which such jobs exist and are created. Here the key characteristics of social inclusion and social mobility become paramount for those willing to undertake economic activity anywhere in their nation-state.

It is suggested that the kinds of ethnic rivalry discussed above could be plausibly traced to insecure livelihoods. Heavy reliance on subsistence crop farming and cattle rearing as a source of livelihood exposes the population to potentially devastating disasters. For instance, the traditional practice (among the Nilotic people) of settling a bride’s “price” using cattle as

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\(^{49}\) Hjort, J. 2011. “Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms.” Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley


\(^{51}\) Nyerere articulates this point as follows: “In Tanzania, it was more than hundred tribal units which lost their freedom, it was one nation that regained it.” From his stability and change in Africa speech given at the University of Toronto, Canada on October 2, 1969.
currency sometimes leads to inappropriate social outcomes. Those households that do not have cattle or an adequate number of cattle are forced into cattle rustling. Statistics on youth (age 15 – 24 years) employment, level of education and industry of employment all point to the potential for socially undesirable behavior. With an estimated 94% of young South Sudanese in the labor force that do not have adequate educational qualifications, cattle rustling becomes one of very few options/’jobs’ for the youth in cattle rearing communities to secure a livelihood.
The conflict in South Sudan has destroyed the social fabric and shattered the foundations of the social bonds that existed since times immemorial. The institutions and mechanisms for social cohesion have been rendered dysfunctional between and within the various communities and even at the national level. These are the challenges facing the Regional and National Dialogue Conferences.

4.3 Grassroots Perception of Social Cohesion and Recommendations

Social Cohesion according to the consultations of the communities is perceived as the mutual bonds of solidarity between the various South Sudanese communities, as the result of peaceful (harmonious) coexistence, respect of diverse cultures, traditions and customs, sharing of the common means of survival (livelihood) and a deep faith in God. This part of the Technical Note is a summary of the grassroots recommendations on various issues intended to form the basis of sound framework for a policy on social cohesion between our communities. They can also act as pillars and indicators for a sound reciprocal relationship between communities and citizens.

A. Grassroots recommendations on Repentance, Healing and Reconciliation

There are ten recommendations summarized from the fifteen reports of the Subcommittees of the Steering Committee. These are:

1. **Repentance, Forgiveness and Reconciliation:** People need to forgive one another and avoid revenge attitudes. Forgiveness is very important for the people who have been in conflict for so long.

2. **Repentance and Confession of guilt before God:** the people of South Sudan should go back to God in their different religions so that God can help them achieve peace by His Grace.

3. **National Peace, Reconciliation and Healing Process:** There should be a process of peace, reconciliation and healing beginning from the top political leaders to the citizens for genuine forgiveness in South Sudan. Politicians should forgive and reconcile with each other to save the country from the ongoing war. They highlighted the importance of politicians uniting their ranks and file to forge a way forward.

4. **Apology for atrocities:** Those who committed atrocities to come back to the people and apologize.

5. **Establish healing center & reconciliation.**

6. **Respect of Human Dignity and Tolerance:** There should be respect for human dignity and tolerance of one another.

7. **Community Dialogue:** Initiate Community Dialogue and awareness about the consequences of the 2013 war and its effects on the Children and their future, including women and elderly who had no connection to what was done in Juba. Such inclusive dialogue should reach out to all the grassroots. Promote dialogue among communities.
8. **Confidence Building Between Ethnic Communities:** Confidence building between the various ethnic communities, e.g. Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer of this area and all the citizens of this area must be done.

9. **Confidence building between tribes of Upper Nile State:** The grassroots urge the people to embrace each other in unity and harmony in order to foster the future of this young nation.

10. **Review of the Resolutions of Wunlit Conference:** This should be revisited so that Dinka and Nuer stop being the cause of problems in the country.

**B. Grassroots recommendations on crimes committed against human dignity**

The following are the recommendations under this subject:

1. **Strengthen accountability and justice** institutions in South Sudan: Court cases against the perpetrators of murder and rape and other atrocities as a commitment that never again shall such things happen in the Republic of South Sudan.

2. **Child Abduction should be stopped:** There should be intervention of traditional leaders and chiefs to discuss with the community leaders of Murle to stop child abduction because politicians are reluctant.

**C. Grassroots recommendations on Problems caused by the Pastoralists**

The following are recommendations from grassroots consultations:

1. **Recovering stolen Cattle:** The government should intervene to recover cattle raided from hiding in the host communities e.g. from Kajo Keji because the raiders are well known even to the Government.

2. **Remove the Cattle from the IDP land:** Thousands of refugees say they will not come home unless the cattle are driven out of their Land.

3. **Pastoralists and IDPs should evacuate** the Ma’di land immediately to enable the Ma’di community to return to their ancestral land.

4. **Regulate cattle movement** by law and conduct comprehensive disarmament of civilians. **Voluntary or force return of cattle** to their original areas and government should regulate their movement by law.

5. **Enforcement of** the decree of the President for cattle to be returned to the state of origin should be enforced without favor. Cattle owning Communities to go back to traditional consultations and agreements on cattle grazing areas.

**D. Grassroots recommendations on Educational Policies on Social Cohesion**

The following are the recommendations under this issue:
1. **National Education Program**: There is need for an aggressive education program with clear targets over the next ten years because the cause of the current conflicts is due to ignorance and very low levels of education and community awareness.

2. **Public Education Program on Nationalism**: There should be intensive social awareness on nationalism, patriotism and sense of belonging to promote love, acceptance of our diversity in order to develop common identity.

3. **Reintroduce boarding schools** in order to **cultivate nationalism**, unity and sense of diversity between the various South Sudanese ethnic groups.

4. **Nationalism and Patriotism** and clear history of the liberation struggle of the people of South Sudan for freedom and independence should be part of school curriculum to fight tribalism, corruption, and nepotism.

5. **Fighting illiteracy through Education**: Communities should be mobilized to reject cattle raiding and cattle wealth acquired through it. Enhancement of development in educational sector by complete educational policy reform to fight illiteracy among the communities.

6. **Cultural Program on the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation (SSBC)**: Play our cultures and images on the national Television in Juba.

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**E. Grassroots Recommendations on Land, Border disputes, and IDPs**

The following are the recommendations from the grassroots consultations on this issue:

1. **Plots and Land grabbed**: should be returned to the rightful owners through intervention of law enforcement agents.

2. **Review land policies and Laws that govern land ownership**, such as the policy of land belong to the community. It impedes relationship between communities.


4. **Boundary Committees**: Formation of internal boundary committee to address the land disputes between states, counties, **Payams** and other administrative units.

5. **Restoration of 1956 borders** between communities, which they claimed served justice for all the citizens.

6. **Local Government Administrators (LGAs)**: The LGA Should be deployed by the government all over South Sudan in areas other than their own.

7. **Reconsider the division of states to promote peaceful coexistence** among the communities and tribes; the states should not be created on the basis of tribes.
8. **Participation of the rebels** in the subcommittees to ensure success of the National Dialogue process.

9. **Repatriation of internally displaced persons (IDPs)** across the nation.

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**F. Grassroots Recommendation on Security of the civilians**

The following are the recommendations identified through the grassroots consultations:

1. **Disarmament of Civilians**: The youth and women recommended the removal of arms from the hands of illegal users and improve on the national army. This calls for disarmament across the country to ensure the viability of peace for innocent civil population in South Sudan.

2. **Disarmament** should start with the organized forces and all the civil populations should be disarmed in the same following manner: (a) voluntary disarmament through persuasion; (b) government should come with a project of buying guns from the people; and (c) forceful disarmament where necessary.

3. **Name of the National Army**: The name of the national army needs to be agreed up by the people and it should be changed.

4. **Army Barracks far from Civilian population**: they also wanted the army relocated far away from civilian settlements. They asked for compensation of their destroyed property including houses.

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**G. Grassroots Recommendation on the Traditional Authority**

The following are recommendations concerning this issue:

1. **Traditional Authority to Settle the Disputes**: They also recommended that the local communities through chiefs be given a chance to discuss among themselves to bring peace and harmony.

2. **Empowering the local traditional authority** to exercise their influence on how to bring peace in the country.

3. **Formation of South Sudan Elders forum**.

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**H. Grassroots recommendation on Compensations**

The following are recommendations from the grassroots consultations on this issue:

1. **Compensation for the innocent deaths**: He inquired whether the people who lost their lives such as women, children, elderly and disabled will, get compensated or not.

2. **Compensation** funds should be directed towards community and national benefit rather than individuals.
3. **Enforcement of Anti-tribal laws**: The people of South Sudan need to abandon tribalism through establishment and enforcement of anti-tribalism laws, intermarriages, promotion of patriotism and nationalism in schools, military colleges and other communal settings.

4. **Encourage Intermarriages**: Intermarriages should be encouraged amongst the youth of all tribes Government to prioritize education because ignorance and negative cultures promote violence.

4.4 **Challenges To Social Cohesion**

According to the grassroots the following are the challenges to Social Cohesions:

1. **Lack of National Policy on Social Cohesion**: Social Cohesion is not given priority in the national policies by the government. Social cohesion is the first victim in such situation of conflict and war.

2. **Lack of civic or national education** to foster citizenry and nationalism.

3. **Ethnicity, Tribalism and Conflict**.

4. **Ethnicitization of war**: According to the consultations the current civil war is being waged on tribal basis. War destroys the elements of social cohesion.

5. **Ethnic groups mobilized by politicians against each other**: It has been stressed in the reports by many communities that the politicians incite inter-ethnic conflict. Many communities have expressed their utter rejection of such attitudes from politicians since it does not promote social cohesion and peace between the diverse ethnic groups in the society.

6. **Ethnic domination and marginalization**: some communities expressed their fear of being dominated and marginalized, particularly by the larger ones. They mentioned this as a factor in the provision of the social services and allocation of public offices.

7. **Ethnic Community Council of Elders**: the ethnic community council encourage conflict between the ethnic communities, e.g. the Jíeng Council of elders are the main contributors to all the conflicts of South Sudan.

8. **Tribalism and nepotism** are practiced by politicians: Hate Speech and Derogative language against ethnic group, hate speech; insulting, use of provocative and derogatory words or hate speeches or expressions such as M.T.N, or expressions such as “these Equatorians are cowards” or NYAGAT etc. These and many others were cited as root causes that have the tendency to tear and throw the Country into turmoil, disunity and disharmony. The challenge is how to eliminate this new behavior.

9. **Churches Preaching Hatred**: Some church leaders are preaching hatred in their religious gatherings and are promoted by the media outlets. Absence of churches in communities creates instability and immorality afflicting the country.
10. **Decentralization is misinterpreted** mainly by elites, as the result it causes rifts that tend to undermine social cohesion and encourage disunity among citizens. The communities perceive decentralization in its current form as the incarnation of ethnic tendencies and regionalism. According to them Kokora phenomena in 1981 was based on decentralization of three regions.

11. **Killing & Raping of women:** according to the communities, the raping and killing of women has become the **norm of the day**. Arm men with impunity commit it. In any fighting even in the smallest village in South Sudan, at the end the victims are women raped and killed by the conflicting parties or by the unknown gunmen. Their dignity and rights are violated; the perpetrators are never brought to book.

12. **Child Abductions between ethnic groups:** The abduction of children and women between ethnic groups is a great crime. Child abduction was reported by most of the sub-committees. Parents are left without knowing who abducted their children. Many have lost the hope of finding them. Tracing the abducted children has proven to be difficult. The phenomena continue with no end in sight, parents in the villages in Jonglei, Central & Eastern Equatoria fear the future of their children.

13. **Looting of community property** by rival community and armed men. People’s means of survival are looted, destroyed, the fields, the houses are burnt down. The harvest is carried away leaving the community with no food and with nothing to depend on. In fact, many blame SPLA and the rebels for looting.

14. **Pastoralists destroying crops:** Several sub-committees reported the conflict between the pastoralist and the agriculturalist. The pastoralist travelled from far areas into areas known for being agriculturalist and destroy their crops. They destroy the means of survival of these communities rendering them vulnerable with no means of subsistence. This is the main source of conflicts in former Central Equatoria, in particular in Lainya, Kajo Keji Counties, Yei River State, Lobono, Ganji and Lokiliri Counties of Jubek State.
This Part Three of Document Number 3 of the Steering Committee of the South Sudan National Dialogue (SSND) gives a comprehensive summary of the reports on the consultations of the key stakeholders. The consultation was at: a) grassroots level; b) refugees in the neighboring countries; c) the security sector; and d) the National Capital. Members of the National Dialogue Steering Committee (SC) were sworn-in on 22nd May 2017. The Leadership of SSND convened the First Session (or Plenary) of the Steering Committee on 29th May 2017 until August 2017. As a result of the deliberations, fifteen (15) Sub-Committees were formed to go and conduct the grassroots consultations. These Sub-Committees were formed and named according to the former ten states and two areas - Abyei Administrative Area (AAA) and Pibor Administrative Area (PAA). The objective realities necessitated the formation of three additional Sub-Committees that were not part of the geographically based administrative setup. The three Subcommittees are: the Headquarters (i.e. Juba as the national capital); Security; and Refugee and International Outreach. The Headquarters Subcommittee was to cater for the diverse groups of stakeholders within Juba. The Security Subcommittee collected the views of all the organized forces, while the Refugees and International Outreach Subcommittee consulted all the displaced South Sudanese in refugee camps and cities of the neighboring countries of Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan.

The Subcommittees carried out their consultations between November 2017 and March 2018. The Leadership of SSND convened the Second Session of the SC in April 2018. This Session was focused on the reports of the Subcommittees. This Part Three is therefore a summary of these reports that have been approved by the SC during its Second Session and are presented here in the order they were subsequently received by the Secretariat:

1. Refugees and International Outreach Subcommittee
2. Western Bahr el-Ghazal Subcommittee
3. Northern Bahr el-Ghazal Subcommittee
4. Upper Nile Subcommittee
5. Central Equatoria Subcommittee
6. Eastern Equatoria Subcommittee
7. Western Equatoria Subcommittee
8. Warrap Subcommittee
9. Unity Subcommittee
10. Lakes Subcommittee
11. Jonglei Subcommittee
12. Pibor Subcommittee
13. Abyei Subcommittee
14. Security Subcommittee
15. National Capital (HQs) Subcommittee
I. Summary of the Report of Refugees and International Outreach Subcommittee

The summary represents the brief of all issues raised in the South Sudan National Dialogue consultations conducted by the Subcommittee on Refugees and International Outreach (NDSRIO) in the republics of Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The consultations were conducted from 11th November 2017 through 25th March 2018 of which the views of refugees were recorded in two reports combining consultations in Uganda and Kenya in one report and Sudan and Ethiopia in the other.

This summary includes issues on; governance/political, security, economy, and social cohesion, as raised in all consultative sessions with refugees. The National Dialogue Subcommittee on Refugees and International Outreach (NDRIO) hereinafter presents this summary with a conviction that it contains all necessary issues raised by refugees in Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. The summary also includes fears expressed by the refugees consulted in the four countries.

1.1 Governance Issues:

1. Bad governance;
2. No common understanding between leaders;
3. Weak leadership;
4. Negligence / ignorance/women are ignored
5. Undermining the law;
6. President Salva Kiir Mayardit should voluntarily leave power;
7. President Salva Kiir Mayardit should be given a chance to bring peace;
8. President Salva Kiir Mayardit, Dr. Riek Machar and current older politicians should leave politics;
9. Elections after repatriation of refugees;
10. Rewards of rebellion with army ranks;
11. Nepotism;
12. Ethno-politics;
13. Major tribes have taken power as their own
14. Lack of understanding how institutions work
15. Greed (money);
16. High Illiteracy rate;
17. Lack of implementation of policy;
18. Youth unemployment;
19. Militia recruitment and exploitation of youth;
20. Political trends are tribal in nature;
21. Power wrangle of power;
22. Weak national assembly;
23. SPLM has failed the people;
24. Too much powers have been given to the president;
25. Presidential degrees make part of political crisis;
26. Jieng Council of Elders are doing the role political party/main advisors to the president;
27. Lack of political will;
28. Peaceful transfer of power;
29. Foreign policy should be changed from East to west;
30. Separation of powers/Lack of independence of the Judiciary;
31. All the views of National Dialogue be implemented;
32. SPLM as a party lack ideology to lead the country
33. Failure to adopt democratic principles
34. Women empowerment (Common agenda/involvement of women and all parties should
uphold respect for women in power sharing);
35. Inequality and injustice;
36. Lack of national language;
37. Constitution is under threat by politicians
38. Dual citizenship is a problem in governance;
39. Federalism but should not mean that regional belonging should be the basis of jobs and
residence; and
40. SPLM should sit with itself and reach a reconciled end.

1.2  Security Issues:

1. Unprofessional army;
2. Tribal militia;
3. Personal trooping;
4. Communal conflicts on resources;
5. Child kidnaping and killing of parents in the region of Jonglei and surrounding areas;
6. Mobilization and training of militants based on tribal lines;
7. Rampant ownership of arms;
8. Incitement and hate speech being motivated by a quest for power;
9. Unwillingness of the government to protect citizens from life threats;
10. Lack of national army with allegiance to the country;
11. War veterans neglected;
12. Unknown gunmen;
13. Unknown gunmen should be made known.

1.3 Issues on the economy:

1. Lack of economic plan implementation for the country;
2. Unemployment of youth;
3. Need for Youth participation;
4. Lack of agricultural development;
5. Both whole sale and retailed Markets are in foreign hands;
6. Insecurity affects agricultural production in the rural areas making import the only source
of food;
7. Land grabbing
8. Retirement age is not yet defined
9. Famers-pastoral problems affects the middle class or primary economic engagers;
1.4  Issues on social cohesion:
1. Tribalism;
2. High bride wealth;
3. Need of the specification of dowry/bride wealth and the need to enact a law by the legislature;
4. Hate speech;
5. Generalization is an aspect of destruction
6. Naming of tribes with negative names as Arian jenge, MTN, Nuer weu, nyamnyam, and others;
7. Lack of a government policy to address inter-communal crimes;
8. The government should attend to the issue of cattle rustling and child abduction;
9. Restoration of social fabric;
10. The need to end tribalism;
11. Fear of domination;
12. The need for reconstitution of Truth and reconciliation;
13. Dinka council of elders to be abolished to form a national council of elders

1.5  Refugees and well-founded fears:

1. Refugees in Uganda expressed their willingness to change their nationality if the stability is not soon realized;
2. The refugees in Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, and Ethiopia expressed the need for a viable peace that will enhance their return to the country; and
3. All refugees expressed the need for lasting peace as a genuine focus.

II.  Summary of the Report of Western Bahr el-Ghazal Subcommittee

During December 2017 the Subcommittee for WEBGR conducted 13 grassroots consultations and one public forum with various stakeholders that included, chiefs, political parties, government officials, ordinary citizens including women and youth. The meeting kicked off with preparatory meetings and an official opening to give context to the national process before embarking on the grassroots consultations. Table 2.1 below shows a list of the WEBGR Sub-Committee members and secretariat.

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<td>1</td>
<td>Dr. Adil Athanasius Surur</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Hon. Joseph Ukel Abango</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Hon. Steward Sorobo Budia</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Mr. Thomas Attari Valter</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Mr. Johnson Bol Achiek</td>
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</table>
2.1 Activities of the Subcommittee

The meeting received support from high-ranking officials including the official launch in Wau State, which helped to set the stage for the meetings. The team met with UNMISS, which facilitated travel logistical arrangements and security to the team. The public was implored to exercise freedom of expression granted by the President. They were urged to express their opinions and grievances freely and openly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stakeholders consulted</th>
<th>Locations covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/12/2017</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Wau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/12/2017</td>
<td>Preparatory meeting</td>
<td>Wau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/12/2017</td>
<td>UNMISS Leadership</td>
<td>Wau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/12/2017</td>
<td>Inaugural launch</td>
<td>Wau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/12/2017</td>
<td>Government officials-Raga</td>
<td>Wau Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/2017</td>
<td>Youth, chiefs, women</td>
<td>Former Wau county Bagari &amp; Kpaile counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/12/2017</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>POC in Saint Mary, Catholic Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/12/2017</td>
<td>Business community</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/12/2017</td>
<td>Chiefs, women, youth</td>
<td>Former Jui River County - Kuajena, Roc Roc Dong, Udici, Kangi, Maria Bai Counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/12/2017</td>
<td>Judiciary and Legislature</td>
<td>Wau State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/12/2017</td>
<td>Bahr el Ghazal and Catholic Universities representatives</td>
<td>Warrap Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/12/2017</td>
<td>Women, youth, sport, music &amp; folklore groups</td>
<td>Ministry of Education Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/12/2017</td>
<td>Raga community</td>
<td>Wau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/12/2017</td>
<td>Chiefs, women, elders, legislature</td>
<td>Kuajena County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/12/2017</td>
<td>Public forum</td>
<td>Peace Hall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 Overview of emerging issues

The overview of emerging issues presented in Table 2.3 below is evidence of the people's desire for change. A government official said the lack of payment of civil servants’ salaries for six months had resulted in some people not able to attend the dialogue, particularly the open public forum, which marked the end of the grassroots consultations with a question and answer session. Emerging issues varied with each meeting although there were
some recurrent themes. Table 2.3 below is a summary of the points raised by the grassroots in the 13 consultations.

Table 2.3: Emerging issues by category of stakeholder

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consultative Meeting with Raga government officials in Wau Town</td>
<td>• Giving Raga an independent state Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Marginalization of Raga people and unequal distribution of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Federal system of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tribalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Army reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with former Wau County</td>
<td>• Tribalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Poor governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Security reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Removal of army from entry points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Federal system and return to 10 States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with the IDPs at POC in Saint Mary, Catholic Church</td>
<td>• Tribalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cattle destroying crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Orphans and widows care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Blocked roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Salary payments for soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The President is a problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Media freedom of expression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Removal of soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• False labelling of civilians as rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of commerce meeting</td>
<td>• Bad roads affect business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Access to foreign exchange is a challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Multiple taxes without receipts and high business licensing renewal fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Illegal detentions leading to business closures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Looting is a headache for business owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Compensation for business losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support for local industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Build food and fuel reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with the former Jur River County</td>
<td>• The presidency must resign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Corruption the root of many problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Politicians wasting state resources by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Issues and Solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending their children to stay for education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
  - Unauthorized gun possessions to civilians is a big problem  
  - Tribalism  
  - Land grabs and cattle raiding  
  - End rebellion |
| Discussion with executive, judiciary & legislature/ Wau State |  
  - Border disputes on the increase  
  - Tribalism, nepotism and corruption causing conflicts  
  - School curriculum is foreign  
  - Armed cattle keepers, land grabs and looting  
  - Need to engage rebels  
  - Hate speech by political leaders  
  - Food shortages  
  - Youth job creation |
| Meeting with Bahr el Ghazal and Catholic Universities |  
  - Prioritization of education  
  - Tribalism  
  - Nepotism and corruption  
  - SPLM party to blame for country's woes  
  - Youth unemployment |
| Meeting with women's groups, youth & sport, music & folklore groups |  
  - Lack of rule of law  
  - Improvement of education system  
  - Gender equity  
  - Reconciliation  
  - Job creation  
  - Tribalism, nepotism and corruption |
| Meeting with Raga Community in Wau |  
  - Lack of rule of law  
  - Curriculum review  
  - A return to 10 states  
  - Respect of the constitution  
  - Appointment of women in government |
| Meeting with political parties, civil society, faith-based groups, teachers, civil servants and workers trade union |  
  - Corruption and lack of accountability  
  - Lack of unity and hatred among people  
  - Poor education  
  - Inefficient and demotivated civil service  
  - Lack of courts and court bias |
### 2.3 Summary and Recommendations

The recommendations were grouped in three thematic points namely political and governance issues; security; socio-economic and welfare issues. There was a general fear that the results of the consultations would not be shared as happened with previous similar exercises. While some participants questioned the composition of the ND committee and accused some of its members for corruption, others viewed it as the only
hope left for the country. The public was vocal and proposed solutions that included calling the President's resignation, ending tribalism and all forms of corruption as well as a call for an independent state in Raga and the dissolution of the Jieng Council of Elders (JCE). Table 2.4 below gives a summary of recommendations in the 13 consultations grouped in the three themes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance and political issues</th>
<th>Security issues</th>
<th>Socio economic and welfare issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End to tribalism, corruption, nepotism</td>
<td>Reform of army and security laws</td>
<td>Solve salary delays and safeguard pensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A return to the January 01 1956 border agreement</td>
<td>Make those responsible for raping, killing, looting and other abuses accountable</td>
<td>Reform of public service to appoint employees on merit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of independent states in the region</td>
<td>Security personnel should not be led by people from other states</td>
<td>Youth job creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignation of President</td>
<td>Return to law</td>
<td>Compensation for those who have lost lives and properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct free and fair elections</td>
<td>Fair disarmament policy</td>
<td>Need for new currency and end money laundering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage rebels</td>
<td>Return to normal life so that people can resume agricultural activities and end hunger</td>
<td>Infrastructure development of health, education facilities and roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional review conference</td>
<td>Judiciary independence</td>
<td>Education and curriculum review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissolution of the Jieng council of elders</td>
<td>Adopt Arabic as national language alongside English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Faith-based organizations must play an increasing role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Respect child and women's rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gender equity in legislature and cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reconciliation policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Media freedom and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4: Recommendations
freedom of expression
- End hate speech and propaganda
- Conference between farmers and cattle keepers

III. Summary of the Report of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal Subcommittee

The Subcommittee delegation left Juba on 16th October 2017 to Aweil and launched the dialogue on 18th October 2017 in Aweil Town in the presence of the Governor of Aweil State and two representatives of other states. The purpose of the launch was to sensitize the population on the aims of the national dialogue and to share the schedule of the activities of sub-committee.

The Subcommittee carried out the consultation process in all the five former counties and Aweil Municipality. The consultation process ended on 8th November 2017. The delegation held 17 consultative meetings with different categories of stakeholders such as chiefs, CBOs, elders, youth, women, persons with disabilities, teachers, faith institutions, the business community, farmers, local government council, members of state assembly, political parties, cabinet, advisors and governors of the three states. These 14 groups of stakeholders were divided into three clusters.

Members of the Sub-Committee for Northern Bahr El Ghazal Region

1. Hon. Kuol Athiaan Mawien
2. Hon. Aldo Ajou Deng
3. Hon. Edward Lual Deng
4. Hon. Rev. Dr Simon Ngor Awejok
5. Hon. Stephen Ajongo Akol

Secretariat of the Sub-Committee

1. Yohanna Manyang Acinbay
2. Mathew Mawut Mading (documentation)
3. Awien Mayuot Ngot (Documentation)
4. Mamer Garang (logistics)
5. Achier Adup Mou (Finance)
6. Ajak Ater Gar (Research)

The schedule of consultations coverage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of the counties</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Stakeholders and the Target groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/10/2017</td>
<td>H/Quarter Aweil of NBGs</td>
<td>Aweil Town</td>
<td>Launching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/10/2017</td>
<td>State Capital</td>
<td>Aweil Town</td>
<td>Chiefs, elders, CBOs, Youth, Women, Disables, Teachers, faith institutions, business community and farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/10/2017</td>
<td>State capital</td>
<td>Aweil Town</td>
<td>Local government councilors, Members of Parliament, political parties, Cabinet (Hon commissioners, Hon Ministers, Hon Advisors and governors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/10/2017</td>
<td>State capital</td>
<td>Aweil Town</td>
<td>Organized forces (army, police, prison, wildlife and fire brigade).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/10/2017</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/10/2017</td>
<td>Aweil South</td>
<td>Malek Alel</td>
<td>Chiefs, elders, CBOs, Youth, Women, Disables, Teachers, faith institutions, business community and farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/10/2017</td>
<td>Aweil South</td>
<td>Malel Alel</td>
<td>Local government councilors, Hon. Members of parliament, political parties, Cabinet (Hon commissioners and Hon Ministers, Hon Advisors and Hon Governors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/10/2017</td>
<td>Aweil South</td>
<td>Malek Alel</td>
<td>Organized forces (army, police, prison, wildlife and fire brigade).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/10/2017</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/10/2017</td>
<td>Aweil Centre</td>
<td>Aroyo</td>
<td>Chiefs, elders, CBOs, Youth, Women, Disables, Teachers, faith institutions, business community and farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/10/2017</td>
<td>Aweil Centre</td>
<td>Aroyo</td>
<td>Local government councilors, Hon. Members of parliament, political parties, Cabinet (Honorable commissioners and hon. Ministers, Hon. Advisors and Hon. Governors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/10/2017</td>
<td>Aweil Centre</td>
<td>Aroyo</td>
<td>Organized forces (army, police, prison, wildlife and fire brigade).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/10/2017</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/10/2017</td>
<td>Aweil East</td>
<td>Wanyjok</td>
<td>Chiefs, elders, CBOs, Youth, Women, Disables, Teachers, faith institutions, business community and farmers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.1 Framing Questions For Open Debate And Discussion Groups For Three Clusters

The consultation was divided into three clusters in each county. The first cluster comprised of chiefs, elders, CBOs, youth, women, persons with disabilities, teachers, faith-based institutions, business community and farmers.

Participants belonging to all three clusters—1, 2 and 3—were asked the following two questions in the public debate:

A. What are the fundamental problems of South Sudan?
B. What are the possible solutions to the problems?

The following stakeholders constituted the second cluster: local government councilors, Hon. Members of Parliament, political parties, Cabinet (honorable commissioners and hon.
Ministers, hon. Advisors and Hon. Governors). The second cluster were asked the following questions during the discussion session:

1. How does the problem of South Sudan affect economy?
2. Why is South Sudan branded “failed nation?”
3. What is the best system of Governance you think is good for South Sudan?
4. Do you think SPLM/A has lost its vision and mission and how as popularly publicized?
5. How can South Sudan promote multi-party system and ensure free, fair and credible competitive election?

The third cluster comprised of organized forces (army, police, prison, wildlife and fire brigade). During the group discussion, the following questions framed the discussion for this cluster:

1. How do the problems of South Sudan affect security?
2. What are the solutions to them?

As usual after the group discussion, the information and the contribution of the groups was read out in order to ensure that what they gave has no addition and/or subtraction.

1. What are the fundamental problems of South Sudan?
2. What are the possible solutions to the problems of South Sudan?

3.2 Framing Questions For Dialogues For Government And Security Clusters

1. How does the problem [facing] South Sudan affect security?
2. What is the best system of government you think is good for South Sudanese?
3. Do you think SPLM/A has lost its vision and how?

3.3 Summary Of The Emerging Issues

The emerging issues identified by the stakeholders relate to social, political, security and economics as below.

3.3.1 Political Problems:

- No rule of law and observance of constitutionalism characterized by among others creation of more states.
- Lack of good governance characterized by accountability and transparency.
- Power struggles.
- Loss of vision among national leaders and unclear priorities.
- President Kiir, Dr. Machar and the Former Political Detainees (PD) are responsible for the crisis prevailing in the country.
- SPLM has been being hijacked by “strangers” (people that did not fight for liberation).
- Division within the ruling SPLM.
- More treaties and foreign policies.
• No democracy to conduct timely elections.
• Encroachment on South Sudanese territory by the neighboring countries.
• The problematic role of and involvement of Jieng Council of Elders in decision-making at the highest level of the state in South Sudan.

3.3.2 Social Issues:

• Lack of basic amenities and services e.g food, water, education health, infrastructure (all-weather road network), insecurity and electricity.
• Hatred, tribalism and nepotism.
• Lack of faith and immorality.
• Inter-communal fighting, cattle raiding and theft.
• Hate speeches and social media propaganda.
• Weak institutions.
• Clash of civilizations.

3.3.3 Economic Issues:

• Control of the market by foreigners.
• Hyperinflation and skyrocketing prices of commodities.
• Lack of regulation of the prices of basic commodities.
• Lack of job opportunities.
• Extortion and payment of ‘taxes’ at checkpoints.
• Corrupt procurement through the award of letters of credit to briefcase companies run by politicians and generals.
• Involvement of public servants and military generals in business.
• Repatriation of money by foreigners back to their countries.
• Money laundering.
• Lack of social security including pensions for retired government officials, military and veterans.
• South Sudan has opened its borders to everyone.
• Depreciation of pounds against dollar.
• Dollar black market.
• Lack of diversification of economy.

3.3.4 Security Issues:

• Unmerited (‘political’) promotions.
• Appeasement of the rebels, which inflate the army.
• Army is disorganized, corrupt, tribal and unprofessional.
• Lack of equipment and materiel for the organized forces to do their job such as cars, guns, ammunition, uniforms and boots.
• Poor training of soldiers.
• Practice of tribalism in promotion within the military.
• Poor conditions of work for military servicemen.
• Existence of militia within the military.
• Appointment of army officers and general to political positions.
3.4 Summary of recommendation by the stakeholders:

A. On the Political:

- Recommended reduction of states to former ten states or other reasonable number.
- The term of the president should be limited to two terms only.
- The current generals should be retired from the army, they have politicized the army.
- Generals and other military leaders should not dabble in politics.
- President Kiir and Dr. Machar should be persuaded by the national dialogue committee to relinquish politics and give other people a chance to run the affairs of state.
- Demanded the formation of coalition government to run the country the next elections.
- Improvement of diplomatic relations with the international community.
- Restriction of the number of foreigners immigrating to South Sudan through visa control.
- Demanded the writing of permanent constitution of the country that limits the powers of the president by introducing checks and balances.
- The rule of law should prevail: laws should be applied equally to all.
- Promotion of democracy.
- Parliamentary system of government should be introduced in the country such that president must be elected by the members of parliament.
- Parliament and judiciary should be independent institutions.
- The stakeholders suggested the introduction of rotational of presidency among the three regions of Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria.

B. On the Social:

- Introduction of social security (pension scheme)
- Demanded the provision of basic services such as hospitals, school, roads, and clean drinking water
- Employment of qualified people in government
- Promotion of national unity and coexistence by discouraging and shunning tribalism
- Demanded the relocation of national capital city from Juba to the proposed capital city Ramciel to avoid issues of land grabbing
- Provision of food and other essential items
- Demanded the formation of South Sudan Council of Elders to help the president to govern.
- Fair distribution of resources.

C. On Security Issues:

- Forceful and peaceful disarmament program to remove guns from the hands of civilians.
- The army should be organized and trained to become a national and professional army. ready to defense the country and constitution from internal and external threats.
- Stop appeasement of rebels with ranks and positions.
• Government should work to bring peace and stability to the country through peaceful means.
• Enforcement of all laws and orders accordingly.
• Improve the conditions of work of the armed forces and ensure prompt payment of salaries.
• Monitoring and evaluation of work of the armed forces.

D. On Economic Issues:
• Government should protect its citizens from exploitation by foreigners and also create job opportunities.
• Unification of taxes and removal of illegal checkpoints.
• The exchange rate must be fixed to stop hyperinflation and introduction of a new currency.
  Establish accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms in the security sector.
• Establish an independent and adequately empowered revenue authority.

3.5 Conclusion
The Subcommittee conducted consultations in conditions of peace. The process was free, fair, transparent and credible. All the stakeholders spoke openly without fear of retribution. The consultations were witnessed by the peace partners, including UNMISS, UNDP and IGAD observers that accompanied the sub-committee throughout the process. They praised the process for its inclusiveness and the transparent manner in which it was conducted. Although many speakers were very pessimistic about the outcomes of the national dialogue, they believe that if there is political will to implement all the recommendations of the national dialogue, normalcy can be restored, and South Sudan can go back to being great again.

The Subcommittee encountered much suffering in areas it visited. The people are hungering for peace. Based on the views from a dozen meetings conducted in North Bahr El Ghazal, the overwhelming view is that the National Dialogue is seen as the best possible way to resolve current problems. The people of Northern Bahr El Ghazal presented their views in good and honest faith. All the stakeholders participated wholeheartedly.

IV. Summary of the Report of Upper Nile Subcommittee
In November 2017 the Subcommittee (see Table 4.1 for names of the team) for the Upper Nile State conducted the first leg of consultative meetings. Initially this was to cover five states namely Central Upper Nile State, with its headquarters in Malakal, Northern Upper Nile state with the headquarters in Renk, Fashoda State whose capital is Kodok, Maiwut and Latjor with their headquarters in Maiwut and Nasir respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Name In Full</th>
<th>Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hon. Simon Kun Pouch</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Dr. Joseph Nyok Abiel</td>
<td>D/Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Hon. Tabitha Guang</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1 Consultative Meetings

Thirteen consultative meetings in three states of Central Upper Nile State, Fashoda and Northern Upper Nile State were subsequently held, reaching out to a total of 1,235 people (see Table 4.2). The remaining two states were scheduled to be visited later due to security concerns. The Consultative meetings in the three states were held with cabinet and legislature, women, youth, elderly, chiefs and other traditional authorities, army and organized forces, political parties, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Chollo community. Meetings in Central Upper Nile State were held with various stakeholders in Malakal and Ogot County on the western bank of River Nile. In Fashoda State the team held one meeting with government officials, chiefs and women and youth in Manyo County-Wadakona. In Northern Upper Nile State, four consultative meetings were conducted in Renk, Melut and Maban.

Table 4.2: Shows the Stakeholders Consulted by the Sub-committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stakeholders consulted</th>
<th>Locations covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08/11/2017</td>
<td>Executive and Legislature</td>
<td>Central Upper Nile-Malakal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/11/2017</td>
<td>Youth and Women</td>
<td>Central Upper Nile-Malakal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/11/2017</td>
<td>UNMISS Leadership</td>
<td>Central Upper Nile-UNMISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/11/2017</td>
<td>Chiefs</td>
<td>Central Upper Nile-Malakal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/11/2017</td>
<td>IDPs Leadership</td>
<td>Central Upper Nile-UNMISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/11/2017</td>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Central Upper Nile-Malakal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/11/2017</td>
<td>Armed units Officers</td>
<td>Central Upper Nile-Malakal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/11/2017</td>
<td>Chollo Community</td>
<td>Central Upper Nile-Ogot County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/11/2017</td>
<td>Gov. Officials &amp; Chiefs</td>
<td>Northern Upper Nile-Renk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/11/2017</td>
<td>Govt. and Community</td>
<td>Fashoda State-Wadakona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/11/2017</td>
<td>Youth, women, &amp; elderly</td>
<td>Northern Upper Nile-Renk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/11/2017</td>
<td>Youth, women and chiefs</td>
<td>Northern Upper Nile-Maban</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Overview of emerging issues

Stakeholders in the three states were urged to freely and openly express their views and opinions without fear of harassment and intimidation. There was optimism about the process although lack of time was cited as a limiting factor. There were also widespread calls to include views of rebels with fears that excluding them from the process would not guarantee peace. Figure 4.1 below is an outline of issues raised by stakeholders in the visited states. The issues can be grouped into three themes of politics and governance; socio-economic and welfare and security related and transparency and accountability issues. Stakeholders identified these issues as the cause of political instability.

Fig 4.1: Summary of emerging issues in three states in Upper Nile State
Political and governance

- Divisive policies used by the government
- Administrative failure and poor governance
- Marginalization of some communities
- Rewarding the rebels with high political and military positions.
- National army (SPLA) looting and taking sides in communal conflicts
- Creation of more states in the country
- Power struggles among the politicians
- The politicians inciting the citizens against each other
- Tribalism and nepotism practiced by politicians
- Elections

Socio-economic and welfare

- Cattle rustling/raiding
- Lack of service delivery to the citizens
- Unfair distribution of national resources
- Restore chiefs powers
- Border disputes
- Youth employment creation
- Unpaid salaries and reforming civil service
- Hate speech by churches and media
- Joint conference of chiefs
- Rebels must be consulted

Security, transparency and accountability

- Lack of accountability
- Lack of the rule of law
- Land and border disputes
- Illegal arms in the hands of civilians
4.3 Recommendations

The ND leadership implored on participants to the meetings to contribute their views without fear. It was through telling their stories that the truth would be known, and solutions found. The ND's mandate was to listen and take views, which were to be discussed regionally and nationally. While others commended the dialogue for providing an outlet for people to express their grievances, providing homegrown solutions, others were critical of it, citing lack of ceasefire, non-inclusion of refugees, rebels and the inclusion of members who were being accused of corruption. Consulted stakeholders in the three states made recommendations related to the themes that were mentioned in the emerging issues. A summary of the recommendations is presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political and governance issues</th>
<th>Security, transparency and accountability</th>
<th>Socio and economic welfare issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Hold free and fair elections</td>
<td>➢ Promote rule of law and enact laws that hold politicians accountable for wrong doings;</td>
<td>➢ Ensure delivery services to the citizens;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Develop a national agenda and promote attainment of power through the ballot box not the barrel of guns which have led to devastating war</td>
<td>➢ Draft security laws that promote accountability among armed forces;</td>
<td>➢ Payment of salaries on time and reform of civil service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Promotion of forgiveness and reconciliation by politicians;</td>
<td>➢ Development of a comprehensive recruitment process for the national army to be prerogative of</td>
<td>➢ Restore 1956 borders between communities which stakeholders claimed served justice for all the citizens;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Appoint an internal boundary committee to address land disputes between</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Create employment for the youth;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Empower the local traditional authority to exercise their influence on how to bring peace in the country and hold joint chiefs conference;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Reconstruction of state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States, counties, Payams and other administrative units;</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>To ensure implementation of the 2015 peace accord in letter and spirit;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review the number of states;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creation of Maban State</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| The central government; |
| Professional training of national army |
| Review process to integrate rebels into the national army which must include a professionally conducted audit of ranks and positions obtained in the bush to curb violence and rebellion; |
| Include rebels in ND consultations; |
| Training of national army |
| Institute a comprehensive disarmament program to end boundaries to promote coexisting of different tribal groups; |
| Incorporate rebels in the ND subcommittees to ensure success of the peace process; |
| Media and churches must stop promoting hate speech and propaganda |
V. Summary of the Report of Central Equatoria Subcommittee

The Central Equatoria Subcommittee (see Table 5.1 for names of the team) of the National Dialogue was in the field for forty-five (45) days, beginning in Yei River State in October 2017, and proceeding to Juba, Capital of Jubek State. The team continued with consultations in Terekeka State and finalized the assignment by conducting meetings in Ganji and Lokiliri counties of Jubek State and in Tali County in Terekeka State in March 2018. The estimated total number of the people consulted, in thirty-seven (37) meetings, is 3,200, inclusive of all sectors of the communities targeted.

The mandate of the Sub-Committee was to guide the process of the National Dialogue, listen and document the concerns raised by the participants and ensure an environment of inclusivity, transparency, freedom of speech and full participation in the consultations.

The stakeholders were asked: What, in their opinion, are the causes of the political and communal violence in the country that has caused unnecessary deaths, displacement into the bush, refugee camps as well as the suffering from hunger and disease? What, in their opinion, is the solution to bring the Republic of South Sudan back to peace, stability, and development?

The process of consultations was highly successful, due to the cooperation and support from Governors of Yei River State, Jubek State and Terekeka State. The Sub-Committee would like to convey its gratitude for the popular reception accorded to the team by the Governors of these three States. Each of the State Governments formed a committee to mobilize, coordinate and facilitate the work of the Sub-Committee. In each State, the committee was provided with transport, security escort to counties and lecture halls. Their support extended to contribution of fuel, feeding and accommodation of the team in Morobo, Kaya, Lainya and Tali Counties. The participants were very keen to meet with the National Dialogue Sub-Committee and they responded enthusiastically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1: Members of Subcommittee for Former Central Equatoria State</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Gen. Clement Wani Konga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Jackson Abugo Gama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Stephen Abraham Yar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

112
5.1 Main Issues Identified in Central Equatoria States of Yei River, Jubek and Terekeka:

1. **Land grabbing**: This issue of land has become a big problem in former Central Equatoria State and needs serious intervention from National Government;

2. **Tribalism**: Tribalism has become the main source of conflict in South Sudan that has affected the whole country;

3. **Accountability**: There is lack of accountability in the country. Most government officials are corrupt and steal from public funds, but they are not accountable for being dishonest;

4. **Governor David Lokonga is a contributor to the destruction of Yei River State**: His allegation that “all the bodo boda\(^{52}\) boys are rebels” alienated most of the youth and encouraged them to join the SPLM-IO in the bush;

5. **Pastoralists** are seen as the main source of conflicts in former Central Equatoria State, particularly in Yei River State;

6. **Borders**: Issues of borders between Terekeka and Bor, Terekeka and Jubek are seen in Terekeka State as serious enough problems to warrant intervention from Central Government;

7. **Power Struggle** has also become the main source of conflict in South Sudan.

8. **Tribal Army**: The so call Mathiang Anyoor\(^{53}\), are seen as the main source of conflict in Yei River State and in other parts of Central Equatoria, for example Bongo and Lobonok in Jubek State;

9. **The Jieng Council of Elders** is accused of being the main contributor to all the conflicts in South Sudan.

5.2 Recommendations of Stakeholders Consulted in Former Central Equatoria State: Yei River State, Jubek State and Terekeka State:

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\(^{52}\) **Bodoboda** is a motorbike commonly used as taxi in South Sudanese towns.

\(^{53}\) **Mathiang Anyoor** is an army unit supportive of the government; but is seen as being entirely manned by the Dinka and therefore “a tribal militia”.

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5.2.1 Security Reforms

1. SPLA should be a national army of South Sudan, independent of any political party and not as it is now affiliated to the SPLM Party.
2. Representation of the sixty-four nationalities (tribes) in the national army is necessary to balance the force from being dominated by one or few tribes.
3. Equitable Employment: Government should recruit proportionally from all the tribes in the country to avoid imbalance with forces composed mostly of nationalities (tribes) supporting their ethnic communities, often breaking military rules and creating tribal militias in the country, thus fueling ethnic conflicts.
4. Unification of the SPLA factions into one South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) to fairly defend the people and the country, not just leave them as splintered brigades who function on ethnic/tribal lines and in unethical manner.
5. Age Limit: The SPLA/M Ministry of Defense should set out clearly a law for the national army. It should clearly spell out the age limit for serving in the national armed forces, after which their pensions are paid and retired from the forces to leave vacancy for the youths to upgrade their ranks in the army.
6. Efficient Service: The SPLA/M have to provide efficient services to all the army units, by paying their salaries in time, providing uniforms, feeding and healthcare; hence reducing crimes caused by the army when these services are not provided in time.
7. Promotions in the SPLA/M must be equitable and based on merit.
8. General Disarmament must be carried out evenly and thoroughly throughout the country.
9. Mathiang Anyoor: This army unit is unprofessional. It is fueling conflicts, looting, raping, and killings in the state. We demand for its immediate removal from the barracks of Yei River State.

5.2.2 Institutional Reforms

1. Equal Employment Opportunities: The public sector of South Sudan should have equitable opportunities for citizens. Employment should be based on merit and qualification. Resources should be shared equitably and equally throughout the nation.
2. Revenue collected locally should be managed by the states. While 40% of the locally raised income should be given to the national government, 60% should remain in the state for development.
3. Resources and budget allocations of the national government should be distributed proportionally, based on the population of each state.
4. Foreign investors who come to South Sudan must first present their intended activities at the level of the state where they intend to operate; they can then be referred to the National Government by the concerned state.
5. Local Government and Law Enforcement Agencies at the state level should be granted powers of structuring local administration and governing the citizens in the state without interference from the National Government.

5.2.3 Public Service

1. Promotions in the public sector should be at least after two to three years to allow for application of pensions and new recruitments in all government institutions.
2. Public Service should provide job descriptions for all employees in government institutions.
3. Pensions: Payment of pensions should be made at the level of relevant state for retiring employees who have served in government institutions.
4. Scholarship programs applications should also be advertised at state levels, not only at the national level.
5. Jobs in the public sector at national level should be awarded on the bases of relevant academic qualifications and experience in the field.

5.2.4 Social Issues
1. Land should belong and be owned by the community. Laws governing ownership and titles should be clearly recorded at both the national and states levels.
2. Community land border issues should be resolved at the inter-states level and based on the 1956 borders.
3. Pastoralist and cattle owners from other regions should leave Equatoria Region. Those groups who committed crimes of looting, child abduction and cattle raiding in the Equatorial Region should be brought to justice at the national level.
4. Empowerment of traditional leaders to solve cases of traditional nature, such as marriages, should be effected at the state level.

5.2.5 Governance and Sovereignty
1. Confederal system of governance must be implemented by the National Government. This should be based on the three regions of Greater Equatoria, Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr-El-Ghazal.
2. The Constitution of the nation should be amended according to the will of the citizens, for effective respect of the law and governance. It should be translated into all the national languages of our ethnic communities.
3. The local chiefs should be given the necessary training to understand the level of crimes and the laws governing the citizens according to the national constitution.
4. Salary for Chiefs: The chiefs should be paid salaries and facilitated with transport to reach all parts of the locality under their jurisdiction.

5.2.6 Political Issues
1. Decree Appointments: The President of South Sudan should stop appointing governors and members of parliament to power by decrees. Such positions should be filled through elections by the citizens, so that democracy is followed to minimize corruption in political appointments.
2. Equitable Employment: There should be equal and proportional representation of the three regions in political posts at the national level inside South Sudan as well as in the Foreign Service, where at the moment only one tribe dominates.
3. Peace & Healing: There should be a process for peace, reconciliation and healing, beginning from the top political leaders to the citizens for genuine forgiveness in South Sudan.
4. Hate speeches at top political level have to be prohibited by law to avoid passing hatred on to the next generations of South Sudanese.

5.2.7 Developmental Aspects
1. Even Development: There should be equitable development programs delegated by the National Government to the states level to boost even development of the country.
2. Women should be given 50% of development programs to empower them to contribute to building South Sudan for future generations.
3. New States: Priority should be given to newly created states, to build their capacity to govern effectively. They should elect their own governors, who should not be appointed by presidential decree.
4. Foreign Investors, NGOs and companies coming to South Sudan should be deployed equally to states for even development of South Sudan.
5.3 Way Forward for Smooth Transition, Fair and Free Elections

1. ARCSS should be fully implemented as called for by IGAD. This is the only way forward for resolving all the conflicts and bring about a lasting peace for South Sudan.
2. JMEC: The parties to the agreement (ARCSS) should be accountable to JMEC in all cases of delay or deviation.
3. Constitutional Review Commission: The commission for the amendment of the national constitution must be fully funded to speed up the process. The concern is that without constitutions, the elections will not be possible by 2018 as planned.
4. Full implementation of ARCSS is the way forward for constitutional amendment. There is concern over the delays in the Constitutional Amendment process.
5. Election Monitors should include the UN and foreign observers, while the management of the elections is handled by the UN for credible results.
6. Development Funds: Funds designated for national development projects should be managed through the UN and the IMF.

5.4 Strategy for the Return of IDPs and Refugees

Repatriation and Resettlement: The government should make proper agreements and arrangements with all parties involved in the care of refugees and internally displaced South Sudanese for smooth repatriation from the camps in the neighboring countries as well as the resettlement of the internally displaced citizens.

5.5 Arrangements for Armed Forces

1. Warring Parties: All the warring parties (SPLA IG/IO and Others) should assemble their forces in cantonment areas, where selection into the national army and training can take place.
2. Size of Security Organs: All security organs must be balanced and limited to numbers manageable by government’s resources.
3. Exclusive Forces: The Police, Prisons, Wildlife and Migration departments at states level should be exclusively staffed by sons and daughters of each state.
4. Reconstruction and Compensation: The Central Government should bear responsibility for the destruction caused by the war at the state level. There should be government’s reconstruction of the destroyed buildings and compensation for properties of the citizens looted by the SPLA soldiers.

5.6 National Peace, Healing, and Reconciliation

1. Healing and Reconciliation should take place when guns are silent and total peace is restored in the country; then the healing and reconciliation can take place between the SPLM-IG and the SPLM-IO.
2. Human Rights: There should be respect for Human Rights among South Sudanese, regardless of politics and ethnic affiliation. The national body for Human Rights should be headed by a UN appointee.
3. Hybrid Court: The government should speed up the establishment of Hybrid Court outside the country for fair trial for crimes committed by South Sudanese nationals during the conflicts.
4. There should be rigorous enforcement of the law by the law enforcement agencies to protect the rights of citizens and aliens alike.
5.7 Power Struggle
1. The Republic of South Sudan should be supervised by the African Union (AU) for a specific period of time to avoid the grabbing of power by military means.
2. AU should use force to punish leaders who want to take power by force.

5.8 Conclusion
1. Federal System of Government: Generally, all the stakeholders consulted in Central Equatoria Region stand for a Federal System of Government based on the three regions, which they believe will transfer political power and resources to the grassroots and avoid manipulations by Central Government to centralize power and resources, in spite of the decentralization policy.
2. The National Dialogue Steering Committee is now to oversee further consultations at Regional Level on issues and recommendations raised at the Grassroots Level and cluster the results for further discussions later in the year at the National Level. In fact the Grassroots National Dialogue consultations seem to have motivated the communities to start owning the National Dialogue for peace to address community to community violent conflicts. The earlier the Regional Conferences are held, the more that would encourage community to community peace and reconciliation conferences, which in turn shall enhance the Revitalization process for the ARCSS.

VI. Summary of the Report of Eastern Equatoria Subcommittee
The Eastern Equatoria Subcommittee consists of the following members.

6.1 Members of the Subcommittee
From the Steering Committee:
- Hon. Nartisio Loluke Manir—Chairperson
- Hon. Tulio Odongi Ayahu—Deputy Chairperson & Administration
- Hon. Grace Amo Abalang—Finance
- Hon. Emmanuel Lolimo Epone—Deputy Finance

The team co-opted Members of Parliament, who include:
- Hon. Francis Ben Ataba—Member
- Hon. William Odingila Elak—Member
- Hon. Michael Losike—Member
- Hon. Gedeone Lopuke—Member
- Hon. Molinga Ajeo—Master of Ceremony
- Hon. Anita Allah-Jabu—Member

Secretariat consisted:
- Daniel Othow—Financial Officer
- Samuel Laki—Cameraman for SSBC
- Stephen Amany Paterno—Documentation
- Chan Dhel—Radio Reporter
- LaisOhisa—Documentation
- Donato Edir—TV Reporter SSBC
- Obwor Peter—Secretary and I.T. Specialist
• Iru Ingofok Iru—Logistic

Moreover, the team also have co-opted members of the communities who bear witness and testimonies of how the National Dialogue process was carried out. They were:
• Martin Obonyo—Acholi Community
• Marko Aloma—Ma’di Community
• Angelo Owuor—Pari Community

In the course of taking this important national duty, Members of the Subcommittee would like to take this opportunity to thank the communities of Eastern Equatoria for their cooperation, hospitality, and the substantial support that they extended to the National Dialogue process in Eastern Equatoria. The team was highly received and fed by communities especially in Lopa (Ibahure and Iboni parish), Ikwoto, Torit Town, Torit East County (Hiyala), Lafon and Camp 15 (Loryiok), and elders of Kapoeta Town (Hon. Paul Napwone’s family, Hon. Marko Lokitoi and Hon. Luis Lobong) just to mention a few. We also thank these communities for their involvement in the planning and active participation in the peace dialogues. This has ensured ownership and inclusivity of the dialogue by all the stakeholders.

6.2 Activities of the Subcommittee

The National Dialogue for Eastern Equatoria Sub-Region was officially launched in Torit on December 19, 2017. The launching event held at Freedom Square was well received and widely attended by government officials from the state, counties, locals as well as the general population and non-governmental organizations. The event marked the beginning of the grassroots consultations for National Dialogue in Eastern Equatoria region. In this course, a total of over 27 recorded major consultations were conducted with various stakeholders, throughout the region and in the Capital Juba. The grassroots consultations process in Eastern Equatoria involved a variety of stakeholders detailed in Table 6.1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Venue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Meeting Stakeholders of EE in Juba</strong></td>
<td>December 2nd-3rd, 2017</td>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>Freedom Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Meeting Deputy Governor of Torit State</strong></td>
<td>December 15th, 2017</td>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>Torit State Government Headquarters</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td><strong>Meeting Governor of Torit State</strong></td>
<td>December 16th, 2017</td>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>Governor’s State House</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Launching of wide media campaigns</strong></td>
<td>December 16th, 2017</td>
<td>Various media houses and outlets</td>
<td>Various media houses and outlets</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Briefing the Governor</strong></td>
<td>December 18th, 2017</td>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>Governor’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Official launching of National Dialogue in Torit</strong></td>
<td>December 19th 2017</td>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>Torit City Freedom Square</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Meeting Government Officials of Torit State</strong></td>
<td>December 19th, 2017</td>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>Torit City Municipality Hall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- The cabinet and other constitutional post holders
- The State Legislative Assembly
- Judiciary team
- The Local government in Torit (Mayor, Commissioner and their senior staff
- Senior Civil Servant officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8</th>
<th><strong>Meeting with Societal Groups</strong></th>
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<td></td>
<td>Civil society organizations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Labor unions</td>
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<td>Teachers, Academics union,</td>
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<td>Faith based organizations.</td>
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<td>Traditional leadership</td>
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<td>Women and Youth Associations.</td>
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<td>Farmers and Cooperative</td>
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<td>Associations.</td>
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<td>Persons of special needs</td>
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<td>Workers Unions among others</td>
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<td>Indigenous NGO</td>
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<td>Non-South Sudanese Business</td>
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<td>Community</td>
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<td>Nonresident Workers</td>
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<td>Minority groups operating in</td>
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<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
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<td>Small and Medium Businesses</td>
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<td>Monyemiji representatives</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>9</th>
<th><strong>Meeting UN and NGOs Agencies</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All UN Agencies, UNMISS, CTSAM,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>including AU Representatives,</td>
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<td>and other relevant agencies</td>
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<tr>
<th>10</th>
<th><strong>Meeting the Security Organs</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Armed forces</td>
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<td>o Sector Command</td>
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<td>o Divisional 6 command</td>
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<td>o Assortment of the MI, NSS,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CIDS</td>
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<td>National Security; Paramilitary</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and Intelligence.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Commissioner of Police,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Officers and men</td>
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<p>|   | December 20th, 2017 |
|   | Torit City Municipality Hall |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting Title</th>
<th>Date/Date Range</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Venue/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with Political groups as Stakeholders</td>
<td>December 21\textsuperscript{st}, 2017</td>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>Torit City Municipality Hall</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Brig. General of Prisons, Officers and men</td>
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<td>• Wildlife</td>
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<td>• Fire-brigade</td>
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<td>Meeting Members of Former Torit County</td>
<td>December 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2017</td>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>Torit City Municipality Hall</td>
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<td>• Torit East County</td>
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<td>• Torit Central County</td>
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<td>• Torit West County</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting Stakeholders of Former Ikwoto County</td>
<td>December 29, 2017</td>
<td>Ikwoto</td>
<td>Catholic Parish</td>
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<td>• Ikwoto County</td>
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<td>• Geria County</td>
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<td>• Kidiopo County</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting Hiyala Commissioner</td>
<td>December 30\textsuperscript{th}, 2017</td>
<td>Hiyala</td>
<td>Commissioner’s House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Members of Former LOPA County</td>
<td>December 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2017—January 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2018</td>
<td>Ibahure, Imhejek, and Iboni</td>
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<td>• The Governor</td>
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<td>• The cabinet and other constitutional post holders</td>
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<td>• Judiciary team</td>
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<td>• The Local government in Torit (Mayor, Commissioner and their senior staff)</td>
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<td>• Senior Civil Servant officials</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting Governor of Kapoeta State</td>
<td>January 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2018</td>
<td>Kapoeta</td>
<td>Governor’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Launching of National Dialogue in Kapoeta State</td>
<td>January 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2018</td>
<td>Kapoeta</td>
<td>Freedom Square</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting Government Officials of Kapoeta State</td>
<td>January 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2018</td>
<td>Kapoeta</td>
<td>Kileo Hotel</td>
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<td>• The Governor</td>
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<td>• Senior Civil Servant officials</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting Stakeholders of Former Kapoeta South County</td>
<td>January 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 2018</td>
<td>Kapoeta</td>
<td>Kileo Hotel</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| Meeting Stakeholders of Former Kapoeta North County  
- Riwoto County  
- Kirmuke County | January 4th, 2018 | Riwoto | Riwoto |
| Meeting Stakeholders in Shingata County | January 4th, 2018 | Kapoeta | Kileo Hotel |
| Meeting Stakeholders in Former Narus County  
- Losolia County  
- Kauto County  
- Jimo County | January 5th, 2018 | Narus | Catholic Compound |
| Meeting Stakeholders in Loryiok (Camp 15) | January 6th, 2018 | Loryiok | Loryiok |
| Meeting Stakeholders in Chuhudum | January 7th, 2018 | Chuhudum | Chuhudum |
| Meeting Stakeholders in Lafon | January 11th, 2018 | Lafon | Lafon Primary School |
| Meeting Stakeholders in Magwi | April 24th, 2018 | Magwi | Magwi |
| Meeting Stakeholders of Pageri County in Nimule | April 26th, 2018 | Nimule | Nimule |

### 6.3 Methodology and Scope of Grassroots Consultations

The methodologies employed throughout these consultations were guided by the general objectives, key principles, and cardinal values of the National Dialogue process. The media played a huge role during these consultations. Members of National Dialogue team were actively involved in radio talk shows, interviews, and announcements using a public address system (PAS). The PAS announcements were also used to create awareness about the National Dialogue process in communities.

The use of Focus Groups (FGs) with community-based organizations, NGOs, political parties, women groups, youth associations, security organs and other interest groups constituted an important methodology for the Committee throughout the consultations. The focus groups are normally assembled and given opportunities to express their views on root causes of the conflict and the way forward, without fear, intimidation, or threat of arrest. Grassroots consultations covered the entire Eastern Equatoria and the capital Juba. Other than FGs, the Committee also used group participation to provide additional opportunities for stakeholders to express their views under different setting. Usually, in the end of the consultation process, the stakeholders were randomly reassembled into smaller focused groups. Each group would be provided with a topic such as governance. A member of a group was allowed to cross to the other group to express his/her opinions on subject of his/her interest to ensure inclusivity of all views. The members were to identify on each assigned thematic topic the root causes of the problems/issues and suggest the way forward. Each group was provided with a flip chat, a marker, and ample time to freely discuss among
themselves and write their findings on the flip chat. What these breakaway groups discussed and wrote are recorded verbatim in this report, with minor corrections, notably grammar.

6.4 Key Themes Covered in the Report

6.4.1 Root Causes of the Conflict in South Sudan

The root causes of social and political disintegration are traced back to the post-Addis Ababa agreement and some of these root causes include the following:

1. Notion of “we are born to rule;”
2. Destabilization of the Regional Government under H.E. Uncle Joseph Laggu
3. The Kokora phenomena in 1981 based on decentralization of three regions;
4. The 1991 split of SPLM/A and its aftermath planted tribal bigotry;
5. Integration of militia groups into the national army without screening;
6. Haggling between global and regional powers over resources and political control of South Sudan;
7. Ideological paralysis of the SPLM leadership-the ideology that directs the vision of the country is not clear;
8. Negative influence and engagement of some neighboring countries;
9. Ethnicity and fear of ethnic domination;
10. The use and practice of using provocative, threatening and derogatory words or use of words that can be interpreted as hate speech such as “M.T.N”, “unwanted goods”, “these Equatorians are cowards,” “wait, we are still dealing with the Nuers and we will come and clear you later”. These and many others were cited as root causes that have the tendency to ignite conflict, cause disunity and disharmony;
12. Negative and false/fake social media reporting; and
13. Lack of recognition and acceptance.

6.4.2 Issues raised by the stakeholders under the themes mentioned herein

A. Governance

1. Federal system of government based on the former three regions of Equatoria, Bahr-El-Ghazal and Upper Nile with rotational top leadership positions should be adopted.
2. The absence of rule of law
5. Tribalism.
6. Lack of accountability and transparency
7. The use of decrees to remove capable leaders and replacing them with leaders devoid of knowledge, skills and expertise.
8. The creation of Torit and Kapoeta states is the cause of divisions.
9. The government cannot manage the current 32 states.
10. Ruling by decrees is major cause of poor governance.
11. There is no permanent constitution.
12. The country is facing major corruption scandal such as the Dura Saga, issuance of letters of credits (LCs) and the list of 75.
13. There is tribal and nepotistic discrimination in employment in the foreign service.
14. The position of undersecretaries in government ministries is dominated by a single tribe.
15. The government at state level is not representative.
16. Meritocracy is not privileged in the system.
17. The governance of South Sudan is influenced by Jieng Council of Elders as “master planners”.
18. Rewarding of rebellion.
19. Misappropriations of public funds is very high among particular tribes.
20. Lack of nationalism and loss of SPLM vision and mission.
21. South Sudan is governed by military generals who have little or no experience in governance.
22. Lack of community participation in governance.
23. The constitution or any other relevant laws of South Sudan is not disseminated to the public (grassroots).
24. The drafting of the current transitional constitution was done without the participation of the public hence top down approach to constitutional development.
25. People get away with crimes committed without being punished (impunity).
26. There is a problem of frequent shifting (reshuffling) or removal of people from positions of power, which creates instability.
27. The powers of states are not respected by central government.
28. Lack of clear laid down policies.
29. Lack of democratic values or sharing of power, representation and participation.
30. Personalization of public institutions.
31. Inadequate protection of human rights, freedom and maintenance of social order.
32. Lack of protection of public and individual properties.
33. No sense of what is right and what is wrong (question of morality).
34. Inefficient and ineffective use of the country’s resources for production of goods and services.
35. No sense of equality before the law and among people (some harbor a sense of superiority and see themselves as “untouchables”)
36. Use of government power to suppress, oppress and deny basic human rights and freedom.
37. One tribe dominates power and discriminates against others.
38. Lack of capacity building at the leadership level.
39. Lack of freedom of expression and participation.
40. Reliance on the external military bodies to protect and safeguard our land. E.g. Uganda army.
41. Lack of nationalistic orientation among the citizens of South Sudan.
42. Lack of recognition of other political parties in the system.
43. Power struggle within SPLM party.
44. Tribalism/marginalization.
45. Unemployment.
46. Injustice.
47. Land disputes and land grabbing.
48. False allegations and rumors in the government system.
49. Wrong people in the right place and right people in the wrong place.
50. The current system of governance is decentralized but the practice in action is centralization.
51. Poor Governance due to lack of accountability and transparency in decision-making.
52. Resources are controlled, managed and enjoyed by few individuals.
53. 60-70% of the national cake or budget is consumed by the central government in Juba while the states and Local Government (counties) are left to struggle with meager financial resources.
54. Weak institutions exacerbated by general apathy and abdication of responsibilities by constitutional post holders and civil servants.
55. Accelerated spirit of institutionalized tribalism, nepotism, sectionalism and regionalism.
56. Widespread corruption vertically and horizontally across the public sector, private sector, NGOs and UN agencies.
57. Encroachment of South Sudanese land by the neighboring countries e.g. Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan.
58. The 32 states do not appear to have been created on clear criteria and have brought more have than good.
59. Imposition of leaders against the will of the people.
60. Absence of the political will to implement the aspirations of the people at all levels.
61. Separation of SPLA from government or politics.
62. President Kiir is blocked by politicians and security personnel from seeing the reality on the ground. The president has not visited some parts of the country since 2005 and the president receives neither adequate nor correct information on what is happening in the country.
63. The people say the current parliament is a “yes parliament” that is doing nothing for them.
64. The stakeholders say the executive and legislature are responsible for the current economic crisis because it was the government that brought the idea of devaluation of the SSP against the USD, an idea fully endorsed by members of parliament.
65. The three arms of the government are not independent nor are they exercising the culture and spirit of interdependence as stipulated in the constitution.
66. The constitution has not been followed nor respected. Instead, the constitution is violated at all levels. For example, centralization of revenue and imposition of national plate numbers for cars.
67. Lawmakers are making laws in their own image but both implementation and oversight over executive are weak.
68. The orders of the president are routinely ignored—notably, the order for cattle
keepers and their cows to leave areas in Equatoria is generally downplayed or
ignored.
69. The constitution concentrates power in the president. For instance, Article 101 is
killing the growth of democracy and the spirit of pluralism in the country.
70. The National Security Act 2014 and especially Section 54 (1) gives members of
national security organs the power to arrest people without an arrest warrant.
71. Rewarding beneficiaries of warfare is total exclusion and denial of justice as well as
total promotion of rebellion in the country. This is prolonging the suffering of the
South Sudanese people.
72. Lack of accountability, transparency and enforcement of the law is breeding
corruption nepotism, tribalism, and open impunity.
73. The relationship, mandate and practice between the Army, National Security
(intelligence), police and the chiefs is overlapping, confused and lacks clarity in terms
of areas of responsibility.
74. The concept of liberation is misunderstood in between espionage (spying) and
mercenaryism. As a result, the principle of nationalism and patriotism that would
form the foundation for the rule of law and justice for all would have gotten its
strength is a fundamental missing link in nation building in South Sudan.
75. Growth of Xenophobia or tribal bigotry among citizens of other countries towards
South Sudanese nationals is a challenge that the ministry of Foreign Affairs, families
and other relevant institutions will have to address. The country’s image has been
battered due to our impulsive attitude and imperious behavior.
76. People say the leaders in Eastern Equatoria are divided and above all they have no
governor.
77. There is a big gap between the grassroots and the state government.

B. Security

- During the liberation struggle, there was security and law in the liberated areas, but
today is a different story.
- The call for formation of a national army with a national character.
- Real reforms that would lead to professionalism in the army.
- Tribalism in the army.
- Unfair recruitment and promotion in the army.
- High indiscipline among the Soldiers, Police Prisons, Wildlife, and Fire brigade
- Delay of salary.
- Disarmament of organized forces and civil population.
- Domination of the army by two ethnic groups (Dinkas and Nuers).
- Politicization of the army and militarization of the government.
- Failure to establish the actual number of organized forces in the country
- Failure to organize and control the army.
- There is no national army.
• There are plenty of weapons and ammunitions in the hands of civilians.
• Members of the armed forces are suffering.
• There is rampant rebellion.
• The composition of the military lacks equal representations of people in the country.
• Current soldiers are answerable to individual commanders.
• Sudan, Kenya and Uganda are encroaching into South Sudan boundaries.
• Top government officials and soldiers took 760 herds of cattle of civilians from Ikwoto County and distributed among themselves.
• Child abduction is becoming more of an issue.
• There is corruption in promotion within the military.
• The army is privatized into tribal units such as Mathiang Anyoor.
• Cattle keepers from Jonglei frustrate the President’s initiative for food security by destroying indigenous people’s farms.
• There is lack of security in Torit and Kapoeta states.
• Intermittent arrest of people suspected for collaboration with rebels is on-going in Torit States.
• There are too many road blocks diverting resources of the government.
• Individuals from within the army provide arms and ammunition for the cattle raiders.
• 1991 crises (Nassir Faction) created division within the movement that resulted in massacre in Kongor, Bor without any accountability.
• Cobra faction war led by General David Yau Yau was due to lack of representation in the army and a quest to have a state among the people of Greater Pibor Area in Jonglei.
• Cdr. George Athor who lost in the 2010 gubernatorial election Jonglei State started his own rebellion (movement).
• Other militias are supported by Khartoum regime to destabilize South Sudan
• The incident on 15th of December 2013 in Juba was created by fallout from the power struggle within SPLM and subsequent division of the army along tribal lines.
• The SPLA are loyal to the SPLM party leadership and not to other political parties.
• Estranged groups NASS, DM etc. created their own movements because of domination, tribalism, segregation and marginalization in the army.
• Proliferation of firearms in the hands of civilians has created more intra and inter communal fights that undermines government authority.
• Soldiers are not given leaves for many years.
• Some children of soldiers have no access to education.
• Some commanders embezzle money for the payment of salaries of soldiers.
• Lack of professionalism in the army.
• Lack of refresher training.
• Recruitment of criminals in army and law enforcement.
• Influence of community institutions in the military and the government.
• Ineffective court martial.
• Cattle raiding.
• Lack of mobility to high risk places.
• Lack of cooperation among the security organs.
• There are random promotions to organized forces without merit or experience.
• Highway and roads robberies.
• Harboring and aiding of criminals.
• Revenge killings.
• Absence of churches create instability and immorality afflicting the country.
• Lack of enforcement of laws.
• High unemployment, especially among the youth and fresh university graduates
• High influence of alcohol.
• Dispute over water points and fishing grounds.
• Border and land disputes.
• Practice of sectionalism.
• Reforms within the Leadership of the SPLM Party both at National and in the States.

C. Economy

• Devaluation of the currency and high inflation and no effort has been done to control it.
• Lack of accountability
• Corruption is eating the country economically, socially, administratively and politically
• Absence of visionary leadership, especially in the economic cluster
• Dependence on oil revenue
• Misuse of natural resources such as Gold, timber, Animal wealth etc.
• Poor economic planning—no refinery of our own, no electric power, no water, no food and no roads
• Lack of political will to execute major National Projects such as Fulla Hydro-electric power, Upper Talanga Tea Project, Aweil Rice Scheme, Wau Canning Factory, Anzara Textile Industry, Kapoeta Cement factory, Boma and Bondigilo game parks.
• Induced poverty—we made ourselves poor despite the riches of our country.
• Over dependence on outside imports including food and other basic human requirements.
• Destruction of the environment especially the ecosystem along the Imatong Mountain
• There is food insecurity in the country
• Fuel price is too high due to establishment of monopolies.
• Employee’s salaries have not been adjusted for inflation and are too low compared to market prices and general economic conditions.
• Government tractors meant for agricultural purposes are sold or misused because of expensive fuel or greed
• Salaries of employees are often being delayed or never come for over six months.
• Retirees are never given packages or pensions.
- Older civil servants are not retiring, because of lack of packages and pension plans.
- There is lack of promotions in civil service, because the old employees are not retiring.
- South Sudan economy is not diversified.
- We created the economic crisis ourselves.
- Certain individuals monopolize the forex exchange business.
- The NGOs have more money than the government.
- Employees for foreign organization including UN promote rising dollar rates.
- Finance ministry destroys sovereign currency by paying in dollars to contractors, travelers and medical who fuel the dollar market higher than domestic currency.
- There are problems with scales and structures of salaries.
- The country fails to prioritize and fail to allocate money in agricultural sector.
- Most budget of the country is spent on military hardware.
- The country is too much dependent on oil revenues, ignoring other potential resources such as agriculture, goal, copper, cement, forestry/lumbering, etc.
- The movement of cattle from one state to another results in conflict among various communities.
- Land grabbing is a cause of communal and individual conflicts.
- Mismanagement of resources.
- Collections of revenues at check points are done by one ethnic group.
- Indigenous states are not benefiting from revenues collected from their international border entry.
- Lack of accountability.
- Poor coordination of tax collections between states and central government.
- Lack of qualified personnel within the economic system.
- Lack of involvement of employed personnel.
- No proper documentations on tax collections.
- Very little allocations of resources to the states by the central government.
- Very few employees are employed at central government from respective states.
- The resources of the country are exported outside by individuals eg. Gold, timber etc.
- Insecurity hampers the import of goods into the country.
- Food insecurity is widespread.
- There is lack of industrialization in the country.
- We are not tapping nor mobilizing our local natural resources.
- Financial mismanagement.
- Uncontrolled foreign currency (dollar) exchange rate.
- High national debt.
- Lack of implementations of economic policies.
- Illegal tax posts (roadblocks).
- Mismanagement of public funds.
- No proper financial system and records keeping in public offices.
- Illegal money exchange in the streets of Juba.
• Donors have withdrawn their support.
• Misuse of free market policy has resulted to exploitation of citizens by traders and foreigners.
• Parliament is incompetent and cannot manage the affairs of the country.
• Unnecessary creation of states and counties without reference to Local Government Act 2009.
• Low rainfall (climate change).
• Global warming.
• Lack of agricultural inputs.
• High taxes imposed on imported goods discourages investment and regional trade.

D. Political

• The people held SPLM responsible for the failures in the country
• The SPLM is divided
• The SPLM brought the war and suffering
• The loyalty of the people in the country is divided among various rivaling individual leaders.
• The SPLM party fails to unite the people.
• Tribalism is the major cause of division among South Sudanese people.
• Individual leaders are the causers of problems e.g. Dr. Riek Machar, the President, Lam Akol and Paul Malong.
• The two tribes Dinka and Nuers engaged in revenge killing due to embedded cultural feuds.
• Chukudum convention of 1994, never fully resolved the crisis within SPLM.
• There is lack of civic or national education to foster citizenry and nationalism.
• Unequal distribution of resources, services and sovereign ministries.
• Land disputes, grabbing, and forceful occupations.
• Misunderstanding and disintegration of the ruling party.
• Lack of trust, love and confidence among the leadership.
• Unnecessary and continuous changes in the leadership at the state levels.
• Lack of respect and implementations of laws e.g. local government acts.
• Lack of check and balances.
• No sharing of national issues with other political parties.
• The SPLM as a political party diverted from its objectives, hence, loss of direction.
• Displacement of communities by other communities.
• The constitutional review is done by the SPLM party without involvement of other parties.
• The SPLM party is allergic to criticism.
• Divide and rule policies.
• Dictatorship.
• Rebellion and political instability have benefited some people.
• Arbitrary arrests.
• Assassinations.
• Looting and robbery by armed me.
• Politicians and the army are the problems of this country, not the grassroots population.
• We are the cause of our own problems, let’s not blame others
• Corruption within political parties

E. Social Service/welfare
• Decline in the education sector and health sectors are alarming
• The standards and service delivery were declining at a faster rate.
• Many teachers leaving the teaching profession in preference of the greener pasture within the NGOs or UN Circles.
• The war from 1983-2005 had made a complete generation illiterate and today another generation will be push by war to become not only illiterate but also a bomb shell for South Sudan.
• Low salary of teachers.
• Delay of teachers’ salary.
• Inadequate number of health technicians.
• Lack of doctors.
• Schools and health facilities are not equipped to the standard required.
• High level of illiteracy, especially among girls and women.
• High death toll among women due to pre and post-natal related cases.
• Poor road conditions.
• Lack of clean drinking water.
• The people of Pageri County deserted their home area and it was occupied by non-natives.
• The SPLA soldiers are involved in destructions of infrastructure such as schools, health centers, houses and churches.
• There is lack of planning for humanitarian assistance for the returnees in Pageri area.
• We often abuse opportunities eg. we abandon our historical allies.
• Corruption causing imbalances in education sector, especially in the distributions of scholarships. The children of politicians, ministers and commanders are beneficiaries of scholarships, while children of poor ordinary citizens are left stranded.
• Poor education curriculum.
• Violent conflict in the country.
• Lack of trained teacher.
• Dysfunctional of educational facilities in most parts of South Sudan.
• Transfer of aggression by the Dinkas and Nuers to Equatoria region because of the destruction the made in their regions.
• The leadership in South Sudan does not consider health as a priority that is why most top leaders go to seek for medical treatment outside the country.
• The Mathiang Anyoor have destroyed most of the health and education facilities in Pageri County.
• The contracts award to the companies are always done in Juba, making things difficult in the states.
• South Sudan has potentials of producing electricity in the country, but tribalism and regionalism made this not to happen because Hatire and Fullah hydroelectric power supplies located in Equatoria region that is why the national government is relaxed about it.
• The allocation of 1.58 percent for agriculture sector compared to 68 percent for defense, is problematic. There is a need to invest more in food security is very important.
• The national government has taken all the forest and concession contracts signed in Juba to undermine the powers of the states’ governments.
• Putting illiterate or semi-literate leaders in the leadership position is a liability to the country
• No proper audits from the national government

F. Peace, Reconciliation, and Healing

• People need peace today not tomorrow.
• President Kiir and his brother Riak Machar should reconcile and unite the country. They cite the experience of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga as well as that of Late Dr. John Garang de Mabior and Osman Taha and also the peace reconciliation between Dr. John Garang and President Kiir Mayardit as good examples that should be replicated to bring about peace to South Sudan.
• Demanded H.E President Kiir and Riak Machar to step down from their positions in order to give peace a chance. The suffering index of the people in the country is hiking every day exacerbated by economic hardships and rising market prices.
• Thousands of refugees say they will not come home unless the cattle are driven out of their land; they also want the army relocated far away from civilian settlements. They asked for compensation for their destroyed property including houses.
• Government to stop arresting and harassing of returnees at the borders, especially Nimule border. Such arrests discourage people from returning back home.
• The current revitalization of the peace process is an important top-down peace venture whose impact could be felt in the short run particularly among the top leaders and political elites who need positions, power and resources. Revitalization could also bring stability through signing of permanent ceasefire agreement unlike cessation of hostilities.
• Juba capital territory has not been defined.
• All the opposition forces in the country should abandon rebellion and join the peace dialogue.
6.5 Resolutions

The stakeholders at the grassroots came up with resolutions and some of them are mentioned below:

- Reforms in the system of governance by creating three states base on the former three regions of Equatorial, Upper Nile and Bahr el-Ghazel
- The two states of Torit and Kapoeta should be united as one state
- The presidency must be rotational among the three former regions of Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr el-Ghazel
- South Sudan must be ruled in accordance to its constitutions
- The constitution should be permanent, reflecting the views and interests of the nation.
- There should be equal opportunity in employment both internal and in the foreign service.
- There should be equal opportunity in the position of undersecretaries in ministries.
- There should be equal representation at state level.
- There is need to create one more state in Eastern Equatoria state.
- The president needs wider consultations for major decision making.
- There should be accountability at all levels of government.
- There should be multiparty system in the country.
- There is need for opportunities to be given to qualified individuals to compete in the system.
- All system, rules and regulations in existence eg. Pension Act, Local government Act, Land Act, etc. be revisited and respected.
- All governments in South Sudan should stick to the aspirations of all South Sudanese and not one tribe.
- All type of appointments should be on merit and qualifications.
- Formation of any government should be inclusive and gender sensitive and done through consultations.
- Assimilation of armed groups, which have taken arms against an elected government should be as follows:
  - Be equated to the rank of his/her colleagues.
  - All those involved in rebellion must face the court.
  - The people who misappropriated public funds must be punished by law.
  - Every leader should be patriotic, honest, committed and God fearing.
  - There is a need for community participation in constitutional reforms.
  - South Sudan should be governed by civil democratic government.
  - Copies of constitutions and any other relevant laws be disseminated to the public.
  - The peace committees should be encouraged.
  - The resolutions of National Dialogue should be fully implemented through appropriate mechanism.
  - There should be equitable sharing of national resources.
  - There should be enforcement of community policing in the counties.
• There should be respect for human dignity and human rights.
• There is need to review and adherence to public service regulations.
• There is a need for stability for those in positions of power.
• There is a need to respect the powers of each tier of government.
• There is a need for inclusivity in governance.
• There is a need to prosecute those found to be corrupting public service.
• The president should only serve two terms in office.
• The three branches of the government i.e., the executive, legislature, and judiciary should redefine their roles, responsibilities and duties to function independent of each other.
• One qualified, unified and professionally trained national army with a national character under one command and gender sensitive should be constituted and instituted in South Sudan
• There should be equal distributions of powers at all levels.
• The SPLM party should unite under one leadership and carry out registration and restructuring of the party, at all levels without any prejudice
• The conception of SPLM ideology, vision, mission, goals and objectives should be clearly defined and understood at different levels and translated in different languages.
• The South Sudan interim constitution should be disseminated at all levels.
• Capacity building for leaders at all levels should be encouraged.
• The police service should be the body to protect and safeguard the citizens
• The citizens should be free to express, react and participate in any activities in accordance to the Bill of Rights.
• There should be transparency and accountability at all levels of institutions
• The anti-corruption commission should be reviewed and accorded prosecutorial powers.
• The South Sudan military should be capable to protect the land of the country and people’s property.
• The spirit of nationalism (patriotism) should be cultivated to all the citizens
• There should be respect for human dignity and tolerance of one another.
• Disarmament should start with the organized forces and all the civil populations should be disarmed in the same following manner: (a) voluntary disarmament through persuasion, (b) government should come with a project of buying guns from the people and (c) forceful disarmament where necessary.
• There should be recognition of other political parties to participate freely in the political arena.
• Customary laws should be applied where they are relevant and necessary.
• The redundant military personnel should be gradually phased out.
• The administration in Juba must reopen the telephone networks (communications) in Ikwoto, Lopa, Lafon, Budi, and Kapoeta East Counties
• Salva Kiir and Riek Machar must step aside for peace to prevail in South Sudan
• Ikwoto as a backbone of the SPLM struggle should be given a token of appreciation with tarmac road and hydroelectric power.
• The loyalty of the people in the country needs to be behind the national leadership, not tribal leaders.
• The name of the national army needs to be agreed upon by the people and it should be changed.
• The people of South Sudan need to abandon tribalism through establishment and enforcement of anti-tribalism laws, intermarriages, promotion of patriotism and nationalism in schools, military colleges and other communal settings.
• Individual leaders should not be allowed to hold the country hostage.
• The culture of defections should be discouraged.
• The resolution of Wunlit Conference should be revisited so that Dinkas and Nuers stop being the cause of problems in the country.
• The leadership should follow the constitution so as not to create many discounted politicians and popular leaders should be given an opportunity to govern and lead people in South Sudan.
• The neighboring countries should refrain and respect the sovereignty of South Sudan and avoid interfering in internal matters of the country.
• Cattle and military commanders should respect and implement presidential orders by removing cattle from the land owned by farming communities.
• Checks and balances should be established in all government institutions by allowing the oversight chamber to exercise its powers.
• Decisions on national issues should involve all the stakeholders’ i.e. ruling party, CBOs etc.
• The SPLM party should follow the vision, mission, and objective of the party in order to drive the country in the right direction.
• Pastoralists and IDPs should evacuate the Madi land immediately to enable the Madi community to return to their ancestral land.
• The constitutional review process should be conducted urgently by all the stakeholders.
• Criticism and freedom of expression should be allowed within the SPLM party
• Elections should take place after the attainment of the real peace and agreed transitional period to allow people to return from refugees and IDPs camps to their ancestral land.
• Resolution of the national dialogue should be implemented by newly elected government.
• The president of South Sudan should declare permanent ceasefire.
• There should be unconditional peace and reconciliation between the government and rebels.
• Inclusive dialogue should reach out to all the grassroots.
• There should be downsizing and intergration of able soldiers into the national army.
• Military should not be mixed with politics. (Any person in the military should not hold a political post, unless he/she is retired).
• There is a need to separate politics from within the different military units.
• The issue of local and international boundaries needs to be tackled.
• The politicians should dialogue among themselves and leave the general public in peace.
• We must find solutions for our problems from within ourselves, because we created these problems ourselves.
• There is need for equitable sharing of resources between the central and state governments.
• There is need to resolve fuel crisis in the country by refining fuel for domestic consumption and export to the region. Export of crude oil should stop.
• There is need to increase salaries of employees.
• Government tractors meant for agriculture must be utilized for their sole purposes.
• The salaries of employees must be paid on monthly basis.
• There is need for retirements to older civil servants and promotions for the upcoming young ones.
• South Sudan is to diversify its economy.
• We need to fix the economic crisis.
• There is a need to regulate the forex exchange business.
• There is an urgent use of decentralization so as to make effective use of taxation and revenues.
• The government needs to redouble its revenue generation input.
• There is a need for unifications of scales and structures of salaries.
• We have plenty of resources to tap into for economic gains, e.g., hydroelectric power, Fulla Falls in Katire, fresh drinking water, and other available minerals.
• There is a need for proper tax collections system.
• The national and state governments should create conducive environment for investors by enacting business friendly laws.
• Both the national and state governments should give loans to able citizens in order to spur the private sector.
• An independent land commission should be established at the state level.
• Review of the land Act 2008 and article number 70 of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, with the wider consultations of all stakeholders.
• There should be adequate allocations of funds for developmental purposes.
• The employees’ salaries should be adjusted in accordance with inflation.
• Community awareness should be carried out on mobilization of local resources.
• Human resources should be trained on financial management.
• There should be a by-law to guide the flow of hard currency.
• The technical personnel are to carry out financial collections.
• Road connection should be maintained or rehabilitated eg. Kapoeta-Torit road.
• Foreigners should not be employed in sensitive national positions.
• The banking system and policies should be restructured and reformed.
• There should be proportional distribution of wealth.
• Inflation needs to be controlled through production and implementation of fiscal and monetary policies.
• The exchange rate regimes need to be fixed for a given of time.
• The tax base should be expanded and the powers of each tier of government in revenue collection must be protected by law.
• South Sudan should pose and re-plan and re-prioritize national projects such as hydroelectric power plant, agriculture schemes, and seek solutions to issues related to water, roads, and oil refinery.
• The sense of strong political will should be cultivated among leaders and shall start from the top.
• Strategy to fight poverty through peace and development should be put in place.
• Issues related to climate change and destruction of environment (ecosystem) should be accorded an immediate attention.
• A committee should be formed and send to assess environmental damage along the Imotong Mountain.
• Pension schemes should be decentralized to the three regions of Equatoria, Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile for easy management.
• Salary scales should be streamlined across the entire country to avoid irregularities.
• Economists should be involved in managing and leading the economic institutions, especially the ministry of finance and economic planning.
• Government in coordination with the communities should lead in mobilization and extraction of other natural resources such as gold and timber etc. These resources are being mismanaged and enjoyed by individuals and companies that are controlled by individuals at the expense of government and community.
• Donors should be engaged to ensure flow of donor funding and humanitarian assistance to the country.
• Free market economy with little control by government is not good practice for a country like South Sudan that has weak institutions. Therefore, government should regulate malpractices and irregularities in the market place and structure to minimize the exploitation of citizens.
• The current creation of counties in the country should conform to the local government Act 2009.
• Ideological paralysis in the country that resulted to unhealthy competition over who should control South Sudan, between the West and the East need proper attention and redress.
• The image of the country has been destroyed and tarnished by opposition and exacerbated by our imperious attitude. There is urgent need for execution of robust and honest foreign policy, aimed at serious engagement with regional and international community to restore and reclaim our position among the nations of the world. We also need to change our attitude and behavior toward one another.
internally to allow not only the infusion of nationhood and nation building, but also with our international partners.

6.6 Conclusions

In conclusion, the National Dialogue is the future and the last card for South Sudan without which, could go the way of Somalia, Libya. But since the process is popular and is driven and owned by the people of South Sudan then, the will of the people will speak louder than our individual or personal interests. Our desire for power resources, wealth or otherwise should not be equated to the value of the country. Indeed, the country is bigger than all of us. There is great hope that South Sudan has the potential to transform and resolve its affairs given the commitment of the members of steering committee as well as the long awaited political will of the top leadership to change the narratives of war, conflict, death, suffering, hunger, poverty, domination, and corruption to the narratives of peace, harmony, unity, prosperity and sustainable development.

VII. Summary of the Report of Western Equatoria Subcommittee

The report of Western Equatoria has been prepared by two teams, which constitute the overall Subcommittee (see Tables 7.1 & 7.2). Members of the Maridi Team are given in Table 7.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Name of Member</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hon. Pascal Bandindi</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Hon. Paramount Chief Wilson</td>
<td>Deputy Team Leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Hon. Gen. Peter Longole</td>
<td>Rapporteur</td>
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Support Staff of the Subcommittee

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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mr. Sikarari Ezikia Nelson</td>
<td>Documentation &amp; Research Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mr. Emmanuel Rabbi</td>
<td>Finance Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Mr. Ayuel Chan Ayuel</td>
<td>SSBC TV Reporter</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Mr. Mori Peter James</td>
<td>SSBC Radio Reporter</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Mr. Ezbon Nathaniel</td>
<td>SSBC TV Camera Lady</td>
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Members of the Tambura Team are given in Table 7.2 below.

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<th>S/No.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hon Prof. Dr. Samson Samuel Wassara</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Hon. Rev. Mathew Mathiang Deang</td>
<td>Deputy Team Leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Hon Edward Lual Deng</td>
<td>Rapporteur</td>
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Support Staff of the Subcommittee

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<th>Name of Member</th>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Hon. Norah Edward Doro</td>
<td>Finance Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mr. Stephen Hassan</td>
<td>Documentation Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ms. Ritah John Lasu</td>
<td>Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Taban Juma Hassan</td>
<td>SSBC Radio Reporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Ms. Hayat Abdalla</td>
<td>SSBC TV Camera Lady</td>
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7.1 The root causes of the crises in South Sudan According to grassroots consultations in Ibba and Maridi

The root causes enumerated below are only samples of several others stated by stakeholders in Ibba and Maridi Counties of Maridi State. They have been summarized for purpose of brevity and ensure that in determining the Agenda for the Regional and National Dialogue Conferences all views from the former ten Counties of the former Western Equatoria State shall complement each other.

7.1.1 Root causes of crises according to Gbudue State Leadership to Grassroots Consultations:

1. Political Power Struggle in Juba was among the SPLM Leadership and which turned to military confrontation and escalated rebellion all over the country.
2. Spiral conflict and violence engulfed the former Upper Nile Region and other Parts of the country with protracted warfare fought countrywide.
3. Democratic and Constitutional Framework was broken down and gave way to rebellion, banditry, robbery, human right violations and injustice.
4. Corruption was becoming rampant with those involved being left unpunished and economy was failing as witnessed today by our weak currency, the South Sudan Pound.
5. The National Army the SPLA is largely composed of two tribes and efforts have not been adequately put into place to reform or restructure the SPLA to reflect national diversity. Training to impart military ethics and discipline required for a professional national army had been lacking since 2005.
6. The former Arrow Boys would not have rebelled if the National Government attended to their grievances after they successfully fought the Uganda rebels, LRA, and pushed them to DR Congo and Central African Republic.
7. Tribalism was and is still a common experience in the Republic of South Sudan though there are perhaps more than 64 ethnic groups in the country. This tribalism has continued to fuel all conflicts and violence in the country as we struggle on tribal basis for the cake that belongs to all of us.
8. The Constitutional Review for the country has been over due, putting the popularly demanded Federal System of Government at bay despite the 2008 SPLM policy decision that the country would adopt Federalism should the Referendum results in an Independent South Sudan.
9. The pastoral communities brought upheavals into Western Equatoria after they failed to live at peace in their original homeland, causing crop destruction and dispelling peaceful co-existence for which Western Equatoria had hitherto been well known.
10. Wealth sharing through timely salary payment, sustainable social service delivery, equitable/equal scholarship, Local Government Budgets, and employment opportunities has much to be desired and indeed fueling discontent and agitation among Western Equatoria Communities, as they had existed.
11. Other root causes of the conflict were mentioned and are available in the detailed Report.

7.1.2 Root causes of crises identified at Yambio and Nzara Grassroots Consultations

The Counties of Yambio and Nzara had enumerated similar root causes of the conflict and violence in the country as those stated above with the following additional root causes:

1. Corrupt politicians and military commandants have left their families in Australia, USA, Europe and neighboring countries and are less interested to develop sound
educational and health systems for the ordinary citizens. Scholarships being offered to
the country are manipulated by South Sudan leaders and Western Equatoria citizens
have continuously been victims of not benefiting from the various scholarship
schemes being offered to the country.
2. Women are being raped by armed and uniformed men suspected to be SPLA soldiers
and also armed opposition groups. This is being done with impunity and no justice to
victims or their families.
3. The killings of civilians have reached an escalation that even the Arab Regime in
Khartoum did not reach and the worst being that killers go free and usually are
relocated in concealment to other parts of the country to continue with killings of
fellow citizens.
4. The issue of Governance is characterized by absence of Rule of Law with justice
denied to citizens especially if the matter is between civilians and the members of a
Security Organ. Bitter statement is that: “we are born to rule and we are the ruling
tribe that liberated the country”.
5. Other militia who opposed and fought the Government were integrated and given high
ranks and yet most of the times, this increased tribal representation in the SPLA
Command. When the Arrows Boys also known as “Home Guards” had supported the
Government and fought the LRA, they were instead rejected and left in the cold,
resulting in unexpected conflict and violence in Western Equatoria and as the say
goes: “When two elephants fight it is the grass that suffers”, meaning that the
innocent population were the victims of the violence and conflict brought by political
leaders and their respective rebellions.
6. The post Independent South Sudan failed to deliver on its promises of better
education, improved health services, good infrastructure to attract investment and
smooth trading facilitation etc.
7. The traditional Authority has not only been denied their responsibilities of
administering justice and fairness on traditional and cultural matters but have also
been humiliated in front of their own people whom they govern.
8. The country has repeatedly been declared as hunger and famine stricken but Western
Equatoria if facilitated would have significantly and adequately responded with
bumper harvest and marketing of surplus crops.
9. There was a group who challenged the creation of 32 States which they said came at a
wrong time when there were not sufficient resources to sustainably govern and
administer the former ten States.
10. There is a moral decadence in the country and leaders and citizens must accept God
and practice moral values that propel a peace loving society, that rejects all forms of
violence and conflict and instead promote peaceful co-existence and not cattle rustling
or child abductions.
11. The army ranks were promised to opposition armed group and achieving full peace in
some parts of the two counties are being made difficult.
12. Women are not realizing the 35% that the SPLM promised them and lack of political
will to solve this challenge and other challenges facing the country must be re-
directed to solve our conflict and violence.
13. The Youth are discriminated and marginalized in the country especially that their
participation in political life, employment, training and empowerment are not given
adequate attention.
14. The youth are the prey of political leaders who employ their tribes and youth for their
political manipulation and hunger/struggle for power.
15. Foreign employment ratio by the NGOs, UN Agencies and other members of the international community has largely identified, discriminated and marginalized South Sudanese in their own countries.

16. Some of the neighboring countries that had contributed to the liberation and Independence of South Sudan are igniting the conflict and violence in the country by supplying arms and ammunitions for their own Agenda.

17. The proliferation of firearms has turned the country into violence and conflict and so far the Government has failed to regulate and control armament in the hands of unauthorized persons through comprehensive disarmament.

18. Law Enforcement Institutions are weak especially when the matter involves the military or when between/among members of different tribes, there is reluctance or negation of justice or even simple investigation procedure is thwarted.

7.1.3 Root causes of crises according to participants in Mundri West, Mvolo and Mundri East Counties

The major root causes were enumerated similarly to what the Sub-Committee obtained in Yambio and Nzara Counties. However specific additions include the following:

1. The pastoralists are the root causes of the conflict in Greater Mundri as they deliberately grazed their livestock (cattle, goats and sheep) on the farms and homesteads of indigenous sedentary farmers, thereby triggering violence and conflict.

2. Intrusion of armed and uniformed persons in the matters mentioned in (1) above, mainly in support and favor of pastoralists, aggravated the situation.

3. The Proliferation and rampant carrying of firearms and ammunitions by pastoralists gave further space for them to stop pedestrians and search their pockets and loot their monies while they, pastoralists, are randomly moving cattle in all parts of Amadi State or Greater Mundri.

4. There is an increased tendency of killings of civilians and targeting of Local Government Authorities that resulted in the killing of Mundri West County Executive Director, shootings and killing members of Security organs who are assumed to be non-Dinka, though known as Government personnel.

5. The beating, raping and sometimes killing of women and children sparked bitterness among the local community in Greater Mundri and the SPLA in Amadi, would sooner than later declare that young people are rebels despite being regular residents in urban and peri-urban vicinities.

6. Some young people also took up arms and joined opposition in response of promised high military ranks along with promised payment of USD 500 per month and 6 month payment totaling USD 3,000 to each rebel soldier.

7. Night attacks on the civilian homes have pronounced impact on fueling rebellion, conflict and violence in Greater Mundri and both rebels and regular SPLA soldiers are alleged to have committed and continue to commit these crimes.

8. Cattle rustling particularly on borders with Atuot and Agar Dinka cattlemen and with Mundari gave space for some violence and conflict.

9. Extreme poverty forced some young people to purchase firearms and ammunitions with intention of laying ambushes on the main road trunk to rob travelers moving on trucks, cars and motorcycles.

10. The people of South Sudan especially certain Zones has a deep culture of rebellion and power struggle not through Democratic processes but through violent means to ascend to leadership positions and have therefore continued to deceive the youth of Greater Mundri and elsewhere in the country.
11. Traditional Authorities have their governing power taken away by higher officials in Government and there is break down of responsibility, resulting in weaker institutions and absence of law and order even at community levels.

12. The SPLA soldiers are not adequately provided for or attended to and as such they spent months and months without salaries and with no provision of food rations and very humiliating uniforms with or without boots. Hunger causes the soldiers with no transfer over years to loot civilians, rape women and girls and the fault is squarely on the Government in Juba.

7.1.4 Root causes of crises according to participants in Maridi and Ibba Counties

The key root causes as outlined by Maridi and Ibba Counties are very similar to those mentioned and documented under Yambio, Nzara (Gbudue State) and those of Mundri West, Mvolo, and Mundri East (Amadi State). Additional and specific root causes of the conflict and violence were enumerated as follow:

1. The SPLM did not sufficiently pursue their vision of being honest, transparent and stringent in governing the country right from 2005 to the present day.

2. Power struggle was tribally motivated and SPLM leadership got divided though Constitution should have united them, leave alone their ideology for which they were united beyond tribalism during the 22-year War of Liberation.

3. The National Army deployment in Maridi came from one or two tribes and the people of Maridi did not know where the remaining tribes out of 64 tribes were to be found.

4. Maridi people are peace-loving people and they had been over-provoked by pastoral community members who targeted their cropping areas for grazing of cattle, triggering violence and conflicts.

5. The assumed SPLA Officers, NCOs and Men usually take side with the pastoralist community, instead of leaving any matter of the sort to be handled legally by the police and court. This tendency sparked misunderstanding even much earlier before the conflict that erupted in Juba on 15th December 2013.

6. As of now pastoralists are still roaming community farmlands, particularly in Ibba County and damaging crops despite the Presidential Decree that directs the returning of cattle to pastoralists’ original homeland.

7. There are weak institutions and governance is not based on rule of law and order, especially in combating corruption and administering justice to citizens.

8. Women and children are the real victims as their sons, husbands, brothers are being killed in the conflict, while they women/children, become widows and orphans with no assistance or any support rendered to them.

9. Natural resources are plentiful in Maridi and Ibba counties and yet no sustainable development and prosperity are being realized, causing a lot of frustration, especially among the youth and civil servants.

10. The monthly salaries are late by over six or even seven months and how can crimes of burglary, looting and banditry/robbery not thrive and cause insecurity on roads, in homes and commercial areas.

11. Soldiers come and overstay in one location without their wives and as a result they resort to raping women and girls and the Government is indeed contributing indirectly to the increasingly high rate of raping in South Sudan.

12. The conflict brought by Dr. Riak Machar in 1991 was not properly solved as South Sudanese leaders did not sit and analyzed that conflict so as to prescribe a permanent solution against culture of rebellion.

13. South Sudanese Leaders since 2005 and especially after gaining Independence in July 2011 did not consult their people countrywide of the type of Governance System their
people want. The current consultation exercise should have been initiated years and years ago, though late is better than never.

14. Underdevelopment coupled with tribalism has fueled the conflict and violence in the country.

15. Do the people and their leaders understand the meaning of democracy? Any population that understands this, then refer to the former US President Abraham Lincoln who stated: “Government of the people, by the people and for the people” and with Democracy is being thrown here and there, only brings violence and conflict in South Sudan.

7.2 Recommendations by Participants from Ibba and Maridi for the Resolution of Conflict and Violence in the Republic of South Sudan

All the stakeholders applauded the National Dialogue Initiative and hailed H.E General Salva Kiir Mayardit for his peace-making process. They recommended the following:

1. The Cease Fire and eventually cessation of hostilities shall go a long way to bring peace and stability.

2. The SPLM Unification should be expedited so as to reconcile the leaders and ensure internal democracy.

3. Wealth sharing to different levels of Government and hence communities must be transparent and accountable by all leaders.

4. Streamlining and restructuring the National Army to reflect national diversity and control of super/high military ranks and to give a manageable size of our Army, while ensuring Pension Scheme for the Security sector.

5. Undertaking reform in the entire Security Sector to instill discipline, rule of law and order, professionalism and patriotism through training.

6. To stress and improve civil-military relationship based on respect of human rights and dignity, tolerance and rule of law.

7. Expediting of Constitutional review so as to adopt Federalism in the Republic of South Sudan.

8. Equitable sharing of the national cake in the form of employment and appointment that benefit all regions and tribal groupings in the country.

9. To promote and empower women and youth on productive schemes in the private and public sectors, ensuring gainful incomes and enhanced purchasing power to them.

10. The leaders of South Sudan to totally reject tribalism, regionalism, nepotism and favoritism at all times.

11. Abhor and discouraging rebellion which should never be rewarded again in South Sudan and work throughout to prevent and eradicate rebellion.

12. Pastoralists and their respective traditional and local Government Authorities should never permit roaming of their cattle on the farm of the sedentary farmers usually from different ethnic communities.

13. Rapists and those who kill fellow citizens should publicly be tried and executed, thus capital punishment should be re-instated to deter criminals who escape justice all these passed years.

14. Social service delivery to all communities and regular monthly salary and wage payments to all public employees at all levels of Governance shall improve security, peace and stability.

15. Diplomacy and intelligence gathering should effectively be undertaken to discourage foreigners from interfering in the domestic affairs of the nascent Nation of South Sudan.
16. Our economy should get its strength from our own human resources and productive capacity of our land; over employment of expatriates deprives our Nation from hard currency and transfer of skills and technology.

17. The IGAD initiative is welcome but like the CPA, the IGAD representatives must allow the opposing South Sudanese leaders to identify and solve their problems but not imposing unworkable solutions that cannot bring permanent and sustainable peace to South Sudan.

18. Infrastructure is the heart of development and social/security delivery and would contribute to trading, mobility of citizens and peace in the Nation.

19. Power struggle should be peaceful and through democratic leverage at regular intervals as determined by Constitution and other administrative laws of the Republic of South Sudan.

20. A few stakeholders angrily stated that Dr. Riak Machar and H.E Salva Kiir Mayardit are the prime causers of the conflict and violence in the Country and they should henceforth step down from holding to power.

21. Stakeholders also called upon Dr. Riak Machar to join the National Dialogue by sending his representatives and not only waiting for IGAD to give him position, since South Sudan is a sovereign country and none should dictate leaders and Constitution of our Country.

22. The National Army the SPLA must be provided with regular salaries, food rations and those who are overdue for promotions to regain their rights or else some of them will tend to join rebellion of conflict and violence.

7.3 The root causes of the crises in South Sudan and proposed solutions According to grassroots consultations in Nagero, Ezo, and Tambura

The views of the participants on the root causes of the problems of South Sudan and proposed solutions are presented below. They are grouped under the above three places where grassroots consultations were conducted.

7.3.1 Root Causes of Conflict in South Sudan According to Nagero Local Dialogue Consultat

The view of Stakeholders: youth, women, teachers, farmers, councilors, traditional leaders, traders organized forces and the general public consider the root causes of the conflict in South Sudan as follows:

1. The President of the Republic of South Sudan his former Vice President are responsible for suffering of their people.
2. Aging political leaders, the President and his former deputy do not pave the way for new generation of leaders to come in free and fair elections.
3. The unlimited Constitutional powers given to the President without checks and balances are the source of conflicts in the country.
4. Centralized system of government in South Sudan is a problem.
5. Lack of credible national army is a source of conflict because we have formations of the army that take orders from specific military and political bosses.
6. Rewarding of rebels is another major problem facing the country.
7. Anti-Corruption Commission is not dealing effectively with issues regarding corruption, embezzlements and wastage of resources in our country.
8. Greed is the major cause of conflicts in the country and it is the one fuelling the conflicts.
9. No respect for the Constitution by the leaders of the three branches of government even their party-offices.
10. Lack of independent judiciary contributes to failure of the rule of law to solve most problems of the country.
11. Creation of more states along ethnic lines is a problem in the Republic of South Sudan.
12. Nepotism and tribalism are real problems fostering conflict and violence in South Sudan.
13. Raping of women by warring parties.
14. The pegging of the value of dollar to South Sudan currency and poor economic performance are fuelling poverty leading to violent conflicts.
15. Negligence of education, teachers and school materials is a serious crime of the state against its people; children are illiterate here because they have no access to education.
16. Leaders do not care about implementation of community and people’s views.
17. Leaders disregard the values of accountability and responsibility regarding their actions.
18. No infrastructures like roads, schools and health facilities to enable movement of goods and services.
19. Lack of equal opportunity between women and men in all domains of life.

Suggested Solutions:

1. There should be term limits to the elected President of the country.
2. Rotation of presidency should be among the three former regions of South Sudan.
3. Both President Salva Kiir and the rebel leader Riek Machar should not be allowed to stand for elections.
4. Call for Federal system of government.
5. The Constitution of the country should be amended and be respected by all without exception.
6. Private recruitment of the army on tribal lines should stop, be checked and reviewed.
7. The army and the security sector should be restructured to eliminate flawed recruitment into the army along tribal lines.
8. Strengthening of the education system; there should be equal access to education and it should be a right for all citizens.
9. The provision of basic services with more emphasis on education, which is the real factor of development.
10. Guns should be silenced, and followed by sustained disarmament.
11. Resources of the nation should be distributed equitably.
12. Political decision makers need to be given orientations about behavior in those institutions they lead.
13. A system of transparency and accountability should be put in place by the government to reduce favoritism and nepotism in national and sub-national institutions.
14. Efforts should be made by the government to combat ethnic politics and tribalism in South Sudan.
15. South Sudan must build on culture of dialogue, tolerance, unity, and healing.
16. Roads should be constructed and maintained so as to enable easy movement of people and their products to other areas.
17. Laws should be made and implemented to stop or reduce revenge killings and build love in the communities.
18. Freedom of expression should be upheld as in the transitional Constitution of the country.

7.3.2 Root Causes of Conflict in South Sudan According to Ezo Local Dialogue Consultation

Here are some of the root causes:

1. Power struggle between leaders in the Government and the SPLM.
2. Lack of credible national army, the current situation is that of private army taking command from particular individuals.
3. Disagreement within the SPLM/A leading into disintegrating factions.
4. Government is not caring about the army as a result; soldiers are doing business of burning charcoal for survival and in some cases, rob civilians.
5. So many armed bodyguards of officers in the army and in other organized forces cause fear and crimes in communities.
6. Corruption and tribalism have weakened institutions of effective governance, the economy and social fabric because there is lack of transparency and accountability in dealing with public affairs.
7. Corruption is the main cause of problems in the national government, the distribution of power, economy, appointment and promotion in all sectors of civil service, and marginalization of sectors of the population.
8. The creation of more states has not only brought lots of division among people, but has created more misery as the counties cannot provide basic services nor could officials receive their salaries for months.
9. Rape cases of women and girls are happening during armed conflict.
10. National revenues are not managed efficiently and equitably that is why politicians and elites are fighting over wealth (e.g. oil money) and power.
11. Leaders are building huge houses in neighboring countries, their children are outside South Sudan, and our money is developing the neighbors.
12. Economic hardship and higher prices in the market contribute to misery of the population.
13. No equity in distribution of resources and underpaid workforce in both public and private sectors.
14. Political hegemony and dictatorship in governance cast doubts about the possibilities of holding free and fair elections after the transition period.

Suggested Solutions:

1. The President and his former deputy should pave the way for new generation of leaders to come in free and fair elections.
2. Unnecessary decrees are spoiling credibility, governance and the economy of South Sudan should be sopped.
3. Federal system of governance.
4. Citizens should give themselves sufficient time discuss all sensitive issues amicably.
5. Recruitment into all public positions should happen through credible institutions (Boards) in a transparent way.
6. Our leaders should establish a credible, disciplined, and inclusive national army and institute professional training programs appropriate to respective units.
7. Peace agreements should be regarded as commitments and as part of social contract between the signatories and citizens, and not consider them as mere papers to be violated.
8. Election should be organized to enable people to vote for their representatives of choice.
9. Revenues of South Sudan should be effectively collected and equitably distributed with more allocation for local government institutions.
10. Segregation on the basis of “we fought and where were you during the liberation struggle” should stop; for South Sudan belongs to all.
11. Learn from Rwanda experience and model to prioritize peace, reconciliation and healing.

7.3.4 Root Causes of Conflict in South Sudan According to Tambura Local Dialogue Consultation:
1. Competition and struggle for power in the national government is the main cause of the current political situation of South Sudan.
2. Our President has not visited most of the States to see situation on the ground and to inform citizens about what happened in July 2016.
3. Unnecessary Decrees are spoiling the administration and the economy of South Sudan.
4. The creation of more states has brought a lot of divisions with us here; previously we were one united people.
5. Politicians, senior officials, military elites and some tribes feel they are above the law and do not respect laws of the land.
6. Sacking of elected leaders infuriates their constituencies and thus encouraging indifference to the government policy.
7. The President and his former deputy do not pave the way for new generation of leaders to come in free and fair elections.
8. Lack of effective system in the government that has control mechanisms to deal with disgruntled politicians and commanders after they have legitimately been sacked.
9. Leaders are buying and building huge houses in neighboring countries, their children are outside South Sudan, and our money is developing neighboring countries.
10. Resources are controlled by a few people in some communities in the country who invest outside our borders.
11. Marginalization and segregation of citizens and some tribes in South Sudan is a problem.
12. There is gender-based violence and discrimination in the country where women and girls are either victims or neglected.
13. The youth are unable to make families because of high bride prices; thus, making them irresponsible in society.
14. Education sector is completely marginalized in annual budget, its implementation, school materials and quality of teachers.
15. Scholarships are not open to everyone for competition, but are given to some nationalities (tribes) while others are discriminated against.
16. Low wages in government institutions is one of the factors promoting banditry, robbery and defection to rebel movements.
17. Government does not pay attention to people with special needs in Tambura State, they are worried about the increase of the conditions as the war is prolonged.

Suggested Solutions to the Problems Facing South Sudan:
1. Introduce tangible and radical reforms of institutions at national and sub-national levels of government in South Sudan.
2. Democratization should be promoted at all levels of competition for public offices.
3. Adoption of the federal system of governance.
4. South Sudanese leaders should stop tribalism, nepotism, greed and favoritism, let us learn from Rwanda.
5. Our leaders should establish national army, restructure and organize the army, and discipline the army.
6. National army of South Sudan should be professionalized.
7. Government should organize campaigns of disarmament.
8. Establishment of systems that combat corruption in the army and in other organizing forces.
9. People should admit their mistakes.
10. Women should be allowed to compete with men for higher positions on equal footing.
11. Marginalization of the people of South Sudanese on ethnic (tribal) lines should stop.
12. Leaders of South Sudan should invest in the country instead of investing in neighboring countries.
13. The government should create employment for the youth to keep them busy and disengage them from exploitation by greedy politicians who intend to exploit the youth in destruction of the country.
14. Parents, communities, and authorities at all levels of society should advise the youth to desist from being misled to go and fight for the interest of disgruntled politicians.
15. South Sudanese should sit down to dialogue and make peace that takes our values and virtues into the Constitution.
16. Women should be employed in higher positions.
17. Government should control and protect our international boundaries from any form of threat.

VIII. Summary of the Report of Warrap Subcommittee

The Subcommittee started its report with the following paragraph, which is essentially a preamble:

With non-existence of all-season roads to outreach population with necessary services; with generations born and raised in war and groaning hardships; and unspeakable suffering of the civilian population since the war broke out; still the people remain persistent and hopeful of the future. We can fall like others, but the responsibility to get up is ours. Together, we can bring change and reverse the direction of things to achieve a brighter and prosperous future for ourselves, we the people of South Sudan. The entire National Dialogue (ND) and Sub-Committee of Warrap Region believe in this principle and call on the whole population of South Sudan and our friends to continue investing our hopes in our endeavor to bring about the change we need and the country we want to build.

Members of the Subcommittee are given in Table 8.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/no</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Sub-Committee Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Hon. Joseph LualAchuil</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Hon. Bishop Gabriel RoricJur</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.1 The Summary of Issues/Concerns Raised by Stakeholders

The following were the issues/concerns raised by the stakeholders during the grassroots consultations.

1. Political Issues (SPLM):
   - Reshuffle of government in July 2013 was met with disapproval and anger among many SPLM cadres;
   - Power Struggle within the SPLM in December 2013 and disagreement of SPLM National Liberation Council on reform documents was a disaster to the nation;
   - Too much indiscipline in SPLM;
   - December 2013 coup attempt caused too much harm to the country;
   - Split of the SPLM into factions and weighed war against each other. By so doing, divided up the country on tribal bases to support them;
   - SPLM lacks clear cut sectorial policies – e.g., agriculture sector, education sector, etc.;
   - SPLM does not build its cadres for tomorrow;
   - Lack of will to reconcile and move forward.

2. Political Issues (Other Political Parties):
   - Inability to comprehend national issues and provide competent alternative ways forward;
   - Lack of clear vision about the country;
   - Many different parties lean more on tribalism than nationalism;
   - Structural weakness;
   - Weak at the grass-root level.

3. Governance:
   - Institutions of governance remained weak – both at federal and state levels;
   - Lack of transparency and accountability in the system of governance;
   - The current federal system having failed – dysfunctional, created more divisions among people & cannot be sustained financially;
   - Accusations of non-Equatoria individuals of land grabbing in Juba;
   - The civil service is no longer national, but has become a state and locally owned;
   - The monopoly of power by vesting both executive and legislative powers in one person. Where are check and balance then?
Too much decentralization of the system of governance at the expense of national unity and unity of people;

Corruption, nepotism, and tribalism have overwhelmingly influenced the system of governance;

Foreign policy remains unclear and confusing: both regional & international;

Transfer the national capital to RAMCIEL to avoid disunity caused by land issues in Juba.

4. Nationalism:

- Lack of strong civic education in the school curriculum for younger generations;
- Nationalism not highlighted nor emphasized over and above tribalism, sub-tribalism, communalism in state-owned media channels;
- Too much allegiance to tribes and communities at the expense of the nation;
- Government failure to initiate programs aimed at cementing nationalism among citizens;
- Lack of patriotism pushes senior government officials, politicians, businesspeople, and army generals and senior officers to keep and educate their children in neighboring countries of East Africa;
- Lack of nationalism pushes army generals and other senior officers to protect their foreigner’s business partners at the expense of nationals;
- Our gold resource in Kapoeta of former Eastern Equatoria State is currently being exploited by foreigners and individuals, not by the government.

5. Economy:

- Mismanagement of financial resources;
- 98% dependency on oil revenues;
- Surrendering of a more significant portion of oil resource to Sudan out of bribery to individuals;
- Lack of clear national policy on how best to exploit non-oil national resources (gold, water, etc.);
- National resources especially gold is being exploited not by government, but by foreigners;
- Lack of clear national policy on allotment of oil blocks to international companies;
- Lack of commitment to diversify the economy;
- Failure to develop agriculture sector despite government declaration of it being priority sector;
- Failure of government to renovate old projects and factories that existed before the war like Wau Fruit & Vegetable Canning Factory, Tonj Kennaf Project, Nzara Textile Factory, etc.
- Inadequate physical infrastructure – roads to connect production areas to marketplaces;
- Inadequate budgetary allocations to agriculture and roads had hampered socio-economic development process.

6. Security:

- Security forces being unprofessional and indiscipline;
- Security forces lack viable retirement and pension systems;
- Parades of armed forces not known to authorities until now;
- Law enforcement agencies are extremely weak;
- Too many arms in the hands of the civil population;
National borders violated by neighboring countries;
Delay in the transformation process of security forces had incredibly undermined national security;
SPLA weakened by the constant absorption of militia groups into it – a militia that has their agendas to pursue;

7. Civil Service:
- Swapping of civil servants to serve in any part of the country could be a tool of unity, but it is hampered by decentralization of the system of governance;
- Professional cadres that include bookkeepers & accountants, clerks, local government officers, teachers, armed forces personnel, etc. are no longer being made to serve anywhere in the country.

8. Land:
- The land belongs to communities as enshrined in the Transitional Constitution;
- Lands reserves are no longer surveyed by government surveyors, but by private ones at the directives of communities;
- Vast agricultural lands already leased to foreign individuals and companies under the authority of communities without the consent of the government, federal or state;
- The land has become a significant factor of disunity, tribalism, regionalism, and communalism in our country.

9. Social Cohesion:
- Tribes mobilized against each other to achieve cheap political interests;
- Misinterpretation of decentralization of governance had pushed the country toward less social cohesion and disunity;
- The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of the civil population has undermined social cohesion;
- Political discontent both at state and national levels is interpreted in terms of tribalism, sectionalism, and communalism;
- Cattle raiding had hampered social cohesion among communities;
- Expansionism and grabbing of other community lands have caused bitterness and conflicts among communities.

10. Cattle Owners vs. Farmers
- Cattle owners disrespect farmers and intimidate them with their arms;
- Cattle owners should be prohibited by law to roam the lands of non-cattle owning farmers to avoid unnecessary conflicts between the two groups;
- Heavy punishment should be put on whoever violates the law.

11. The Armament of Civil Population and the Cattle Raiding
- Cattle raiding is a serious crime that needs to be checked by the government heavy-handedly;
- Cattle raiding is not rejected and fought vigorously by the community leaders in the way it is supposed to be;
- Cattle raiding makes communities desperate to acquire arms to either protect their cattle or engage in the crime of cattle raiding itself, or both.
## 8.2  Detailed Categorization of Issues/Concerns Raised and Proposed Way forward by the Stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Issues/Concerns raised by Stakeholders</th>
<th>Proposed Ways Forward /Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. SPLM</td>
<td> SPLM had lost a sense of direction;</td>
<td>1. Reconciliation, healing, and dialogue within the party to review what had transpired over the period of current conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td> South Sudan is yet to see SPLM vision for the country;</td>
<td>2. Transformation the party organizationally and politically;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td> SPLM has undermined the spirit of nationalism and unity;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td> SPLM is currently sunk deep into the leadership and power struggle;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td> Lacks political will to resolve conflicts as a political party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Other Political Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Ascension to Power (Presidency)</td>
<td> Weak organizationally and unpopular;</td>
<td>1. Needs a lot of organization work;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td> Failed to roll out a clear vision for the country.</td>
<td>2. Need to engage in much political work</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td> Costs the nation wars, death, disunity, instability, and bleak future</td>
<td>1. Power should be obtained through elections, not through a military takeover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td> Lack of clear vision for the country;</td>
<td>1. Development of a clear vision for the country;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td> Weak executive institutions;</td>
<td>2. Research and choose the most appropriate for the country;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td> Lack of clear administrative structure of the country is it federalism, decentralized system;</td>
<td>3. Creation of more states and counties should be based on population and economic viability;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>centralized system;</td>
<td>4. Executive to plan and engage in the continuous institution-building process;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td> Current federal system of governance continues to divide people along tribal,</td>
<td>5. Executive leadership positions should be filled with the most qualified personnel - “Right person in the right position” principle;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Combination of both executive and legislative powers in one person.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Geographical, and sub-tribal lines; | Separation of executive powers from legislative powers. A Member of Parliament or Council of the States should not be a minister, governor, commissioner, etc. and vice versa to avoid vesting executive and legislative powers in one person to safeguard against “conflict of interest”;
| Continuous creation of states and counties – (e.g., Former Warrap State used to have six (6) counties, now it has 53 counties); | 7. Different opinion:
| Not economically feasible; | a. Get back to the former system of ten (10) states;
| Lack of delivery of basic services to the population; | b. Divide the country into three (3) regions:
| Less qualified people lead most state executive positions (governors, commissioners, 'Payam' administrators); | (NBeG, WBeG, WES) - (WS, US, LS, CES) - (EE, JS, UN) and avoid old ones because they are based on tribalism;
| Weak foreign policy; | d. Divide five (5) Regions |

### Legislature
- Most MPs in states assemblies are either illiterate or semi-illiterate;
- MPs not well connected with their constituencies;
- Larger majority not well versed in legislative work;
- Passive parliament;
- Lack of parliamentary oversight;
- Lack of “Check and Balance”;
- Lack of accountability of the executive;
- Lack of effective governance for the country

### Judiciary
- Weak judiciary;
- Pending of untried cases;
- Lack of

1. Parliament should be tough on corruption: impeach any public official found guilty of corruption;
2. Parliament should impeach any public official guilty of abuse of his/her position;
3. Re-structuring of judiciary system;
4. Formation of special courts to clear pending untried cases;
5. Clear demarcation between cases to be
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation of the rule of law;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Crimes have grown beyond expectations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Death penalties not implemented and consequently, revenge is committee;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Interference of executive in the judiciary system;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Lack of borders between cases to be tried by judges and those to be tried in traditional courts;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Role of legal counselors not clear.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insecurity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Insecurity in the country is caused by &quot;Arms Proliferation&quot;;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Rush to armed rebellion;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Cattle raiding and theft;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Non-execution of death penalty cases – their pending causes revenge;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Pending of Communal conflicts cases causes revenge too;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Border problems between counties and states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Economy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Government expenditure much higher than government revenue;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Mismanagement of financial and other national resources;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Lower oil prices in the world market;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Reliance on single trade-outlet (East)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>tried by judges and those to be tried by chiefs;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ 4. Awareness-building on the role of legal counselors in the judiciary system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insecurity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ 1. Disarmament of the Civil population based on the incentive system (pay for every arm surrender);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 2. Destroy the guns disarmed from the civil population;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 3. The committee should be formed to look into the issues of internal borders;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 4. Rebellions must not be rewarded; they should be punished instead;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 5. Establishment of special courts to expedite the pending cases;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 6. Those who committed capital crimes should get capital punishment to avoid revenge from the relatives of the deceased.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ 1. Bring peace to the country;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 2. Cutting of government expenditure to match revenue;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 3. Diversify the economy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 4. Create more trade-outlets with neighboring countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 5. Seek support from international economic institutions such as IMF &amp; World Bank;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ 6. Seek bi-lateral help from friendly countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Insecurity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Lack of viable monetary and fiscal policies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Devaluation of national currency without sustainable economic bases;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Control of marketplaces by foreigners;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Economic sabotage &amp; black marketeering;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ The monopoly of oil contracts by a single country, China.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permanent Constitution</th>
<th>▪ Lack of respect and complicity with the constitution; 1. Weed out ambiguities; 2. Drafting &amp; enactment of Permanent Constitution;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Existence of ambiguities in the transitional constitution</td>
<td>1. Weed out ambiguities; 2. Drafting &amp; enactment of Permanent Constitution;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>▪ The weakness of law enforcement agencies heightened crimes; 1. Establishment of special courts to expedite the pending cases. Human Right should, therefore, be undermined; 2. Transformation and training of law enforcement agencies; Establishment of more police stations and judicial courts; 3. The building of more prisons: county prisons, regional prisons &amp; Federal prisons; 4. Empowerment of judges and police with requirements to perform their duties; 5. Supervision and implementation of laws and orders.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Weakness and Inefficiency of judiciary accumulated untried cases.</td>
<td>1. Establishment of special courts to expedite the pending cases. Human Right should, therefore, be undermined; 2. Transformation and training of law enforcement agencies; Establishment of more police stations and judicial courts; 3. The building of more prisons: county prisons, regional prisons &amp; Federal prisons; 4. Empowerment of judges and police with requirements to perform their duties; 5. Supervision and implementation of laws and orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and Lack of Accountability</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Those who make mistakes or failed to perform well are not punished;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Those around President Salva Kiir Mayardit have failed and are not removed;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Public resources continue to be looted;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ The country had become poorer and corrupt individuals had grown richer;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ The corrupted are not held accountable but given good names and praises.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1. Ensuring accountability and transparency at all levels of governance; |
| 2. The corrupt officials must be held accountable; |
| 3. Get rid of ghost names in payrolls and save money; |
| 4. Hold corrupt individuals accountable and punished severely. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribalism, Nepotism, and Favoritism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Employment-based on tribal affiliations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Employment with NGOs confined to those from Equatoria states;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Appointments in leadership positions based on tribal balance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1. Fight tribalism with the right tools: encourage inter-marriages; |
| 2. Leadership positions should be based on capabilities rather than on tribalism, nepotism, and favoritism. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Incapacity and inability of the civil servants to perform effectively;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Lack of consistent training of civil service;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Inequality of civil service salaries at national and state levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| 1. Swapping of Governors, Commissioners &amp; civil servants will reduce tribalism; |
| 2. Employment must be based on merits; |
| 3. The building of National Schools for mixed and diverse ethnicities will fight tribalism; |
| 4. Incorporation of the National Anthem and other National elements into the curriculum to install Patriotism and Nationalism in the hearts of South Sudanese; |
| 5. Salaries system of civil service should be unified; |
| 6. It is the qualified nationals that should be recruited in government institutions; |
| 7. Training and Capacity building of civil servants should be prioritized. |
| <strong>Non-politicization of Civil Service</strong> | Individuals leave civil service to serve in political positions and get reinstated in civil service again. | Stop reinstatement of those who left civil service before to serve in political, military, or other armed forces positions to avoid politicization and militarization of civil service. |
| <strong>Non-politicization of the Army &amp; the other Armed Forces</strong> | Individuals leave armed forces to serve in political positions and get reinstated in the army or the other armed forces again. | Stop reinstatement of those who left armed forces before to serve in political or civil positions to avoid politicization of the military and other armed forces. |
| <strong>Land Issues</strong> | • The government denied land for a public purpose by communities; • The land has become a source of conflicts and disunity among people. | 1. Land should belong to the government; 2. Relocate national capital to RAMCIEL as proposed earlier. |
| <strong>National Capital</strong> | As in the above | Relocate the Capital of the Country to RAMCIEL |
| <strong>State House</strong> | Our leadership should be God fearing. | Establish a chapel in the State House; Appoint a spiritual leader to lead prayers in the chapel. |
| <strong>Boarders: Inter-State boarders</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Inter-County boarders</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Inter-Communal boarders</strong> | • Issues related to borders cause most inter-communal conflicts; • Inter-state boarders causing misunderstanding among states and communities – Tonj State complains about Gok encroachment and Twich State about Abyei. | 1. Inter-communal and inter-state borders should be addressed not now, but at a later time when stability had been achieved; 2. Communities or states that start or dwell on those border disputes should be rebuked and punished. |
| <strong>Traditional Administration (Chiefs)</strong> | Chiefs have become so many and weaker; | 1. Reduce the number of chiefs to reasonable numbers – the fewer, the better; |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-Communal Conflicts</th>
<th>Conflicts without rational reasons;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hatred and unnecessary death;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destabilization of individuals and households;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflicts undermined households to cultivate their farms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Form special courts to try cases and to put down heavy punishment on those found guilty;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Imprison those convicted in prisons outside the states to deny them contacts with their relatives;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Punishment should range between 10 years and the death penalty to deter others.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament of Civil Population &amp; Crimes that Follow</td>
<td>Communal conflicts no longer settled peacefully;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cattle raiding is a serious crime not checked by government in the way it deserves;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cattle raiding is a factor in the proliferation of arms among the civil population;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth no longer respect the law and commit crimes with impunity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Immediate disarm of the civil population;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Death penalty and long-term imprisonment should be the punishment put on cattle raiders that commit murder or manslaughter;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Enactment of laws that allow confiscation of cattle that belong to cattle raiders;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Communities should be mobilized to reject cattle raiding and cattle wealth acquired through it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Overstaffing of embassies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance of many embassies is a clear financial burden on the nation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most ambassadors and diplomats are not trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Reduction of the number of Embassies to those the country need most;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Appointment of competent officials in the Embassies;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| NGO's Engagement | \- NGOs are centered in Equatoria state more than other states, and that creates imbalanced delivery of services;  
\- Deepens tribalism, sectionalism, etc. | 1. Need a clear policy that ensures uniformity of NGOs' services in the country;  
2. Enact laws to handle NGOs' engagement;  
3. All NGOs must be deployed equally all over the country to deliver services on equal bases;  
4. NGOs urged to employ South Sudanese based on merits and without discrimination to any tribe. (Like "Don’t employ Dinkas"). |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Socio-cultural Issue:  
1. **Marriage**  
2. **Poverty**  
3. **Under-age marriage**  
4. **Superstition** | Higher dowries encourage cattle raiding;  
\- Diverse opinions – some encourage higher dowries, while others advocate lower dowries | Let the level of dowries to be paid in marriages optional and left to the families to decide for themselves. |
|  
\- The army, disabled, civil servants have grown poorer  
\- Rural population had grown poorer because of communal conflicts, cattle raiding, and cattle theft. | 1. Prioritize the agriculture sector and facilitate the rural population to engage in large scale production;  
2. Create more job opportunities through foreign investment  
3. Establishment of “Poverty Eradication” institution to initiate relevant policies;  
4. Encourage the microfinance approach to poverty eradication;  
5. Introduce incentive system to reward hardworking within communities. |
|  
\- Marriage of under-aged is unhealthy for girl children;  
\- Denies them childhood;  
\- Denies them an education that they need for their future;  
\- Creates social disorder | 1. Prohibit it by law;  
2. Heavy punishment for the perpetrators;  
3. Heavy punishment for the parents that give out their girl child in marriage; |
Magicians and Spear-masters have taken over the role of Chiefs and became powerful, respected and awarded with much wealth mainly by politicians that need an appointment to higher positions and criminals that need favoritism. Should be discouraged seriously

| Transportation | Poor Roads Network; Production areas not connected to market places; Almost all the roads that were constructed a few years ago had collapsed. | 1. Construct more roads to establish stronger connectivity; 2. Maintain the existing ones; 3. Contract foreign companies with the track of quality work and give sub-contracts to national companies. |
| Communication | Poor Telecommunication system in the rural areas; Many of them are not being maintained. | 1. Build stronger telephone networks countrywide to ease communications; 2. While maintaining the old aerial antennae, install new ones. |
| Health | PHCUs, PHCCs, and hospitals not proportional to the population of Warrap Region; | 1. Distribution of health services should be based on population – we need more PHCUs, PHCCs, and hospitals in Warrap Region; 2. Recruitment of more nurses and other paramedics. |
| Education | Schools not proportional to the population of children of school-age in Warrap Region; Enrollment in primary up to secondary schools is far less than expected because schools are fewer; Tonj Teachers College | 1. More schools of all levels for Warrap Region; 2. Reinstate technical education; 3. Encourage Free Education for the vulnerable especially the orphans; 4. Prioritize the agriculture sector to engage the larger population in productive work and empower a majority to reduce the level of poverty; 5. Encourage foreign investment to widen employment for youth and society at |
in Tonj Town is not renovated since peace and independence were achieved;

- Technical education has not been revitalized since peace and independence was achieved, and so existing technical schools in Tonj Town and elsewhere have not renovated to function again.

IX. Summary of the Report of Unity Subcommittee

The Subcommittee of Unity of National Dialogue Steering Committee led by Hon. Manasseh Magkok Rundial held the grassroots consultations in the for Unity Statea, which now encompasses three states of Northern Liech, Southern Liech and Ruweng states, between February and April 2018. Hon. Rundial remarked that his committee had not censored the views and opinions they recorded from the people. He commended the government of the three states, saying they had cooperated and offered his team good hospitality. Chairperson of the national dialogue sub-committee for Unity region, Hon. Magkok Rundial implored people to speak out without fear. A total of eleven (11) grassroots consultations were carried out with various stakeholders. Prior to the 11 consultations, the ND team met with the cabinet and legislature to explain the process before launching the dialogue process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.1: Members of the Subcommittee for Unity region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>s/no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The schedule of meetings is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.2: Timetable for Stakeholders Consultation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/02/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/02/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/02/2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>22/02/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/02/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/02/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/03/2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/03/2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>03/03/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/03/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/03/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/03/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/04/2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.1 Successes and challenges

The cabinet and legislature who met the ND subcommittee to share their views before the grassroots consultations endorsed the process. This was followed by an official launch of the grassroots consultations process to set the stage and explain the process and its benefits to the people. The national dialogue was generally commended for its work but with calls to take an inclusive approach to include rebels, POCs and visit other areas that had not been included. According to comments during the consultative meetings, some people had failed to attend the meetings because of fear of security with others citing tribalism.

9.2 Overview of emerging issues and recommendations

The people asked for an inclusive approach and youth wanted to be represented in all meetings. Emerging issues that were highlighted included the call to retain the 32 states, the need to pay attention to oil leaks that were causing diseases and deformities in babies and infertility and border demarcations and security. An overview of emerging issues and recommendations by stakeholders are articulated below. Emerging issues and recommendations for each meeting are pulled and presented in Table 9.3 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Emerging issues</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Chiefs and Elders    | ➢ Chiefs and community neglected  
➢ No social services like food, water, shelter, education, health, road network, electricity and communication  
➢ No rule of law to account for; corruption and nepotism  
➢ Tribalism  
➢ Immorality | ➢ Give back the power to communities/chief  
➢ Provision of social services  
➢ Rule of law  
➢ Nationalism and patriotism |
| Women                | ➢ Our husbands and sons are dying  
➢ We are being raped and killed  
➢ Arms in hands of people used for revenge killing and raiding  
➢ Victims of diseases and lack of health care centers | ➢ Need for peace  
➢ Those who kill, and rape should be punished  
➢ Improve health facilities  
➢ Implement a disarmament policy |
<p>| Youth                | ➢ Youth are unemployed and | ➢ Empower youth by giving creating jobs |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>27 percent literacy rate, education is being neglected</th>
<th>Improve quality of education by prioritizing education in the country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Lack of good governance, peace, and democracy</td>
<td>Respect for rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of technocrats in government</td>
<td>Nationalism and patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of nationalism</td>
<td>Technocratic government through national elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tribalism and nepotism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith based institutions</td>
<td>Lack of faith</td>
<td>God above all things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business community</td>
<td>Markets foreign controlled</td>
<td>Indigenization of the economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor road networks affect development of industry in South Sudan</td>
<td>Fund construction of roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People living with disabilities</td>
<td>Neglect of people living with disabilities and lack of social services to cater for their needs which results in hunger and deaths among other abuses</td>
<td>Establish humanitarian care for people living with disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Affirmative action of the disabled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                | ➢ Overlooked in all social sectors even though disability is not inability. | ➢ Rule of law  
 ➢ Specify the term limits |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Cabinet        | ➢ No rule of law  
 ➢ No clear term limits                                                      | Enforce laws  
 Assembly should regulate the executive functions |
|                | Lack of implementation of the law  
 ➢ Assembly is undermined by the executive                                     |                                                                  |
|                | ➢  Assembly is undermined by the executive                                     |                                                                  |
|                | ➢ Lack of implementation of the law  
 ➢ Assembly is undermined by the executive                                     |                                                                  |
|                | ➢ No multiparty pluralism in the government                                   | ➢ Encourage multiparty participation in government  
 ➢ Empower human right commission  
 ➢ Specify term limit to stop power wrangling  
 ➢ Enforcement of the rule of law  
 ➢ Democracy via national elections  
 ➢ Provision of social services |
| Political parties. | ➢ No multiparty pluralism in the government  
 ➢ Abuse of human rights for expressing political office aspirations  
 ➢ Political wrangling over power  
 ➢ No respect of rule of law  
 ➢ No democracy  
 ➢ Lack of service delivery | ➢ Encourage multiparty participation in government  
 ➢ Empower human right commission  
 ➢ Specify term limit to stop power wrangling  
 ➢ Enforcement of the rule of law  
 ➢ Democracy via national elections  
 ➢ Provision of social services |
| Police/Fire Brigade/Wild Life | ➢ Lack of security amenities to maintain security  
 ➢ Police neglecting duties of protecting property and citizens  
 ➢ Police is tribal and unprofessional  
 ➢ Lack of social services, low and delay of salary affecting smooth operations of police  
 ➢ Army is being dehumanized  
 ➢ Ghost names in the security sector | ➢ Provision of needed resources to maintain good security  
 ➢ Nationalize the police service to protect civilians  
 ➢ Improve social services and pay salaries regularly and on time for high motivation  
 ➢ Provide training to bring professionalism in the security sector  
 ➢ Conduct security sector census |
Finally, the consensus that emerged from Unity Subcommittee on the root causes of crises in South Sudan is in Table 9.4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance and political issues</th>
<th>Security issues</th>
<th>Socio economic and welfare issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Rewarding corruption</td>
<td>➢ Lack of respect of rule of law</td>
<td>➢ Lack of provision of social services: food; water; shelter; roads; education; health; electricity; and telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Rewarding rebels with high ranking positions</td>
<td>➢ Army is tribal and unprofessional</td>
<td>➢ Lack of faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ No separation of army and politics</td>
<td>➢ Availability of firearms in the hands of civilians a high security risk</td>
<td>➢ Lack of patriotism and nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Lack of accountability e.g. lack of prosecution of corrupt senior elites</td>
<td>➢ Border disputes</td>
<td>➢ Inequitable distribution of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Lack of transparency</td>
<td>➢ Security along borders weak</td>
<td>➢ Gender inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Tribalism breeding corrupted and nepotism</td>
<td>➢ No disarmament until there is peace</td>
<td>➢ Dual citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Lack of technocrats in government</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Foreigners controlling economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ President surrounded by corrupt elements i.e. lobbyists and gossips</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Rectify pension system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ South Sudan enriching other nations</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ South Sudan currency losing value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ South Sudan adopting foreign ideologies</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Lack of jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ SPLM leadership is enriching itself and undermining people</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Weak institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ SPLM factional fights destroying the country</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Multiple taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Frequent changes in government promoting rebellion</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Oil production should benefit all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Lack of promotion of multiparty politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Oil leaks causing diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Presidential term limits</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Hepatitis has gone out of control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Externalization of funds buying property and educating children abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ National Dialogue representation questioned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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9.3 Summary and recommendations

Despite concerns that other areas had been left out of the national dialogue process, several recommendations were made with some common ones such as ending tribalism, corruption, nepotism, implementation of a fair disarmament policy and dealing with a disease pandemic allegedly from oil leaks being raised at almost every consultation. The below Table 9.5 is a summary of the recommendations that participants felt were needed to end the crisis in South Sudan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance and political issues</th>
<th>Security issues</th>
<th>Socio economic and welfare issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Respect of rule of law</td>
<td>✓ Army reforms</td>
<td>✓ Subsidize food, water, shelter,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Stop awarding rebels with senior positions</td>
<td>✓ Fair disarmament policy with peace and jobs</td>
<td>education, health, security, road networks, electricity and telecommunication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Separation of the army and politics</td>
<td>✓ Fair integration of organized forces</td>
<td>✓ Faith in God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ End tribalism</td>
<td>✓ Deploy forces to protect borders</td>
<td>✓ Fair distribution of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Accountability and transparency</td>
<td>✓ Set committees to investigate tribal killings and border disputes</td>
<td>✓ Solve currency problems to deal with inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Technocratic government</td>
<td>✓ Peace committees</td>
<td>✓ Oil proceeds must benefit people such as jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Review of constitution and setting of Presidential limits</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ A percentage of oil proceeds used to develop hospitals and schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Prosecute perpetrators of crimes and violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Hepatitis vaccine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Strengthen security for people working in agricultural fields to boost production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Bring professionalism and good leadership in government</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Strengthen Civil service and pay civil service salaries regularly and on time, put pension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ President unveils himself to people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
X. **Summary of the Report of Lakes Subcommittee**

The membership of the Lakes Subcommittee was comprised of the following names given in Table 10.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/no</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td><strong>Subcommittee Members</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Hon. Joseph Lual Achuil</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Hon. Bishop Gabriel Roric Jur</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Hon. Arthur Agany Poole</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Hon. Machok Majong Jong</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Hon. Nyaruach Pal Gai</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Hon. Dr. Kuot Mawien Kuot</td>
<td>Member and Secretary of the Subcommittee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2.0  | **Secretariat Support Staff** |                                               |
| 2.1  | Bullen Yohana Walla         | Reporter (South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation; SSBC) |
| 2.2  | Miss Alak Nhial Mageer      | Logistic Officer                              |
| 2.3  | Harun Digge Tuka            | Camera Man (SSBC)                             |
| 2.4  | Emmanuel Amin Sebit         | Radio (SSBC)                                  |
10.1 Issues to be tackled by the National Dialogue through the Central Government

The following opinions were expressed as causes of the conflict at the national level:-

1. Power struggle within the SPLM leadership.
2. Lack of strategy and loss of vision by the Ruling Party.
3. Lack of rule of law, which leads to anarchy, corruption and lack of accountability.
4. Mismanagement of resources.
5. Proliferation of small arms in the hands of civilian populations.
6. Appeasement and reward to rebels policy by the central government.
7. Appointment of state and local leaders without consultations.
8. Lack of consultation of grassroots and states in choice of their leaders or representatives.
9. Hate speech.

10.2 Emerging issues to be tackled at the state level

1. Absence of rule of law and justice.
2. Revenge killings.
3. Cattle raiding.
4. Land and border disputes.
5. Improve state infrastructure.
6. Corruption and misuse of resources.
7. Reform of cultural practices.
8. Improve education and health services and many other issues.
9. Lack of local development strategy.
10. Weak communal relations.
11. Weak party structures.
12. Tribal border disputes and many other minor issues

10.3 Recommendations:

1. Restructure, reform and strengthen the national government institutions specially of rule of law and economy
2. Central Government to disarm the civilian populations comprehensively
3. The National Leadership to develop plans that would lead to national census and elections.

10.4 The following suggestions were put forward to the National Dialogue:

1. Comprehensive disarmament of the civil populations across all the states. This will create regional and national peace and stability and can pave way for economic recovery and infrastructural development.
2. By achieving this first step, it will create conducive atmosphere for conducting national census and elections
3. The delegates expressed that it is only through peaceful means and elections that leadership positions be sought instead of rebellion and appeasement

10.5 Conclusion

The general consensus of all the views expressed in all the consultations condemns the rebellion as a means to ascending to power. That the central government expedites means of ending the war to recover the economy and infrastructure and conduct the elections.
Restructure and reform the army and security organs to attend to their functions. Disarm the civilian populations across the states to restore communal stability. Most issues of governance featured highly in the discussions i.e. Rule of law, accountability, human rights etc. The team could not make it to travel on land from Yirol to Awerial due to bad road and was not possible by air.

10.6 The Proposed Way Forward:
1. The President should check and remove advisers and ministers that are not performing well. There are so many South Sudanese who could their jobs more efficiently and effectively;
2. The President should be tougher on corruption;
3. The President should not reward those who have rebelled against the nation. Instead, he should deal with them heavy handedly to save sovereignty of the nation; and
4. The President should prolong the period of disarmament and ‘State of Emergency’ at least for 4 years.

XI. Summary of the Report of Jonglei Subcommittee
The summary of the report of the Subcommittee for Jonglei is presented under two headings. The first is on what the participants at the grassroots level in Jonglei have identified as the root causes of the crisis facing the country. The second heading is on how to address these root causes.

11.1 The root causes
There are four main groups of root causes of the South Sudanese crisis according to the people who have been consulted in Jonglei. These are: a) political and economic factors; b) security issues; c) social and cultural factors; and d) developmental issues.

11.1.1 Political and economic factors:
1. Duplication of rules, laws and policies adopted from foreign countries by the Republic of South Sudan, are seen by the participants to have undermined the building of our institutions.
2. Failure of the Republic of South Sudan Government to punish or hold accountable corrupt officials and politicians.
3. Bad Governance was raised as one of the issues causing conflict. Soldiers and civil servants not being paid for long, and this leads to indiscipline in the army and poor performance in the public service.
4. Tribalism and Nepotism being practiced by politicians. Participants emphasized that politicians use their tribes as a mobilization tool to get to power.
5. National resource management: The issue of equity in resources allocation and utilization. These national natural resources include but not limited to the oil, minerals, agriculture and even marram soil for road making.

11.1.2 Security
1. Failure of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to protect and care for its citizens during the conflict and crisis: The people of Jonglei Region did not feel that their Government did enough in terms of protection when it came to attacks from the Murle and the SPLM (IO).
2. **Reward of rebellion**: Those who have rebelled are rewarded with positions, making rebellion attractive. The people of the Jonglei Region prefer the Government to be dissolved so that there is election.

3. **Indiscipline in the Organized forces**: Participants felt that the armed forces and other security organs at times create insecurity due to being indiscipline. They even accuse the security organs of selling arms to the raiders.

11.1.3 **Social Cultural**:

1. Child abduction by the Murle was one of the major issues identified by the participants. The issue is creating and generating great frustration and resentment in Jonglei Region. What makes it even more critical is the feeling that the National Government had prevented the youth from going to the Murle land to rescue the abducted children, including the looted cattle. Participants claimed that the National Government promised to return 56 abducted children, something that has not happened until now.

2. **Cattle rustling**: The issues of cattle rustling are being politicized when it happens, creating divisions among communities and people.

3. **Water and grazing lands**: These are sources of dispute in the communities. Participants reported that once conflict erupted in these resource places, the politicians of the area escalate the issue by making it political.

11.1.4 **Developmental Issues**:

1. Lack of basic services, such as health facilities and schools. As there are no functioning schools, the youth grow up idol and thus easily mobilized by politicians for conflict or even cattle rustling.

2. **Road connectivity**: This was a major issue raised during the discussions. The participants said that if there were roads the Murle raids would be easily countered and pursued.

3. **Telecommunications, particularly telephone connectivity**: It is said by the participants that most of the places have no telephone network and makes it difficult to raise alarm if there is imminent attack.

11.2 **Recommendations to Resolve the Root causes**

The participants in the grassroots consultation made concrete proposals as to how to resolve the root causes that were identified. The proposals for the resolution of the issues to be presented at a Regional Conference were as follows:

1. The SPLM leadership should consider holding election when the security situation improves.

2. Government to work on returning all the abducted children and stop the issue of child abduction.

3. Government to enforce law and order to stop the issue of cattle rustling and restore security in the country.

4. Promotion of education should be a top priority of the government.

5. The government should build dykes to better control drainage and therefore eliminate flooding.

6. The government should improve health care in the country by providing medical personnel, quality medical drugs and facilities.

7. Telecommunication networks should be erected to open up communication in the remote areas.

8. The government should construct main roads linking all the county headquarters with the state headquarters.
9. The government should create more jobs for the youth to minimize crimes related to youth unemployment.
10. The government should come up with a policy dealing with equal distribution of national resources in order to avoid complaints.
11. The payment of salaries of the government workers should be done on time in order to boost morale in the civil service.
12. The security agencies should carry out a general disarmament of the civilians all over the country.
13. The government should regulate the prices in the market to avoid inflation.
14. The government should come up with a plan to tackle tribalism in the country.
15. The government should modernize the security forces and retrain them to enforce discipline.
16. The government should stop appeasing rebels with positions and ranks, in order to discourage rebellions in the country.
17. Corruption and nepotism in the government sector should be tackled head-on by the anti-corruption commission and the ministry of public service.
18. The government should consider building hydro-electric dams to provide electricity to the general population in the country.
19. Politicians should always be held accountable for their actions and words, in order to eliminate the culture of selfish politics, which only lead to killings.
20. The government should consider introducing presidential term limits in the constitution and always hold general elections on time to avoid backlash from the electorates.
21. The executive arm of government should always work hard to implement government policies once approved by the legislature.
22. The media authority to control bad social media practices against the government.

XII. Summary of the Report of Pibor Subcommittee

Members of the Subcommittee are:
1. Hon. Baba Medan Konyi (Chairperson);
2. Hon. Mark Nyipuoich Ubong (Deputy Chairperson);
3. Hon. Festo Simon Pigga (Member);
4. Hon. Kennedy Gain (Member); and
5. Hon. Ngundeng Moses Giek (Member).

Makeup of the Boma Region Subcommittee secretariat:
1. John Jal Wuor (Documentation);
2. Victoria Ayen (Finance);
3. Mayo James Ween (SSBC Reporter);
4. Monday James Pigga (SSBC Radio);
5. Enosa Karaba Gabriel (Cameraman); and
6. Ibon Martin David (Secretary).

**12.1 Executive Summary of the Emerging Issues of Greater Pibor and Greater Pochalla**

The consensus that emerged from the grassroots consultations in the Pibor Administrative Area (PAA) consists of four categories, which are presented below.

**12.1.1 Political Issues:**
1. Change of government through ballot boxes in general elections.
2. The cabinet at the national level does not reflect the 64 ethnic groups of South Sudan.
3. Ministers once appointed stay there for life and don’t even want to give chance to others.
4. SPLA be properly restructured and equipped with modern military equipment.
5. Each state to have an army Division.
6. Party procedures are not being followed when appointing people in political positions, nepotism and tribalism is the major practice.
7. There should be two terms limit for president (5+5).
8. Random arrests of the people by national security in Juba induces fear.
9. The President usually consults Jieng Council of Elders before issuing any presidential decree.
10. Stop Rewarding rebellion with high ranks and positions.
11. The appointment by the President using his 5 percent of MPs who have failed in the general elections is bad.
12. Currently one constituency has more than two MPs in the Transition National Legislative Assembly.
13. Change of Governor every four or six months creates instability in the state in addition Governor cannot implement his/her programs.
14. Change of governorship must be done through consultations in with the citizens of the concern state.
15. People Demand for federal system in South Sudan.
16. Review the political party act to reduce the number of political parties in South Sudan.
17. People support 32 states plus Abyei.
18. Disagreement among the senior members of the SPLM in 2013 is the root cause of this conflict in the country.
19. Reunification of the SPLM would be part of the conflict resolution in South Sudan.
20. Other groups want to take advantage of the SPLM divisions.
21. Former Cobra Agreement of 2014 has not been fully implemented.
22. National wealth is not equitably shared as a result, no development activities since independence, no schools, no hospitals, no agricultural projects, and no Telecommunications network.
23. Government officials served themselves first instead of serving peoples.
24. Anyuak community has problems with their neighbors over land issues.
25. Government should look into Ethiopia encroaching to South Sudan border.
26. There should be a regional conference between Anyuak and Murle to stop child abduction.
27. President of the republic should come from minority tribes next time.
28. The interim period should be 2 to 3 years to prepare for general elections.
29. Federal system be established as the best system of governance in South Sudan.
30. Separation of power between the three organs; Executive, Legislature and Judiciary in the Country.
31. Local borders demarcation to stop organized-crimes from county to county, state to state and national level as well.
32. President Kiir to introduce fire squad policy Late Dr. John Garang used to do for country to move forwards.
33. Boma state community demand representation with ministerial post in the national government.

12.1.2 Social issues:

1. People demand for construction of Roads to provide services.
2. The only link to Pibor is the Pibor airstrip.
3. People travel on foot and Canoes during the rainy season because of lack of permanent roads.
4. Child and women abduction is the main crime between Murle community and their neighbors.
5. The army is kept away from their families and have no leave.
6. Reintroduce boarding schools in order to cultivate nationalism.
7. People need to forgive one another and avoid revenge attitudes.
8. Pibor Women Request President Salva Kiir to organize all women forum or conference in Juba so that we ask ourselves as women why we allow our children to kill themselves, this is very important request since the children do not listen to their fathers anymore.
9. Resort back to traditional cultivation to eradicate depending on United Nations (UN).
10. Central government to build Central prison in Pibor Town.
11. Appoint proper judges and magistrates in the Boma state.
12. There is need for reconciliation for people of Boma state.
13. Lack of promotion in civil services.
14. Abolish and disband the practice of age set among the youth in Pibor.
15. Review the policy of land belong to the community.
16. Pibor-Juba road be open as a matter of urgency.
17. Dig artificial lakes along Kongkong River to solve Murle water problem in the dry seasons.
18. Play our cultures and images in the national Television in Juba.
19. Repatriation of internal displaced persons across the nation.
20. English to be the first official language in South Sudan follow by Arabic language.
21. Recruitment and promotion be based on merit basis not who you are and where you come from.
22. Strengthen accountability and justice institutions in South Sudan.
23. During the rainy season Pochalla is cutoff from the Pibor.
24. Jieng Council of Elders must be dissolved and form a South Sudanese Council of Elders.
25. Pochalla is a mother of all struggles from Anyanya1, Anyanya 2 and SPLA up to the independence why is Pochalla now forgotten in terms of development?
26. Pay back the chickens, goats, and cows you ate during the struggle.
27. Forgiveness is very important for the people who have been in conflict for so long.
28. President Kiir has to visits South Sudan states all for him to understand people views about the situation
12.1.3 Security issues:
1. General disarmament in the country.
2. Construct army barracks and supply rations regularly.
3. Unknown gunmen activities be eliminated.
4. Lack of Promotion in the army.
5. The issue of Jamus, Jerad, Muor Muor and Kazuk divisions be settle.
6. Construct military hospital.
7. Anyuak community are too vulnerable because they are not armed while the Murle are armed.
8. Let the government stop rewarding rebellion with high ranks or positions
10. Stop child abduction and cattle raiding in Boma state.
11. Pochalla population depend on Ethiopian currency instead of South Sudanese Pound
12. People who died during the liberation struggle are forgotten with their families.
13. War veterans should be properly taken care of.
14. War bring nothing accept destruction and fear.
15. There is a sign of progress and peace with the advance of new Governor and National Dialogue team in Boma state.
16. National Dialogue is a great initiative from the President and may God has mercy on South Sudan.
17. The leadership of the SPLA should regularly visit the army on the ground to see their conditions.
18. SPLA in Pochalla need to be supply with two Trucks; one big truck and one pickup cruiser.
19. We heard others are awarded with cars, where are the Anyuak chiefs cars?

12.1.4 Economic issues:
1. Corruption started after the CPA was signed in 2005 when government officials corrupted the system.
2. Some government officials have taken the wealth outside the country’ and should be recovered.
3. National wealth is not being equitably shared between states.
4. Ghost names cut off pay, and unpaid wages and salaries not remitted back to government treasury.
5. Contracts are not handled according to the procurement procedures.
6. Presidential flegdes are not implemented.
7. Devaluation of South Sudan Pound (SSP) has badly affected the common citizen.
8. Increase youth employment so that cattle raiding and child abduction is eradicated.
9. Foreigners control our market and economy.
10. No Banks in Pibor and cows are the capital.
11. Encourage agriculture system in the state.
12. There should only be four political parties in South Sudan.
13. Introduce reforms to mitigate corruption.
14. No development schemes in Boma since 2005 up to date.
15. Chiefs are moving on foot, where are the cars donated by the President?
16. Pochalla MPs build houses in Juba instead of Pochalla.
17. Let us forgive one another for us to live in peace and harmony in South Sudan.
18. CDF authority in the TNLA to hold accountable the MPs of Pochalla about the allocation of CDF Funds for Pochalla.
19. Delay of our salaries is a big problem.
12.2 Recommendations and Conclusions:

1. The stakeholders discussed the above general questions in-depth on the basis of socioeconomics, cultural, political, technological, environmental and legal perspective. Hence the stakeholders touched their internal issues, such as child abduction and cattle raiding to be stopped before addressing their conflict with neighboring states.
2. In answering general questions, stakeholders say Yes National Dialogue is the right forum to resolve our differences in the country of South Sudan, and will help us to engage our communities with long lasting peace and coexist with one another.
3. People should depend on traditional agriculture rather than depending on foreign aid.
4. Salaries delayed; hence civil servants abandoned their jobs for private sector for better payment.
5. South Sudan has been in serious political crisis and deep ethnics divisions since 2013.
6. Discrimination within government institutions, promotion and recruitment be based on merit.
7. All people’s rights are derogated due to state of emergency, and people lose their lives on daily basis.
8. SPLM must be reformed to save the country from disintegration.
9. Boma communities are not represented in the national government nor in the in foreign services.
10. Politicians mismanaged the country’s affairs, which affects human security.
11. There should be a Permanent constitution in South Sudan.
12. We need Democracy and the Rule of law.
13. Justice, Accountability, Unity and Diversity in South Sudan.
14. There should be term limit for president (5+5).
15. Federal system in the country.
16. General reforms in all government institutions and the restructure of the SPLA into a national army.
17. Separation of Power between the three organs of the government, that’s; the Executive, Legislative and the Judiciary.
18. General disarmament to be carried out to address the issue of insecurity.
19. Government of South Sudan to look into Ethiopian Government encroaching into South Sudan particularly in gold rich areas of Pochalla, Damballa and Rahat.
20. President Kiir need to introduce a fire squad policy to stop corruption and crimes like Late Dr. John Garang used to do.
21. National Dialogue should be a nationwide thing as the only mean of achieving peace in South Sudan.
22. Satellite system in the Boma state.
23. Roads and bridges to be constructed in Boma state with emphasis on Juba-Pibor Road, Pibor-Pochalla Road and Pibor-Boma Road.
24. Ngachigak Hospital to be constructed in Pibor.
25. Put in place proper Education system if the Murle youth are to abandon child and women abduction practice.
26. Put in place strong law enforcement agencies especially Courts and magistrates.

XIII. Summary of the Report of Abyei Subcommittee

As is the case for other subcommittees, the Abyei regional subcommittee is mandated to: identify key stakeholders in the region; prepare budget and plan for the grassroots
consultations; facilitate grassroots consultations; prepare regional consultation report; prepare agenda for the regional conference; facilitate regional conference; supervise selection of regional conference delegates; prepare the report of the regional conference and facilitate nomination of National Conference delegates.

Specific objectives of Abyei Regional Subcommittee are:

- To make sure identification of stakeholders is conducted fairly
- To ensure grassroots consultation is carried out free and in a conducive environment.
- To ensure that minutes are taken accurately (verbatim).
- To make sure that verbatim report is guaranteed.

The Abyei Regional Subcommittee is uniquely composed of members drawn from different parts of South Sudan. Its membership inspired the Dinka Ngok community and sent an unequivocal political message that their cause is still very much right at the center of the political equation of South Sudanese people. Members of the NDSC had the flexibility to choose any committee each member would wish to join. Hence, all Abyei Regional Subcommittee joined it in an absolute free will. The Abyei Regional Subcommittee members elected Gen Pieng Deng Kuol as their chairperson to lead the subcommittee programmatic activities in Abyei. The committee identified major stakeholders, operational locations (Counties and Payams) in Abyei region and prepared a work plan, which included budget projection for the recently concluded consultation phase.

The stakeholders identified by the committee are:

- State authorities, State Executive, Legislature, local Government authorities.
- Traditional authority and community leadership.
- Youth and women associations.
- Farmers, Traders and cattle herders.
- Intellectuals and Senior government officials
- Political parties.
- Civil society organizations.
- Organised forces.
- Internally displaced persons.

Identified counties are:

- Rum-Amer County.
- Alel County.
- Majak County.
- Ameth Aguok County.
- Abyei Municipality.

13.1 Methodological Approach

The members of the Abyei Regional Subcommittee members opted to use group consultative approach as opposed to other known methods of consultation. The identified stakeholders were profiled, categorised and regrouped based on profession and other social characteristics. For example, farmers, cattle herders, traders, youth and women associations were consulted together in each county, dictated by the time factor and resources’ available. The consultation processes were interactive and participatory. The participants expressed their opinions freely on a range of questions posed by members of the Abyei Subcommittee.
13.2 Summary and Recommendations of the Abyei Subcommittee

These are presented below:

13.2.1 Summary of Emerging Issues from the Stakeholders: National Issues

1. SPLM leadership has abandoned the Movement/Party’s core values, vision and Mission causing serious division that has resulted to senseless armed conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan. The SPLM has lost vision and mission by allowing tribalism, corruption, and nepotism to thrive.

2. Undemocratic practices and mismanagement of 2010 elections by SPLM electoral colleges is the genesis of the current conflicts in the country.

3. SPLM internal differences and power struggle split the party into many factions. This has been the main cause of the ongoing aimless civil strife. Internal power struggle within the party top leadership led to a devastating SPLM division, which culminated in bloody violence in 2013 and multiple factions within the party—SPLM IG, SPLM IO/IG, SPLM IO/IB and SPLM FDs.

4. Bad governance characterized by unbridled corruption and lack of transparency and accountability has created instability in South Sudan. Undemocratic governance and the abuse of power by the President are some of the root causes of the political predicaments in South Sudan.

5. Tribalism and tribal bigotry among the South Sudanese people have greatly scaled up over the years to a seemingly irreversible proportion. Tribalism, ethnicity, hatred, intolerance and tribal bigotry create disharmony among the people of South Sudan. Tribalism and nepotism are on the rise across the country, compounded by the fact that all senior government officials, including governors and commissioners are always assigned to the states and counties they originated from. It might be critical for the government to assign officials to places other than their original areas in order to uphold national unity.

6. Absence of rule of law and lack of respect for the constitution has created anarchy and equally produced chaotic conditions in the system of governance in the country. Stakeholders in Abyei consider weak institutions and lack of transparency and accountability as major impediments to the effective application of rule of law.

7. Lack of nationalism, patriotism and political will to govern the country within the framework of rule of law.

8. Greed and power hunger among the political elites is the one of primary conflict fueling factors in South Sudan. Greed and rampant corrupt practices in all government’s institutions hinders basic social service delivery. Abject poverty in the country has created an environment of hatred that breeds conflict among South Sudanese people. Poverty, mismanagement and poor governance are the main threat to national harmony and peaceful coexistence.

9. Lack of developmental projects, such as industry, large agricultural schemes, power planets, roads, schools and health facilities limit the country’s job creation opportunity prospects. The ongoing conflict has seriously impeded development efforts, it has crippled the government's ability to construct roads, schools, hospitals, power plants or provision of clean drinking water.

10. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons across the country poses serious threat to peace and development in South Sudan. Proliferation of arms in the hands of the citizens is one of the major causes, which is fueling the ongoing communal conflicts across the country. The proliferation of small arms in the hands of unauthorized persons in the country, including light weapons is squarely the
responsibility of the army and other organized forces that reportedly supply their relatives with these lethal weapons to fight communal conflicts.

11. Marginalization of large sections of South Sudanese citizens and the exclusion of SPLM/SPLA historical cadres is one of main reasons behind the ongoing political instability.

12. Appointing unqualified people to senior positions through nepotism and cronyism is a major impediment to development and basic social service delivery.

13. Policy of appeasement, reward and promotion of militias to senior military ranks and senior government positions encourage the vicious cycle of disastrous rebellions and it also affects negatively the morale of SPLA. Military generals and senior politicians take arms against the nation when relieved from their duties.

14. SPLA does not reflect the face of South Sudan; it is still a tribal based army.

15. Crimes are committed with outright impunity across the country; criminals are not brought to account for their crimes.

16. The establishment of 32 states has increased tribal based conflicts over land/borders.

17. Adoption of a federal system of governance without proper understanding of its principles and implications has amplified tribal bigotry that degenerated into devastating armed conflicts in the country.

18. SPLM has failed to formulate an appropriate system of governance after the independence of the country from the Sudan in 2011.

19. The establishments of tribal councils of elders such as the Jieng Council of Elders, Nuer Council of Elders and Equatoria Council of Elders, which are allegedly being accused to have been interfering or acting intrusively in state affairs has emasculated public institutions, including the ruling party (SPLM).

20. The constitution clause that assigns the land ownership to communities has become a major cause of disputes and conflicts over land across the country.

21. Ineffective policies and mechanisms put in place for revenue collection contribute to the economic depression that the country is going through.

22. The prevalence of traditional cultural values, based on communal way of life—rather than individualism—, coupled with high rates of unemployment among the youth has encouraged dependency syndrome. Many people opt to live with relatives instead of working hard to improve their livelihoods.

23. Many leaders have taken their families abroad to ensure they get better schooling, healthcare, education and security.

24. Power struggle among politicians and military generals is driven by greed for material gains.

25. Neglect of martyr’s families, wounded heroes and heroines cursed South Sudan.

26. Generals do not respect the rule of law and when removed from positions of power take away government assets, such as vehicles and refuse to evacuate government houses or in the worst-case scenario take up arms.

27. Poor and weak security institutions that are unable to control even the security in Juba where killings by unknown gunmen are rampant.

28. Lack of inclusivity, political participation and the tendency to narrow political space is also another cause of the conflict.

29. SPLA is impartial politically because it has not been transformed to be a professional national army that respects and obeys a civilian-led government. The SPLA and other organized forces have not been politically oriented, are factionalized along tribal lines, are not conventionally organized and lack political
training. The involvement of SPLA commanders in politics and their allegiance to the SPLM as a party is a very dangerous—it undermines democratic evolution.

30. High rate of illiteracy renders the population vulnerable to manipulation by the elites to fight their wars in South Sudan. The ‘cut and paste’ approach to adopting national syllabus mainly from Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan renders our educational system unresponsive to our needs and is above all, not reflective of cultural values of the nation.

31. Lack of political will on the part of leadership to strictly abide and respect the spirit and the letter of constitutional provisions and other agreed laws has perpetuated impunity in South Sudan.

32. Human right abuses and gender-based violence are serious matters that have created vulnerability for women and children and undermine their potential to effectively participate in nation building.

33. The President of South Sudan Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, has governed the country poorly. He is the cause of all the problems which are facing the country by allowing corruption and state of lawlessness to prevail without accountability. Moreover, division of SPLM has been occurring under his watch. He should resign instead of seeking communities’ opinion over what went wrong under his leadership that caused bloodshed and destruction in the country.

34. Presidential system of governance may be the best, but parliamentary system would be more suitable for South Sudan.

35. SPLM leaders and SPLA generals want to own South Sudanese people’s struggle that started way back in 1955 and the benefits associated with the freedom, a sense of limitless entitlements. Misunderstanding of the federal system of government is a driving force behind the unreasonable demand for the creation of more states along ethnic lines, which has become a major divisive factor among South Sudanese.

36. The deployment of inexperienced, untrained former SPLA and other armed group fighters into specialized and organized forces such as prisons, police and fire brigade affect their abilities to efficiently deliver these critical services.

37. Constitutional post holders, army and other organized force generals and senior civil servants have to be barred from engaging in business whether in a partnership with local or foreign nationals because the nature of their professions.

38. Lack of tolerance and patience among South Sudanese people is another problem that has ravaged the country.

39. Asymmetrical distribution of resources is a fundamental starting place of the problem, as few individuals have been exclusively and excessively enjoying the economic benefits of the country since 2005.

40. Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Bari are the communities creating instability in the country.

41. Frequent reshuffling of national and state governments is one of the major sources of conflict—it creates a considerable number of former post constitutional holders who are in most cases left without income for many years.

42. People from Bahr el Ghazal region misadvise the President in a manner, which is often aimed at promoting their regional narrow interests, an action that is incompatible with the nation building agenda.

43. Army officers appointed to political positions or to lead civil institutions are returned to the army after they are relieved. This is one of the major sources of the conflict because these officers have already been politicized.
44. SPLA officers, both senior and junior, NCOs and soldiers require rotational and periodical redeployment so that they don’t spend more than 2 years in the same division or unit.

45. Lack of training and capacity building for the army generals and division commanders has led to corruption and lack of accountability in the army. In many cases, there is an acute lack of managerial skills among senior officers.

46. Senior generals and politicians educate or set up their families abroad and there are disinterested in developing the country’s infrastructures, roads, schools, and hospitals among others. They orchestrate conflicts without remorse because their families are not in the country.

47. South Sudanese who returned from diaspora with dual nationality lack nationalism, as they apparently have competing allegiance and loyalty.

48. South Sudanese currency’s devaluation was unnecessary economically, as the country depends entirely on agricultural products imported from the neighboring countries, which has resulted to a massive outflow of the United State of America Dollar; a process that will ultimately destroy the economy of South Sudan.

49. SPLA command allows selling of guns to citizens, which has encouraged them to engage in communal fights and cattle raiding.

50. The President of the Republic, Salva Kiir Mayardit bears greater responsibility for the ongoing political crises in the country. “Aci baai yiek ijaza Chol Ayuak” (he gave the country a holiday, Commander Chol Ayual’s permission).

51. Corruption is practiced on daily basis with impunity in the system, a case in point is the selling of firearms to civilians, misuse of government funds and get away with it undisturbed, because the offenders are protected by their relatives in high places and by the system as well.

52. Abandonment of South Sudan’s—friends, individuals or countries—, such as the USA and Norway, which could have helped in infrastructural development, notably roads, hospitals, water and other important public utilities.

53. A historical war museum in which the destroyed military equipment and documents are stored should be established to keep records and accounts of events and key actors in the liberation struggle.

54. The colonial system of governance, which was anchored on the policy of divided and rule, is seemingly being maintained in South Sudan whereby Chief’s children strongly believe that they have inherent right to be the rulers.

55. The west orchestrated this war as a punishment or coercive measure against the leadership of government of the Republic of South Sudan for pursuing an independent foreign policy.

13.2.2 Summary of Emerging Issues from the Stakeholders on Abyei

1. The stalemate over the final status of Abyei is responsible for anxiety and uncertainty among Ngok Dinka community. Abyei residents roundly condemned Hon. Bona Malwal’s alleged concession to Khartoum. It was expressed that statements such as that attributed to Dr. Marial Benjamin, Michael Makuei Lueth and more recently Hon. Bona Malwal are likely to undermine or weaken Abyei’s legitimate and inherent right of being an integral part of South Sudan. The failure of the Government of South Sudan to recognize the 2013 Abyei referendum results was strongly condemned by the people of Abyei.

2. Residents also raised as pertinent, various questions and issues pertaining to inter-communal relations, insecurity and border issues. These included views about:
The threat posed by militia commander Thomas Thiel Malwal Awak and Sudan arm forces, division 31 based in Difra.

Land disputes between Twic and Ngok communities (over internal border) was said to have the potential to lead to an armed confrontation that may involve all segments of the two Dinka sections.

Targeted killings of Dinka Ngok along their common border with Twic community compel some people to conclude that the killers hail from Twic State.

The alleged role of politicians in engineering border conflict between Twic and Ngok Dinka communities.

Lack of finances and a unified syllabus is upsetting provision of quality education in Abyei region.

Nepotism, tribalism and political cronyism in the administration of Abyei region is causing political disquiet and rift among the people of Abyei. For instance, the NDSC heard that Mareng community is not adequately represented in Abyei area’s administration and that it was feared that inequitable power and wealth sharing can cause conflict within Dinka Ngok community.

The allegation that forces threatening Dinka-Ngok in Difra are in fact under Bona Malwal’s command.

The encroachment of the Sudanese army and their militia allies into Abyei’s territory and more importantly the security threat associated with their presence in the northern part of the area.

UNISAF is actually running the administration of Abyei behind the scenes alongside the Sudanese government.

Grievances over the internal governance issues in Abyei area regarding mismanagement of financial resources and power sharing.

13.2.3 Summary of Recommendations by Stakeholders

The following are stakeholders’ recommendations on a range of issues raised during the consultations:

1. That President Kiir should visit Abyei, Malakal, Bentiu and all war-affected areas in the country to see for himself the level of devastation and the misery to which South Sudanese people are subjected.

2. The president of the Republic of South Sudan should resign and hand over the country to another SPLM leader to create a new political dynamic that will lead to the settlement of the ongoing political crises. He should allow the country to conduct free and fair elections in 2018 so that South Sudanese are able to elect a capable leader to govern them.

3. South Sudanese politicians known to be Anti Abyei ought to be urged by the leadership of the country to refrain from making provocative and contradictory statements that are detrimental to the final solution to Abyei’s problem.

4. Development of a permanent constitution to lay down a solid legal foundation to safeguard and strengthen the rule of law, ensuring proper provision of equitable judicial services to South Sudanese people in an accountable and transparent manner.
5. Reconciliation among the citizens affected by conflicts is urgently needed. It is necessary to initiate reconciliation among the political leaders and other political figures in the country.

6. Abyei status should be part of the National Dialogue (ND) conference agenda item at all levels.

7. UNISFA should be deployed between Twic and Ngok to prevent conflict between the two communities over the border dispute. Moreover, an urgent intervention from the national government to mitigate and peacefully solve the brewing Twic-Ngok border conflict is needed. Furthermore, the dispute between Twic and Ngok communities over land needs a forum to discuss it and to amicably find a lasting solution.

8. SPLM party factions (SPLM IG, SPLM IO-IG, SPLM IO-IB, SPMM DC and SPLM FDs) should negotiate faithfully their reunification to finally settle their political wrangling to pave the way for peace, reconciliation and national healing in the country. The SPLM needs to re-unite its ranks and file and re-define their vision to match the governance system and development agenda expected of them by the citizens of South Sudan. Re-unification of SPLM top leadership, especially Awald Garang or “Garang Boys)” and Awald Kiir “Kiir boys” is central to SPLM unity as a whole.

9. The tribally established councils of elders such as the Jieng Council of Elders, Nuer Council of Elders, Equatoria Council of Elders must be banned.

10. SPLM as a ruling dominant party needs should re-appraise its vision and mission in order to adapt itself to a new political dynamic created by the process of decolonization and the current political turmoil in the country.

11. The constitutional clause that assigns land ownership to the communities should be amended, as its misunderstanding has caused loss of lives among the communities over the years. It has also been a consequential hindrance for development. Government needs to reassume its regulatory responsibility over land ownership to ensure its equitable sharing.

12. National Ministry of Education and Instruction in South Sudan has to develop a unified syllabus and allocate enough resources to support the education sector in Abyei region. Moreover, such a unified syllabus should incorporate civic education to marshal a nationalistic spirit among South Sudanese young people.

13. The national government should develop effective laws and hold individuals accountable for abuse of power and embezzlement of government funds.

14. President Salva Kiir’s Government ought to make it a priority to work toward finding a final political settlement for Abyei.

15. South Sudanese people should demonstrate a degree of tolerance to one another based on mutual interests and respect for cultural and ethnic diversity. In order to reduce tribalism and sectionalism in South Sudan, government needs to construct national schools at all levels in which pupils and students from different parts of the country will be enrolled.

16. The government should intervene and negotiate with Thomas Thiel Malwal Awak militias at the border to resolve his grievances and to spare the lives of innocent Dinka Ngok people he has been murdering ever since.

17. Governments of South Sudan and Sudan need to negotiate compensation for SAF destruction of Abyei in 2008 and 2011 and to also investigate the circumstances in which Dinka Ngok Paramount Chief Kuol Adol was murdered in cold blood on 4/5/2013.
18. Presidential term limit should be included in the constitution so that South Sudanese people seize the opportunity to regularly elect leaders of their choice into offices.

19. SPLM as a party needs to develop policies on development and governance in general, education, and health and to keenly make sure that these policies are fully implemented in letter and spirit.

20. Govern by the rule of law and allow democratic principles to guide the political discourse in the country. The predictable solution to South Sudan political crisis is to uphold rule of law, adhere to democratic principles of governance and an absolute respect for the constitutional order.

21. Disarmament of the civil population in the country must be carried out simultaneously in all the 32. If effected appropriately, disarmament could probably provide a lasting solution to deadly communal conflicts in South Sudan.

22. An inclusive political participation, such as introduction of a genuine multiparty system of governance is a critical ingredient for the growth of democracy in South Sudan.

23. Tribal bigotry, hatred, intolerance, contempt, and greed need to be replaced by tolerance, love, compassion, an absolute respect for one another, unity and peace.

24. South Sudanese people must solve their differences, including political differences through peaceful means and also should be prepared to forgive and reconcile with one another.

25. Abyei issue should be included in all 15 grassroots consultations, because it is a national problem. It should also constitute an agenda for the regional and national conferences that are planned to take place at the end of the grassroots consultations.

26. Effective economic policies that will increase wealth creation must be urgently put in place to reduce the level of poverty in the country, especially reviewing down arbitrary devaluation of the national currency. Government needs to control the extremely excessive outflow of hard currencies from the country.

27. Constitutional post holders, army and other organized force generals and senior civil servants have to be barred from engaging in business, whether in partnership with local or foreign nationals.

28. South Sudan government needs to abolish dual citizenship policy to protect vital interests of the nation, as those who have two nationalities do understandably have competing loyalties.

29. The President of the Republic ought to officially recognize referendum results and declare Abyei as an integral part of South Sudan.

13.3 Thematic Classification of Emerging Issues
Stakeholders views detailed below relate to the following key themes teased out of presentations:

1. Governance and rule of law
   a. Inequitable power and resource sharing (creates disquiet that breeds a sentiment of injustice, hence leads to rebellion).
   b. Poor governance.
   c. Constitutional challenges including weak institutions
   d. Absence of the rule of law, which induces corruption practices, nepotism, unaccountable crimes committed against the country, and lack of transparency and accountability.
e. Human rights principles as enshrined in the Interim Constitution of South Sudan 2011; amended 2015
f. System and Forms of Government including unitary system, federal system, confederate systems, presidential, parliamentary and mixed systems, presidential and parliamentary, France’s example.

2. Socio-economic development
   a. Providing free, quality and universal education at all levels, as constructing/enhancing human capital capabilities is a critical step that will significantly scale up the level of creativity and innovation, which are the necessary ingredients, expected to foster accelerated economic development.
   b. Technical education must be a top priority.
   c. Provision of affordable and quality healthcare to cover all segments of South Sudan.
   d. Construction of schools, hospitals and healthcare centers across the country
   e. Build national boarding schools across the country in which students from different parts of South Sudan will be enrolled.
   f. Development of a unified syllabus for primary, secondary school and university
   g. Ineffective investment policies.
   h. Bad economic policies, including monetary policies that include unnecessary devaluation of national currency. These have led to a skyrocketing of inflation, falling living standards of South Sudanese people.
   i. Unpredictable political environment creates uncertainty for investors.
   j. Policy of empowerment of home-grown vibrant private sector entrepreneurship through preferential loan provision has to be initiated.
   k. High rate and multiple source of tax levying regimes do not create conducive investment environment.
   l. Tax collection is ineffective, and it is seriously marred by widespread corruption practices.
   m. Lack of basic economic infrastructure such as roads, schools, hospitals, power supply among others
   n. Corruption and embezzlement with impunity of public resources hamper government ability to invest in potential productive sectors, agriculture, mining and infrastructures.
   o. Inequitable distribution of national resources.
   p. Mismanagement of national resources has subjected citizens to abject poverty in the country.

3. Security sector reform and culture of rebellion
   a. SPLA reorganization that took place in the second half of 2005 was marred by serious deficiency and ineffectiveness.
   b. Unlimited integration of militias into SPLA since 2006.
   c. Rewarding rebels with high ranks disadvantages the SPLA proper, and affects force morale.
   d. Lack of equipment and other military requirements/amenities.
   e. The true size of the SPLA not known.
   f. Training has not been conducted to enhance its capabilities as modern and professional army.
   g. Human rights training for the SPLA is necessary.
h. There is a need to develop clear doctrine and code of conduct and the rules of engagement tailored to reshape SPLA and to transform it into a modern and highly professional army.

i. SPLA and organized forces were to be transformed to reflect the face of South Sudan; all communities should be represented in accordance with individual free will.

j. Causes that ignite constant rebellions in the South Sudan require identification and properly analyzed.

k. Policy of rewarding killers and destroyers needs a critical review.

l. Identify remedial mechanisms aimed at eradicating the culture of rebellion in the country.

4. Civil service reform

a. The Civil service Act 2011 has to be fully implemented and its provisions strictly observed.

b. Professionalism, work experience, character, commitment, irrefutable academic credentials and merit should be the only basis upon which civil servants are appointed.

c. Government should enact labour laws.

d. Promotion of civil servants to high position has to be effected after a thorough appraisal of performance and character of the concerned Staff.

e. Policy of capacity building of civil servant, training, both in-service and out service should be a top priority.

f. Civil servants, like the army and other law enforcement agencies need to be kept out of politics.

5. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons among civil population in the country

a. Availability of small arms in the hands of unauthorized persons has created instability in the country—civilian deaths negatively impacts the work of local authorities due to insecurity encourages cattle raiding and rustling and child abduction and undermines the state ability to deliver basic social services and development projects.

b. A proper inventory of small arms possessed by unauthorized persons in South Sudan should be set up.

c. The source of small arms and ammunition suppliers must be identified and punished severely.

d. Conduct sensitization and awareness raising campaigns among the communities on the negative impact small arms possession before implementing disarmament programme.

e. Disarmament should be carried out comprehensively and simultaneously in all communities.

f. Improve security across the country following disarmament.

6. National and cultural identity

a. Redefine South Sudanese national identity (who we are and what binds us together).

b. Identify and promote common cultural norms and values.
c. National identity cards, passports and other official documents should not include
details about the bearer backgrounds, such as community, state, Payam and Boma.
d. Cultural and ethnic diversities are source of strength in South Sudan.
e. South Sudan should create lingua franca out of their existing 64 or more national
languages like in Somalia, Senegal and East African countries.

7. Foreign policy
   a. South Sudan needs to develop a focused foreign policy to ensure that its vital
      interests are safeguarded.
   b. While it is inevitable for the Republic of South Sudan to forge a balanced foreign
      policy, it is cardinally important to maintain strategic bilateral relations with core
      historical allies, such as Israel, the USA, Norway, Uganda, Ethiopia, Cuba,
      Nigeria, South Africa etc.
   c. Experienced diplomats of high caliber and prominent politicians should be
      deployed in strategic and important friendly countries.
   d. Merits, professionalism, academic credentials, experience, character and loyalty to
      the country should be the only guiding principles for appointing and deploying
      diplomats.

8. Abyei’s status
   a. South Sudan and the Sudan need to collaboratively engage to bring to address the
      plight of the people of Abyei.
   b. The two countries are duty bound to implement Abyei Protocol, the Hague ruling
      and the referendum results.
   c. Insecurity caused by SAF division 31 based in Difra, Arab Baggara and militia
      commander Thomas Thiel Malwal Awak should be jointly addressed by the two
      countries. Sudan should be made to compensate victims of past violations,
      including 2008 and 2011.
   d. Investigation of the killing of Dinka Ngok Paramount Chief Kuol Deng has to be
      completed and culprits brought to book.
   e. Twic and Ngok Dinka border requires an urgent solution before it escalates into a
      full-scale conflict.
   f. A conference should be organized to discuss lasting solutions to Ngok-Ngok
      internal conflicts.

XIV. Summary of the Report of Security Subcommittee

These were not per se grassroots consultations, but rather with the organized forces in
Juba. This summary is divided into three sections. The first section presents the root causes of
the problems, their effects, and recommendations from the perspective of the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA). The second section provides the perspective of the other organized
forces ((Police, National Security, Fire Brigade, Prison and Wildlife Services). And third
section gives the way forward as proposed by the organized forces in a workshop that was
organized by the Security Subcommittee for the representatives of the organized forces.

14.1 Root Causes of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan According to the Sudan
Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA)

Participants at the consultation meetings of the SPLA have identified the following
five areas in which some of the main root causes of the crisis are found: a) governance; b)
Economy; c) security; d) social cohesion; and e) regional and international interests/threats. Effects of the causes and recommendations were made within each of these five areas. It is important to note that only this group of the National Dialogue stakeholders has identified external threats/interests to be among the sources of the root causes of the crisis in South Sudan. The Subcommittee used a policy matrix format in presenting these views.

14.1.1 Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Causes/Problems</th>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Legislative  | -Selection/ Appointment of semi-illiterates to the parliament based on mere representation.  
- Monopoly/ combination of executive and legislative powers in one person.  
- Ambiguity in the constitution  
- Information breakdown between MPs and their constituencies. | - Dormant and passive parliament.  
- Conflict of interest.  
- Lack of check and balance principles  
- Absence of effective governance  
- Lack of parliamentary oversight | -Parliament should impeach any corrupt public official found guilty of misappropriation of public fund or misuse of his/her position in any form.  
- Develop check- and-balance system by enforcing parliamentary oversight  
- Constitutional review. |

Executive | -Lack of clear vision and grand strategy  
- Weak institutions  
- Appointment based on nepotism and favoritism.  
- Re-structuring of states after popular consultation  
- Misinterpretation of decentralized governing system, including localization of government administrators  
- Weak foreign policy  
- Lack of Revenue Authority to organize revenue collection | -Loss of sense of direction  
1. Rampant corruption at all levels of government.  
2. Lack of service delivery  
3. Weak foreign relations.  
4. Wrangling among all levels of government over taxes | -Clear vision, one objective for the nation should be developed.  
- Implementation of laws, rules and regulations that govern the operations at all levels.  
- Review and restructure foreign policy strategy.  
- Government to review its current policy of appointing senior state officials (Governors, ministers, etc.) within their localities. In other words, avoid localization of... |
| Government Administration | -Support the implementation of the ARCSS and other agreements entered into by the government  
-Transformation of civil service  
-Strengthening the weak government institutions  
-Eradicate harmful practices (eg. Corruption, nepotism and tribalism)  
-Nationalism be inculcated in every citizen  
-Adoption of suitable federal system that suits the interests, cultures and values of South Sudan.  
-Transparency and accountability  
-Establishment of Revenue Authority to streamline collection of revenues |

| Judiciary | -Weak judiciary system  
-Interference of the executive in the judiciary system | -Myriads of crimes at alarming rate  
-Lack of | -Restructuring of judiciary system and law enforcement |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical (SPLM/A)</th>
<th>-Weak law enforcement agencies</th>
<th>implementation of rule of law</th>
<th>-Strict enforcement of rule of law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Power struggle of Anya’Anya 2 over the leadership that ended in 1987 which led to the integration of the Anya’Anya 2 into SPLA</td>
<td>-All problems mentioned herein during the liberation struggle, had a ripple effect in the ongoing conflicts in South Sudan; for example:</td>
<td>-National reconciliation and healing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Incident of Kerbino Kuanyin Bol in 1987</td>
<td>i. Lowered image of South Sudan regionally and internationally</td>
<td>-Building the spirit of nationalism and national identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Incident of Arok Thon Arok in 1988</td>
<td>ii. Disunity and disharmony among the communities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Coup attempt &amp; rebellion of Dr. Riek, Dr. Lam &amp; Gordon Kong, 1991</td>
<td>-Rebellion of William Nyuon, 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Rebellion of William Nyuon, 1992</td>
<td>-The Yei Disagreement (Before signing of CPA), 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>-The Yei Disagreement (Before signing of CPA), 2004</td>
<td>-Following the death of Dr. John Garang, Salva Kiir was endorsed as successor by the leadership of SPLM/A, which annoyed some elements within the leadership of the SPLM/A e.g. Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. Lam Akol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>- SPLM struggle over leadership, and issues of government corruption and lack of accountability</th>
<th>-SPLM’s loss of direction undermines the development of the spirit of nationalism and unity</th>
<th>-Weak political parties in the</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Intentional deviation from the Constitution of the SPLM party and electoral college system guiding rules led to indiscipline in the party. The same scenario occurs in other political parties</td>
<td>-The government reshuffle in July 2013 and SPLM National Liberation Council discussion on reform document generated anger among the SPLM members, which led to December 2013 coup attempt and rebellions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-The government reshuffle in July 2013 and SPLM National Liberation Council discussion on reform document generated anger among the SPLM members, which led to December 2013 coup attempt and rebellions</td>
<td>-SPLM’s loss of direction undermines the development of the spirit of nationalism and unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Weak political parties in the</td>
<td>-National reconciliation and healing</td>
<td>-Building the spirit of nationalism and national identity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>country -Lack of political will to resolve conflicts</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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</table>

### 14.1.2 Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Problems</th>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>
-98% dependency on oil revenue
-Globalization/decline of oil prices
-Unfavorable agreement with Sudan on oil transactions
-No established local oil refinery
-Inadequate distribution and mobilization of resources
-Poor infrastructure development
--Dysfunctional diversification of economy (Do not put all eggs in one basket)
-Ineffective institutions/poor capacity enhancement to manage resources
-Lack of exports leading to reliance on foreign markets (Imports)
-No access to hard currency (Poor production)
-Inadequate private sector development
-Corruption and lack of accountability and transparency (A culture of get rich quick and get the hell out)
-Insecurity – leading to poor economic growth
-Political power struggle, which contributed to economic decline and underdevelopment
-Youth unemployment, leading to poor contributions to economic growth
-Economic sabotage to weaken South Sudan
-Continuous instability

-Destruction of oil wells and refinery in Upper Nile and former Unity States
-Economic meltdown given the drop-in oil prices
-Reliance on imports
-Higher inflation/depreciation of SSP
-Encroachment by some neighboring countries into South Sudan’s mineral rich territories
-Political unrest in the country
-Dispute on border issues among the communities along the borderline
-Economic meltdown
-Wrangle between multi-national companies over controlling oil blocks (e.g. Total versus White Nile in Jonglei State)

-Effective and efficient economic management policies
-Effective policies of accountability and transparency
-Renegotiation of oil agreement with Khartoum
-Revitalization of previous projects (sugar cane, cotton factory etc.)
-Regulation of policies to maximize non-oil revenues collection
-Start being producers rather than being consumers
-Increase exports (Access to hard currency)
-Evaluate and reassess the Central Bank
-Disourage black market
-Stop favoritism and nepotism (Employ and promote on meritocracy)
-Tax more those with more wealth to improve the economy
-Professionalization of the national army to contribute to economic growth (participation in developmental projects)
-Safety measures to protect refineries and oil installations
-Intensification of agricultural production, exploration and diversification of economy/GDP
-Quick resolution on border delineation and protection of territorial integrity to protect our mineral areas
-Strengthening international and regional bilateral economic cooperation
-Development of robust laws to safeguard South Sudan’s economy from foreign exploitation
-Diplomatic campaigns to
| and preoccupation by internal conflicts -Weak and devalued South Sudan currency | convince UN member countries to reject economic sanctions against the Republic of South Sudan |
### 14.1.3 Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Problems</th>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Planting of secret regional and international agents to destroy the ruling</td>
<td>- Loss of confidence</td>
<td>- Government to legislate the army’s retirement and pension bills and set a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party (SPLM) from within</td>
<td>- Constant insecurity and political unrest in the country</td>
<td>timeline for operationalization of these bills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Instigation for the formation of negative parties to wage war against the</td>
<td>- Disputes on border issues among the communities along the borderlines</td>
<td>- Regulate continuous integration of other armed groups and devise recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state</td>
<td>- Ill-trained and ill-equipped national army</td>
<td>procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians</td>
<td>- Loyalty of the integrated militias to their groupings and sections</td>
<td>- Transformation of security sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before and after South Sudan independence</td>
<td>- Destruction of oil wells and refinery in Upper Nile and former Unity</td>
<td>- Civic education and political sensitzation and awareness to promote peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State</td>
<td>and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Border issues with some neighboring countries</td>
<td>- Encroachment by some neighboring countries into South Sudan mineral</td>
<td>- Promote and maintain peaceful co-existence among communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Continuous integration of Other Armed Groups (AOGs) who have different</td>
<td>rich territories</td>
<td>- Professionalization of the national army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political agenda after Juba declaration</td>
<td>- Blockage of SPLA to attend training and capacity building courses in</td>
<td>- Protection of territorial integrity and the constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>some countries</td>
<td>- Internationally supervised border demarcation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Delay in the implementation of security sector reform led to weak law and</td>
<td>- Blockage to acquisition of equipment</td>
<td>- Development of counter-insurgency strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>order</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Establishment of military cooperation with neighboring countries, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Formation and arms support to the militia groups across the borders</td>
<td></td>
<td>region and international friendly forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Diluted SPLA as a result of constant integration of militia groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Equip the SPLA for the defense of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secret or open completion amongst the multi-national companies as to who</td>
<td></td>
<td>territory, people and the constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>will exploit natural resources of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Subversive activities leading to devaluation of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ongoing silent arms embargo and economic sanctions</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### 14.1.4 Social Cohesion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Problems</th>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Pitting tribes against one another</td>
<td>- Political unrest in the country</td>
<td>- Sensitization through civic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cross-border issues with some neighboring countries</td>
<td>- Disputes among communities along the borderline</td>
<td>- Internationally supervised border demarcation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tribalism, corruption, nepotism, and misinterpretation of decentralized</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>governing system, including location of government administrators, have</td>
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<tr>
<td>exacerbated the conflict and undermined unity and nationalism.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### 14.1.5 Regional and International Interests/Threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Problems</th>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Planting of secret regional agents to destroy the ruling party (SPLM) from within</td>
<td>-Political unrest in the country</td>
<td>-Sensitization through grassroots and faith based peace initiatives and civic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Instigation for the formation of negative parties to wage war against the state</td>
<td>-Dispute on border issues among the communities along the borderline</td>
<td>-Internationally supervised border demarcation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Border issues with some neighboring countries</td>
<td>-Inter and intra-tribal fight in South Sudan</td>
<td>-Peaceful coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Exploiting societal differences to stir up conflicts, foment anger, hate speech and xenophobia amongst the people of South</td>
<td>-The negative effect of social media in generating fabricated news and disseminating hate speeches, among others</td>
<td>-Establishment of laws that regulate NGOs and international agencies activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Interferences by some NGOs and international bodies in national issues</td>
<td>-Constant confrontation between NLA members on the matters of national interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Facilitating transfer of the embezzled money to foreign banks</td>
<td>-Loss of confidence in the top leadership of the country</td>
<td>-Develop measures, laws and policies that combat corruption and deal with money laundering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Intensification of subversive activities to collide top leadership with general public</td>
<td>-Loss of confidence in the Judiciary and the entire law enforcement agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Secret agenda for regime change</td>
<td>-Formation of some many rebel groups waging war against the government</td>
<td>-Develop measures for accountability and transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Negative publicity against the judiciary and the entire law enforcement agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Genuine national dialogue that realizes national interest as a basis of nationalism rather than one’s tribal affiliation and/or political agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Agitation of some politicians to work for the downfall of the government</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
14.2 Root Causes of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan: Views from Other Organized Forces (Police, National Security, Fire Brigade, Prison and Wildlife Services)

The other organized forces have similar views, but have been summarized around causes and recommendations as presented below.

### 14.2.1 Governance/Political Causes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Problems</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power struggle</td>
<td>- Restructuring the system of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Adoption of a sound federal system approach that suits the aspiration of the people of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Political and democratic participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of political will to change the status quo</td>
<td>- Introduction and commitment to good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepotism and tribalism</td>
<td>- Inclusivity and fair representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Eradication of harmful practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Sensitization against tribalism and nepotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Engage in civic education to promote nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Criminalize unsound generalization when expressing self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Penalize hate-speech mongers by law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Engage the media (Mainstream and social) in tackling the ethnocentrism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rampant corruption</td>
<td>- Enforcement of checks and balances on the system of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Commitment to strict application of law on corrupt officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak institutions and political parties</td>
<td>- Strengthening the political parties (Eg. Functional multi-party system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Encouragement of intra-party democracy and ensuring fair representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Establishment and strengthening of democratic system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strengthening the government institutions (eg. Recruitment of skilled manpower)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsettled/unresolved post-independence issues (e.g. Abyei and borders)</td>
<td>- Strengthening foreign policy through improved regional and international relations (i.e. diplomacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Clear delineation of South Sudan’s national interests and goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Lack of nationalism, patriotism and commitment | -Promotion of national identity through civic education  
|                                            | -Introduction of national service |
| Weak administration of justice within the legal system, i.e. Weak judiciary | -Strengthening the judiciary system  
|                                            | -Respect for human rights, civil and fundamental liberties |

14.2.2 Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Problems</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Promotion based on nepotism and favoritism | -Formulate policies/strategies for fair promotion process  
|                                               | -Discourage promotion based on nepotism and favoritism |
| Ineffective organization (e.g. Officers trained abroad are not utilized) | -Effecting security sector reform/ transformation across the security organs  
|                                               | -Establish and commit to standards of recruitment and promotion |
| Non-indoctrinated integrated other armed groups | -Proper training of integrated other armed groups |
| Inadequate training for specialized security sector units | -Refresher training for specialized security sector units |
| Lack of proper armaments/capabilities | -Acquisition of necessary armaments |
| Improper procurement procedures | -Improvement of procurement policies and implementation guidance |
| Biased disarmament exercises | -Inclusive disarmament exercises |
| -Political unrest in the country (Multiple insurgencies)  
-Inability to properly tackle rebellion | -Commitment to build a strong army that can defend the country  
-No reward to rebellion  
-Accepting national dialogue as a way to resolve the crisis in the country  
-Devise action plan and ways to stop rebellion  
-Political will to be encouraged |
| Partisan army | -Professionalized and non-partisan army |
| Poor intelligence gathering | -Adequate training  
|                                               | -Selection of personnel based on meritocracy (competence)  
|                                               | -Provision of resources |
| Lawlessness, impunity, human rights abuses i.e. rape, abduction etc. | -Strict application of laws, rules and regulations  
<p>|                                               | -Respect for human rights, civil liberties and freedoms |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confidence building between the civil population and the security forces</td>
<td>-Confidence building between the civil population and the security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians</td>
<td>-Criminalization of bearing of arms by unauthorized individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-General disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Protection of civil population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High rate of illiteracy among the forces</td>
<td>-Establishment of officers’ colleges and unified national training centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Alternative education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of parade control and presence of ghost names in security sector</td>
<td>-Establishing of an effective system for controlling the parade such as biometric system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>payrolls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power struggle among security organs</td>
<td>-Clear and sound policies on functions and duties of the security organs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of security reform</td>
<td>-Transformation of the security sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Restore the rule of law by strengthening the security sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemic diseases</td>
<td>-Conceive and promote nationwide HIV/AIDS, hepatitis A, B &amp; C and other communicable diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>through sensitization and indoctrination programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Engage the media (Mainstream and social) in tackling epidemic diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of control over security forces</td>
<td>-Building barracks for security personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Implement law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition over limited resources</td>
<td>-Policies for utilization of resources by giving attention to priorities (Strategic budgeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-communal conflicts</td>
<td>-Inclusive community dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Promotion of peaceful coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Disarmament and sensitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate disposition or deployment of manpower within the</td>
<td>-Deployment based on merits and proper disposition of forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of accountability within the security forces</td>
<td>-Accountability and strict application of the laws, rules and regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improperly planned integration of Other Armed Groups (OAGs)</td>
<td>-Establishment of integration rules to govern the integration processes into the security sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Especially into the Sudan People’s Liberation Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty of some individuals within the security organs to political</td>
<td>-Professionalization of the security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leaders and ethnic identities as witnessed in the 2013-2016 events</td>
<td>-Instilling of nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Introduction of national service for youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate application of laws, rules and regulations</td>
<td>-Respect for the rule of law and constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment of unqualified personnel based on ethnic, sectional and</td>
<td>-Establishment of pension scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political affiliations rather than on merit</td>
<td>-Reflection of regional/states representation in recruitment exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Commitment to, and enforcing equal regional and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Lack of social welfare services for the organized forces | -Establishment of co-operatives  
-Introduction of medical and life insurances  
-Establishment of recreational facilities |
|---|---|
| Absence of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) as well as of pension, hence lack of dignified exit strategy for the forces | -Establishment of pension scheme  
-Undertake DDR  
-Strengthening the NDDR commission |

### 14.2.3 Economic Causes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Problems</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Lack of exports of goods and services produced in the country | -Diversification of the sources of production (i.e economic diversification) to achieve diversified revenues  
-Encouragement of domestic production of goods and services  
-Commercialization of farming |
| Lack of socio-economic development, e.g., infrastructure, health, education etc. | -Provision of funds to establish infrastructure  
-Improvement of existing infrastructure  
-Service delivery |
| South Sudan being a landlocked country (No seaports) | -Embarking on industrialization  
-Creation of effective economic management policies in order to improve economy  
-Building strong bilateral relations with countries that have seaports |
| Corruption and lack of accountability | -Promulgation and implementation of tough anti-corruption and anti-laundering policies/laws  
-Commitment to the rule of law (including ending impunity) |
| Poor economic growth due to insecurity in the country | -Genuine national dialogue  
-Provision of security to the civil population |
| Economic sabotage mounted against South Sudan through proxy agents | -Establishment of trade agreements and regional cooperation with the neighboring countries  
-Strict application of laws against proxy agents |
| -Lack of proper national economic policies guiding the market (including lack of policies guiding the influence of foreign traders) | -Amendment of our investment laws and taxation laws in order to reserve some investment activities to the national and private or domestic to investment  
-Creation of investment activities for the government in order to stop exploitation of the traders or investors in the country |
| Multiple taxes at check points | -Reduction of check points  
-Establishment of national revenue authority to streamline the collection of revenues |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Problems</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Destruction of oil wells and suspension of construction of refineries in the former Unity and Upper Nile States | -Expediting the operation of the refineries to solve the issue of fuel subsidies and shortages  
-Establishment of oil fields protection brigade |
| Reduction of oil prices in the international markets                           | -Embarking on massive economic diversification |
| Import dependency                                                              |                                                                                  |
| High inflation/devaluation of South Sudan’s currency                           | -Control of exchange rates  
-Establishment of appropriate fiscal/monetary policies |
| Competition between multinational companies over the resources of South Sudan (Who to control oil industry in the country) | -Creation of agricultural schemes in the country  
-Introduction of agricultural revitalization programs, e.g. Restarting previous plantation schemes, and opening of new plantations  
-Prioritization of commercial farming  
-Strengthening of agricultural education within schools and universities  
-Establishment and consolidation of agriculture specific institutions of learning, e.g., the Yei Crop Training Institute |
| Lack of clear economic policies in the country leading to poor banking governance | -Establishment of appropriate fiscal/monetary policies  
-Strict application of laws governing malpractices such as money laundering  
-Consolidation of the tax laws and associated penalties |
| Money laundering                                                               |                                                                                  |
| Mismanagement of resources and embezzlement of public funds                   | -Strict application of laws governing malpractices such as embezzlement  
-Capacity building for existing personnel and recruitment of new skilled manpower to ensure proper management of resources |
| Lack of diversification in the production sectors, and overdependence on oil | -Embarking on massive economic diversification  
-Introduction of capacity building and poverty reduction programs across the country  
-Maximizing the use of microfinance institutions to fuel economic growth |
| Inadequate exploitation of other natural resources                            | -Provision of security in the country to create conducive environment for mineral explorations  
-Engaging multinational companies to participate in the exploitation of natural resources |

**14.2.4 Social Cultural Causes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Problems</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

201
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Land issues/disputes over grazing and water resources                | - Introduction of land reforms  
- Disarmament of the civil population                                   |
| Culture of cattle raiding and child abduction or human trafficking   | - Promotion of inter-communal dialogue and cooperation  
- Application of laws to punish culprits                                |
| Lack of adequate social services                                     | - Provision of social services to the people                               |
| Cultural differences among South Sudanese based on imported foreign  | - Promotion of cultural exchanges  
- Sensitization and civic education on accepting cultural diversity as a blessing |
| influences/cultural norms                                            |                                                                           |
| Weakened traditional values and institutions                         | - Strengthening traditional institutional leadership and sound customary laws |

**14.3 The Way Forward**

**14.3.1 Way Forward on Governance/Political**
1. Permanent constitution  
2. Clear vision  
3. Effective governance  
4. Transparency & accountability  
5. Rule of law  
6. Effective political systems  
7. Eradication of harmful practices  
8. Diplomacy  
9. Professional civil sector

**14.3.2 Way Forward on Economy**
1. Effective/efficient economic policies  
2. Revitalization of old projects and initiation of new ones  
3. Exploration of natural resources  
4. Transparency and accountability
5. Maximization of non-oil revenue collection
6. Clear fiscal/monetary policies evaluation
7. Evaluation and reassessment of Central Bank
8. Discouraging black market
9. Intensification of agricultural production

14.3.3 Way Forward on Security
1. Transformation of the security sector
2. Legislation of pension bills
3. Development of counter-insurgency strategy
4. Accountability
5. Tough measures against ghost names
6. Tough measures against corruption
7. Accuracy of the parades
8. Formulate tough measures for integration
9. Recruitment and enlistment based on regional representation (percentage model)
10. No incentive for rebellion
11. Respects of the rules of law and rules of engagement
12. Respect for human rights and tough measures on crimes against humanity
13. Participation in economic growth and development

14.3.4 Way Forward on Social Cohesion
1. Strengthened societies
2. Equality
3. Promotion of cultural diversity
4. Unity
5. Nationalism
6. Peaceful co-existence and harmony

14.3.5 Enemies of South Sudan

1. Human Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example/Explanation</th>
<th>Way Forward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any person or human being who takes a negative stance towards the interest and progress of South Sudan</td>
<td>-Design/devise policies and strategies on how to deal with people with sinister motives towards the interests and progress of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Situational Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example/Explanation</th>
<th>Way Forward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Any situation that is natural or manmade, which induces a negative influence towards the interests and progress of South Sudan eg. War and natural calamities - Design/devise policies and strategies on how to deal with natural or man-made situations which induce a negative influence towards the interests and progress of South Sudan - Emergency preparedness and management

### 3. Internal Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example/Explanation</th>
<th>Way Forward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Power struggle among South Sudanese politicians and elites | - Good governance  
- Check and balances  
- Democratic participation  
- Clear vision  
- Respect for human rights and fundamental liberties |
| Ethnocentrism, tribalism, nepotism and corruption | - Design/devise a strategy on how to eradicate malpractices  
- Sensitization on diversity and multiculturalism |
| Underdevelopment: poverty, illiteracy and poor health | - Provision of quality health services, education for all and economic strategies that can eradicate abject poverty |
| Lack of application of rule of laws | - Commitment and application of the rule of law |
| Environmental degradation and pollution | - Designing and implementing environmentally sustainable plans and activities |
Harmful traditional/cultural practices | -Discouraging harmful traditional and cultural practices, while creating a fusion of sound ones by means of copying and imitating them

4. External Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example/Explanation</th>
<th>Way Forward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Any negative/harmful foreign policy directed against South Sudan as an extension of another country’s domestic policies and interest | -Development and deployment of sound domestic policy as a basis for South Sudan’s external relations  
-Preference of constructive engagement over confrontation with external actors |

5. Poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example/Explanation</th>
<th>Way Forward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Poverty anywhere within the country is an enemy to South Sudan

- Effective policies and strategies to mitigate poverty
- Enhancement of agricultural schemes
- Encouragement of small business enterprises
- Capacity building in entrepreneurship
- Establishment of vocational training schools/centers to enable the youth to acquire skills for the labor markets
- Introduction of microfinance institutions/initiatives to provide capital for starting businesses
- Encouragement of foreign investment in critical sectors of the economy
- Systemic empowerment and encouragement of domestic investors
- Provision of social welfare to help the poor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. Tribalism/Ethnocentrism</th>
<th>Example/Explanation</th>
<th>Way Forward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Tribalism/ethnocentrism in all sectors, sections and spheres of South Sudanese society – be it in the public or private sector, and regardless of whomsoever commits or does it – it is an enemy to South Sudan (Although tribalism has been previously stated as a component of internal enemy, it deserves to stand here alone)

- Engage in civic education to promote nationalism
- Criminalize unsound generalization when expressing self
- Penalize hate-speech mongers by law
- Conceive and promote nationwide sensitization and indoctrination programs
- Engage the media (mainstream and social) in tackling ethnocentrism
- Promote peaceful coexistence and unity among South Sudanese communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Illiteracy</th>
<th>Way Forward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example/Explanation</td>
<td>Formulation of policy to make education mandatory for all school age children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy and associated negative social behaviors, whether amongst women or men; girls or boys, are an enemy to South Sudan</td>
<td>- Promotion of alternative education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Promotion of girl-child education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Criminalize unsound traditional/cultural practices that hinder children’s education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Penalize child-marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Engage the media (mainstream and social) to assist in civic education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Diseases</th>
<th>Way Forward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example/Explanation</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), STIs, Malaria, Typhoid, Ebola, Cholera, Measles, Meningitis, Hepatitis A, B and C etc.**

- Conceive and promote nationwide campaigns against STIs, HIV/AIDS and other communicable and contagious diseases
- Immunization
- Sensitization and indoctrination program
- Engage the media (mainstream and social) in tackling disease menace

### 9. International Terrorism and Cross Border Crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example/Explanation</th>
<th>Way Forward</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example/Explanation</td>
<td>Way Forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- LRA and others</td>
<td>- Development and implementation of sound domestic policy as a basis for external relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Importation of firearms and other prohibited items</td>
<td>- Development and implementation of National Security Policy and Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strengthening foreign policy through an improved international cooperation</td>
<td>- Development and implementation of defense policy, military and other security strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Building a strong military and security machinery</td>
<td>- Punishment on those caught importing illegal firearms and other prohibited items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 10. Rampant Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example/Explanation</th>
<th>Way Forward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Embezzlement</td>
<td>- Checks and balances on the system of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Looting</td>
<td>- Strict application of law on corrupt officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Confiscation of public property</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dubious practices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Accepting bribes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
XV. Summary of the Report of National Capital Subcommittee

Members of the National Capital (or Headquarters) Subcommittee are shown in Table 15.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Name in full</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hon. Jasmine Samuel Adakayi</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Hon. John Marik Makur</td>
<td>D/Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Hon. Lily Albino Akol</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Prof. Paul L. Berang</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Hon. Paul Mayom Akec</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Hon. Manira Abdella wabah</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Hon. Michael Mario</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Dr. Albino Bol</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Administration and Documentation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Miss Ayen Tobby Maduot</td>
<td>Head of Documentation unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Miss. Monica Akwoc</td>
<td>D/Head of Documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Mrs. Jennifer Bangbe</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Mrs. Achol Dongrin</td>
<td>Finance officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Miss. Achok Wol</td>
<td>Logistics officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Media officials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Mr. Gore Alex</td>
<td>Reporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Mr. Deng Tut</td>
<td>Video Recorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Mr. Abate Simon</td>
<td>Recorder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15.1 Activities of the Subcommittee

The Headquarters Subcommittee report entails the summary of the consultations with identified stakeholders in the capitol, Juba. The committee was mandated to identify stakeholders, consult with them, facilitate the selection of delegates among stakeholders to participate in the National Dialogue Committee (NDC), and to compile and forward their views to the National Dialogue Steering Committee (NDSC) to form part of the forthcoming NDC agenda to be conducted in Juba after the regional conferences. In the initial plan of the Headquarters Subcommittee, 20 stakeholders were identified to be consulted during the consultation process. After all the arrangements for consultations were made to fully implement the plan, NDSC leadership advised the NDC to refrain from consulting the Presidency and the Cabinet because, according to them, it was less important since they own the initiative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/no.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stakeholders/Participants</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2.</td>
<td>10 October 2017 and 19 October 2017</td>
<td>Women’s Organizations</td>
<td>Freedom Hall</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>22 November 2017</td>
<td>Transitional National Legislature (TNL) Leadership</td>
<td>TNL premises</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15.2 Summary of Issues and Recommendations
During the consultations, the committee (facilitators) asked stakeholders the following questions:

- As South Sudanese citizens, what do you think are the root causes of the current conflict in the country? What are the issues involved?
- In your own perspective, how do you think the conflict can be put to an end?
- Are the root causes of the conflict political, security, governance, economic or social in nature?
- How do you think we can reduce the current ethnic tensions, classes, urban /rural differences and the current decline of living standards?
The stakeholders (participants) responded by expressing their views freely to the Committee for documentation. The collected opinions were then organized, summarized and compiled into a report, which is currently being tabled before the Steering Committee for deliberation and adoption. The issues stakeholders raised and the recommendations they provided were organized and summarized on a priority basis under political, governance, security, economic, education, social/ humanitarian and public service/ human resource (see Table15.3).
Table 15.3: Issues and Recommendations

1. POLITICAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES RAISED</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Power struggle in the ruling SPLM party led to 2013 and 2016 conflicts</td>
<td>1. Re-unify SPLM factions (ARUSHA Agreement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Let those who rebelled form their own political parties; people should not be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>forced to come back to SPLM after they have already decided to abandon the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Address the issue of the peaceful transfer of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The scramble for political power right after the 2011 independence referendum</td>
<td>4. South Sudanese should draw a new political map that will transform the country into a viable state for us and for generations to come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. SPLM as a party is synonymous with SPLA (militarization of the system), which weakens democratic system operations in the country</td>
<td>5. Reform SPLA and transform it to be a conventional national army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Weak political party structures have affected democratic functioning in the country and the unity of its people</td>
<td>6. Implement the Political Parties Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The is a lack of separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government</td>
<td>7. Separate powers between three branches of government to ensure good governance in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lack of nationalism</td>
<td>8. Maintain continuous dialogue and awareness raising among the South Sudanese people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Failure to develop South Sudan identity after 2011 independence</td>
<td>9. Develop South Sudan identity to suit its diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The president and state leaders mostly do not honor the country’s constitution and laws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Leaders lack political will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Foster the political will to save the country from tearing itself apart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Lack of nation’s ideology and vision to govern the country after 2011 independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>The loss of national visionary hero late Dr. John Garang undermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>A culture of greed, selfishness and ignorance of political leaders set the country to current suffering and mass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>The elected government (executive and assembly) neglects electorates and constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Elected legislators and executives should engage in confidence building between them and the electorate through visits and service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Elected legislators and governors are mostly appointed and relieved by decrees</td>
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<td>The culture of militia in the country is a public concern</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Rebellions are always rewarded</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Leaders term to rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Juba as a capital of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Ineffective commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Inherited system of governance (10 states) from Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>The ‘Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan’ gives power only to certain regional groups who took up arms and ignores others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Land ownership and distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Removal of Dr. Riak Machar from the post of Vice president and SPLM D/Chairperson is a cause of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Large tribes marginalize small tribes in government (Anyuak and Western Bahr El Ghazal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>The Jieng Council of elders is an issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Corruption and nepotism by political leaders favours their personal interests and tribesmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>The current decentralized system of governance (32 states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>The Constitution should guide leaders’ term limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Relocate the capital to Ramchiel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Strengthen the laws that establish commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>South Sudan should review the inherited system of governance from Sudan and should establish a system that favours its diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Review land policies and laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Encourage dialogue among the two leaders (Kiir and Dr. Riak) in order to work for peace and unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Address the need for separate states for the Anyuak and Western Bahr El Ghazal communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Establish an integrated South Sudan Elders forum</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Reunification of SPLM factions (Arusha Agreement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>People rebelled upon removal from political post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Some governors are a cause of conflict in their respective states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Issuance of the national identity to foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Employment of political leaders in their places of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Lack of awareness and dissemination of the state constitution and enacted laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Lack of representation of persons with Disabilities at all levels of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Lack of representation of Muslims in the government at all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>Lack of incorporation of Islamic laws in the nation’s Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Lack of implementation of laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>Tribal-based promotions of officials in the government institutions/SPLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Employment of foreigners in government</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Review policy for issuing national identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Appoint and deploy political leaders out of their regions to ensure unity and integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Government to allow freedom of expression and speech in order to ensure public participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>The government should adopt affirmative action policies to ensure representation of people with disabilities at all levels of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Muslims should be given enough representation in the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Amend constitution to include Islamic laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Appointments and promotions should be based on merit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Government should avoid employment of foreigners in the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutions</td>
<td>sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>45. People have forgotten what we fought for and assume the worth of enemy</td>
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<tr>
<td>46. Political domination by a few individuals who feel indispensable and entitled who, once removed from political posts, pick up arms against the system.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Some intellectuals send wrong messages to the public to serve their own interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Lack of foreign policy in the country</td>
<td>34. Government should formulate strong domestic and foreign policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. UNMISS uses destructive policies against women and children in Protection of Civilians (PoCs)</td>
<td>35. UNMISS should stick to its mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Politicians apply divisive policies in PoCs</td>
<td>36. Politicians should promote peace and dialogue in PoCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Appointments and relief of states’ governors by presidential decrees is not done on the will of people</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>52. The SPLM-led government appoints constitutional post-holders without qualifications</td>
<td>37. The appointment of constitutional post-holders should be based on merit</td>
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<tr>
<td>53. Tribal politics in Malakal are destructive</td>
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**2. GOVERNANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES RAISED</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
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<p>| | |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Governance System (32 states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Introduce good system using the SPLM Manifesto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Study and design a system that accommodates the diversity of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Return to three former regional government using ratios (i.e. four for Bahr El Ghazal; three for Greater Equatoria; and three for Upper Nile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Back to 10 States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Federal system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Centralized the system of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Parliament is not independent (it is controlled by the executive and the SPLM party)/ or is unable to exercise its oversight function over the executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Parliament should be independent from the executive branch of government in order to exercise oversight functions over the executive and to ensure good governance in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Weak government institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Establish strong institutions that satisfactory serve stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Weak judicial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Need for judiciary reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>A lack of a code of ethics leads to politicians not being held accountable when they fail to deliver their promises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The entire system of governance is based on tribalism and nepotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Fight tribalism through education, orientation, awareness and dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Unquenchable (scramble) desire for higher offices by all costs or means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Failure of leadership to establish viable political and military systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Reform and transform the system of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Corruption with impunity, nepotism and tribalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Promote good governance to ensure transparency and accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Lack of equality and equitable distribution of wealth</td>
</tr>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Apply equity and equality in resource distribution</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Issue</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Failure to establish a viable democratic government</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The current constitution lacks inclusivity</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>The president and state governors violate the constitution by relieving and appointing constitutional post-holders through decrees</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Employment of foreigners in government institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Misconception of governance, as many see the government as synonymous with Dinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Dual nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>The President makes poor decisions as a result of ill advice from his advisers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>The rule of law is constantly undermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Weak import and export control policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Non-implementation of the pension scheme policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Poor governance</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Removal of elected governors and lawmakers by decrees</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Kokora legacy still impacts and affects the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>State governors’ and commissioners’ term limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Appointment of governors without qualifications</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Excessive powers of the president (e.g. relief and appointment by decree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>The government has neglected infrastructural development</td>
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<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Concentration more power in the centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Lack of accountability and transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Parliamentarians without merits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Non-implementation of land policy</td>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>Islamic laws</td>
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<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Employment of people in their respective areas of origin</td>
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<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Leadership dominated by one ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Absence of dialogue among the tribes of South Sudan (Anyuak, Dinka, Murle, Nuer, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Diverse community elders’ opinions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Limit governors and commissioners to two terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Set the criteria for appointing governors</td>
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<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Constitutional review to balance the powers of the president in the permanent constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Develop infrastructure policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>South Sudan should adopt a decentralized system of government</td>
</tr>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>Good governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Review election laws to set proper criteria and qualifications for the election of parliamentarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Land policy to be reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Incorporate Islamic laws into the constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Rational deployment of civil servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Promote dialogue between all tribes of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Form a South Sudan Elders forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Land grabbing</td>
<td>41. Set proper land policies</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Weak institutions that cannot uphold law and order</td>
<td>42. Overhaul and reform government institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. The culture of violence</td>
<td>43. Civilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. The absence of reform and rehabilitation policies for the prison service</td>
<td>44. Formulate reformatory and rehabilitation policies for the prison service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Many generals in military service have different backgrounds (e.g. militias, citizens, military etc.)</td>
<td>45. Transform the military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. The award of contracts by government institutions</td>
<td>46. Provide contract opportunities to South Sudanese companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. The unjust treatment of local nationals in favour of foreign nationalities (law enforcement agencies)</td>
<td>47. Provide justice and equality for all without exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Police service officials; involvement in bad practices (e.g. prostitutions in Suk El Jabel)</td>
<td>48. Hold corrupt officials accountable to the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Wildlife offices stationed in towns</td>
<td>49. Establish wildlife camps in pacts to attract tourism and generate hard currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Political appointment of the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan (BOSS) undermined the Bank’s independence as a professional institution</td>
<td>50. State leadership should allow independency of the Bank; or 51. The appointment of a governor of the central bank should not be a political decision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. SECURITY

#### ISSUES RAISED

1. Conflict between the President and former Vice President Dr. Riak Machar, 2013 and 2016

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Encourage dialogue between the two leaders to reconcile and bring peace; or  
2. The two leaders should unite and work for peace
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Rampant killing of citizens by security officials and criminals</th>
<th>3. Strengthen the rule of law</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Unknown gunmen</td>
<td>4. Apply the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The raping of women and men</td>
<td>5. Human rights and rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The proliferation of small arms in the hands of civilians, militias and veterans</td>
<td>6. Pursue comprehensive disarmament of civilians, militias and veterans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The return of fighters from the war with a bush mindset of killing and raping</td>
<td>7. President Kiir and Dr. Riak and other armed factions should disarm their forces and support peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Promotion of cattle raiding and the destruction of crops and properties by cattle</td>
<td>9. Need for healing and reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The issuance of decrees by the president</td>
<td>10. Constitution and rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The ongoing conflict increased the number of disabilities in the country</td>
<td>13. Stop war and promote a sustainable peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. The targeted killing of Dinka travellers (Yei, Juba-Nimule, Terkaka roads)</td>
<td>14. Strengthen the security sector to maintain law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Continuous integration of the militia into the army</td>
<td>15. Promote respect for human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. The prevalence of military and other organized forces uniform everywhere</td>
<td>16. Transform SPLA into a national, conventional army that is representative of all tribes of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Orientation of forces</td>
<td>18. Non-integration of militias into the army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. The National Army is unprofessional and unfriendly to the citizens</td>
<td>19. Implement SPLA and others laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Soldiers wives encourage their husbands to loot others’ properties</td>
<td>20. Wives should discourage their husbands from committing crimes</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. National Security and the Criminal Investigation Department have become part of insecurity</td>
<td>21. Hold Criminal Investigation Department and national security officials to discipline and account in accordance with the National Security Act or other laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Women road users are harassed and subjected to search by security men</td>
<td>22. Security officials should respect women road users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Searches of women should be conducted by security women</td>
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### 4. ECONOMIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES RAISED</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The economic crisis</td>
<td>1. Need for economic reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The lack of initial economic assessment since the formation of interim government in 2005 and after independence in 2011</td>
<td>2. Diversify the country’s economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Single source of revenue (oil)</td>
<td>3. Formulate proper economic policies (involve economists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Poor economic policies</td>
<td>4. Institutional and economic reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Oil shutdown, 2012</td>
<td>5. Review monetary policies with involvement of economists and scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Poor monetary policies (SSP devaluation and floating rate for the dollar)</td>
<td>6. Formulate investment policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The lack of investment policies</td>
<td>7. Need for economic identity for South Sudan economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Economic identity (capitalist, socialist and Islamic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>The lack of wealth-sharing between the centre and states (81 percent of budget allocations remain in the centre annually)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Lack of inclusivity in the annual budget in the country (United Nations and non-governmental organization budgets are exclusive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Huge budget allocations to the presidency and to national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Lack of transparency and accountability in revenue collection and expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Foreign commercial banks are not participating in development (i.e. siphoning of hard currency out of the country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Foreign commercial banks are not participating in development (i.e. siphoning of hard currency out of the country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Oil prices have fallen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>The public has lost trust in the banking system (citizens don’t deposit their money in banks due to a culture of no money in banks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>The government borrows from the BOSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>There is high public demand for USD (leads to lack of social services such as education, health services etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>States’ budget preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Rampant distribution of hard currency at ports of entry by the</td>
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<tr>
<td>authorities (airport, Nimule and kaya)</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. Letters of credit issuance (cash transactions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. BOSS to stop letters of credit cash transactions and apply the banking system</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. UN and NGO annual budget declarations do not deposit their money into the bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>o No accessibility to hard currency</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Fuels the black market with dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>o The Bank does not get taxes from their money</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Encourages vendors transactions</td>
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<tr>
<td>o BOSS does not receive interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. UN and NGOs should declare their budgets to the government and deposit their money with BOSS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Political appointment of the Governor of BOSS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Need for Bank autonomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES RAISED</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High rate of illiteracy</td>
<td>1. Government should invest in free education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Inadequate government budget allocations to the education sector</td>
<td>2. Allocate sufficient budget to education sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The absence of school facilities and the lack of qualified teachers in most parts of the country</td>
<td>3. Develop infrastructure to ensure accessibility of schools</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Maintain the rule of law to create a conducive environment to educate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5. Citizens should invest in education (private school) to open education opportunities to their children</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. Implement free education policies (free education for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Scholarship management (corrupt practices in scholarship allocations)</td>
<td>9. The Ministry of Higher Education should fairly and transparently distribute scholarships</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The lack of freedom of expression in higher institutions of learning</td>
<td>10. Intellectual discourse and creativity should be allowed to thrive in universities in order to produce future thinkers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. University independence</td>
<td>11. Stop government interference in the autonomy of universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Curriculum</td>
<td>12. Develop a national education curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Include Islamic education in the national education curriculum</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Arabic and local languages should be included in the national education curriculum</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Include brail and deaf teaching methodologies in the South Sudan education curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Poor standard of education (parents are taking children abroad)</td>
<td>16. Establish education standards in the country for public and private schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Teachers conditions</td>
<td>17. The government should improve teachers conditions (environment)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6. PUBLIC SERVICE/ HUMAN RESOURCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES RAISED</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Public service (low institutional capacities and lack of clear public</td>
<td>1. Reform the public service</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong> Pensions</td>
<td>2. Implement Pension policies to cater for pensioners/ old age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.</strong> Employment (education standards are not considered)</td>
<td>3. Employ according to academic qualifications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **4.** Youth employment | 4. Youth should not look to white collars jobs only  
5. Create self-employment programmes and promote industrial employment |
| **5.** Arabic pattern graduates employment | 6. Employ Arabic pattern graduates in public and private sectors  
7. The Arabic language should be a medium of communication in government institutions |
| **6.** Employment for people with disabilities | 8. Employ people with disabilities in the public and private sectors according to their merits |
| **7.** Promotion in all sectors (public and private) | 9. Public service regulations should be followed |
| **8.** Public services are abused by accommodating, unqualified people (corruption, nepotism and favouritism) by ministers and senior government officials | 10. Appointments and promotions should be based on qualification or merit |
| **9.** Salary structures | 11. Review salary structures to improve workers conditions |
| **10.** Foreigners employed in government institutions | 12. Review and implement public service laws |
| **11.** A Lack of qualified or experienced people, mostly dealing with foreign matters | 13. The government should allow local experts to deal with negotiations on foreign issues |
| **12.** Labour laws | 14. Parliament should enact labour laws |
## 7. SOCIAL / HUMANITARIAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES RAISED</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Communities are traumatized</td>
<td>1. Establish reconciliation and healing centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tribalism, nepotism, hatred and hate speeches</td>
<td>2. Promote the acceptance of our diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conflict between the two leaders causes a high influx of refugees</td>
<td>3. Develop a common identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The destruction of crops by cattle within farming areas</td>
<td>4. Promote dialogue among communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Service delivery</td>
<td>5. Promote dialogue between the two leaders to work for unity and peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Land grabbing in Juba (by communities and individuals)</td>
<td>6. Voluntarily or forcefully return cattle to their original areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Three tribes (Dinka, Nuer and Zande) have caused violent in juba</td>
<td>7. The government should regulate cattle movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Inaccessible government buildings by person with disabilities</td>
<td>8. Need for good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The lack of employment opportunities to persons with disabilities in</td>
<td>9. Government should prioritize social service delivery to citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government institutions and the private sector</td>
<td>10. Equitable power sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Loss of culture and folklore</td>
<td>11. Review land policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Camps tribal living (PoCs)</td>
<td>12. Make equitable land distributions and application of laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The lack of employment opportunities to persons with disabilities in</td>
<td>13. Apply the Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government institutions and the private sector</td>
<td>14. Formulate policies that protect the rights of persons with disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Promote awareness of disability issues</td>
<td>15. Develop infrastructure to ease people with disabilities’ access to government facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Apply affirmative action as a policy to favour persons with disabilities</td>
<td>16. Promote awareness of disability issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Develop a national museum to reflect our cultural heritages</td>
<td>17. Promote awareness of disability issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Develop a national museum to reflect our cultural heritages</td>
<td>18. Develop a national museum to reflect our cultural heritages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Sensitize community to life in peace and unity (PoCs)</td>
<td>19. Sensitize community to life in peace and unity (PoCs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Communal violence</td>
<td>20. Apply the Rule of Law and disarm the civil population</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Mixed politics, religion and witchcraft</td>
<td>22. Separate politics from religion and witchcraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Government houses occupied and owned by retired constitutional post-holders</td>
<td>23. Occupation of government houses should be according to law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Muslims properties</td>
<td>24. Muslims properties should be restored to the rightful owners according to the presidential order, 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15.3 Issues to be addressed in the short-term

During consultations the Subcommittee managed to observe stakeholders’ views on short-term issues that are meant for the leadership of the country to immediately act upon before NDF/NDC. These views include:

1. Appointment of the Governor of Bank of South Sudan (BOSS) should be based on the internal bank system and the law.
2. The government should stop borrowing money from BOSS.
3. Letters of credit should be paper transactions rather than cash transactions as being practice by the government (Ministry of Commerce, bank management and companies); the practice should be according to international banking practise.
4. Employment of foreign nationals in government institutions is a public concern that needs urgent attention from the government (application of national labour laws).
5. The agriculture bank should be financially empowered to boss national economy through agricultural sector.
6. The pension scheme policy should be implemented to cater to pensioners and the elderly in the country.
7. The government should establish multipurpose vocational training institutions to develop youth capacities to enhance self-employment opportunities.
8. The leadership of the country should develop criteria for appointing constitutional post-holders after having assessed their qualifications.
9. The President and governors are advised not to relieve elected officials by decrees, but instead according to the law.
10. The Murle community is advised to stop exercising child abduction practices.
11. The government should regulate the movement of armed cattle keepers and their cattle to avoid destruction of farmers’ crops.
12. Land grabbing must be stopped and the government should provide a mechanism for land allocation to non-residents of Juba.
13. It is observed that the Presidential guards hailed from one ethnicity and are too big for a young country.
14. The Western Bahr el Ghazal community demanded a state of their own.
15. The government should strictly allow its removed constitutional post-holders to occupy government houses in accordance with the law.
16. Muslims’ properties that were wrongly occupied or owned by some individuals should be restored as per presidential order, 2014.
17. The Anyuak community demanded the establishment of a state of their own due to the tribal dominance of larger tribes in Boma state.
18. The government is advised to conduct a comprehensive disarmament of armed civilians and veterans.
19. Residents of Mangatain demanded the provision of basic services such as water and school for their children who are badly affected by the ongoing conflict in the country.
20. Arabic language and Islamic education should be incorporated into the national education curriculum.
21. Islamic laws should be included in forthcoming constitutional review processes.
22. Representation of persons with disabilities in the current peace process is important.
23. Political parties demanded more representation in the National Dialogue (ND).
24. The government should include UN Agencies and NGOs budgets in the national budget.
25. The Chillu community demanded that their land be restored back to them.
26. The stakeholders consulted raised concerns on the current economic hardships to be urgently addressed by the government.
27. Stakeholders are very concerned with who is to implement the outcomes of the NDC.

15.4 Committee Recommendations:
1. The Headquarters Subcommittee recommends to the NDSC and the leadership of the country the immediate implementation of the stakeholders’ short-term recommendations.
2. The Headquarters Subcommittee is proposing to the NDSC plenary that it approve a two-day preparatory meeting with 200 selected delegates from the 18 consulted stakeholders to draw up a common agenda to the upcoming NDC.